Author
Acts of violence by non-state actors prompt questions of motive and their institutional classification. As such occurrences become public, they turn into matters of societal concern, taken up by the media and political actors. On the one hand, the classification of motives is often shaped by political worldviews, group identities, and prevailing narratives. Ideological motives tend to be more contested when concerning White offenders (Kauff, 2024; Kunst et al., 2018). Cases involving minoritized offenders often provide support for repercussions that extend beyond the individual to people who are perceived to share identity features, such as demands for changing migration policies (Matthes et al., 2019). This illustrates the blurred line between objective assessment and subjective attribution, raising critical questions about how politically motivated harm is perceived and responded to. Against this backdrop, the rigidity and opaque operationalization of institutional classification systems employed by states and security agencies become particularly problematic. These limitations highlight the need for more adaptable frameworks, greater involvement of independent bodies, and systematic consideration of the experiences of affected individuals and communities.
Interpreting Motives: Between Ideology and Pathology
Recognizing political violence is not merely an administrative task. It is a reflection of how societies define justice, threat, and belonging. A key challenge lies in distinguishing ideological from non-ideological motivations. Political interpretations of acts of violence are often influenced by the perceived identity of the perpetrator. Research shows that when perpetrators are minoritized, ideological explanations like terrorism tend to be applied more readily. In contrast, White perpetrators are more likely to be framed as suffering from psychological distress or individual deviance (Kunst et al., 2018).
This framing influences not only media narratives but also judicial outcomes and public perception. The case of Anders Behring Breivik in Norway remains a prominent example: even after publishing a manifesto detailing his ideological motives, public debate focused heavily on whether he acted from ideological conviction or psychological disturbance (ibid.). Reports from the German Federal Criminal Office also discuss terrorism almost exclusively in the context of Islamist extremism, despite mounting evidence of far-right and conspiracy-motivated attacks (Bundesministerium des Innern & Bundeskriminalamt, 2025).
The implications of such framing are significant. Cases involving minoritized perpetrators are more commonly linked to broader collective blame, affecting not only the perpetrators but also entire communities associated with them (Kauff, 2024; Noor et al., 2019). Implications range from supporting citizenship withdrawal to stricter immigration policies. Similar acts committed by non-minoritized individuals, on the other hand, are often treated as isolated cases. These asymmetries ultimately play a role in how violence is understood and addressed (Kauff, 2024; Matthes et al., 2019).
Categorizing and Targeting Political Motives
In the European context, both definitions of political violence and the institutional processes governing classification vary. In some countries, like Norway, independent researchers play a role in providing typologies and frameworks of political motives, whereas in others, such decisions lie primarily with police authorities. The criteria used to distinguish between hate crimes, politically motivated violence, and terrorism differ widely. For instance, in the UK, hate crimes are treated separately from terrorism (Home Office United Kingdom, 2024), while in Germany, the annual report on politically motivated crime includes both categories. Under a unified typology of politically motivated crime, hate crime incidents and ideological motivations are reported (Bundesministerium des Innern & Bundeskriminalamt, 2025). These differences make cross-country comparisons difficult and contribute to confusion around overall trends.
Although many countries have revised their classification procedures in recent years, their application remains largely fragmented, opaque, and susceptible to bias. In Germany, for instance, the gap between state-reported data and documentation by civil society organizations has long been a point of contention. While government sources report a growing number of right-wing crimes, they still significantly undercount incidents, particularly when it comes to far-right, racist, and antisemitic violence (Kleffner, 2018). This discrepancy highlights the difficulty of recognizing political violence especially with new hybrid ideologies emerging. Thus, classification systems and procedures need to become more transparent, operationalized with clear criteria, yet adaptable to new forms of violence. Besides, they should be anchored in victims’ perspectives and informed by independent actors to increase the reliability of assessments.
Finally, targeting violence cannot rely on prosecution alone but requires the sustained involvement of civil society actors. While state responses stress prosecution and security (Sivenbring & Andersson Malmros, 2019), civil society plays a significant role not only by working with offenders but also with those affected by political violence. Although a rise in incidents may suggest a deficiency of prevention, the link is more complex (Greuel & Milbradt, 2024). Political violence is also shaped by broader sociopolitical dynamics and events. Moreover, increasing surveillance and punitive measures may have counterproductive effects, potentially escalating rather than preventing future acts of violence (Schädler & Schwarz, 2025). Thus, the role of civil society actors and their relational approach play a crucial role in preventing extremist offenses.
Conclusion
Acts of political violence challenge not only public safety but also the ways institutions interpret, categorize, and respond to harm. Existing classification systems often struggle to account for the complexity of motivations and the broader societal implications of such acts. To avoid reproducing stereotypes or overlooking certain forms of violence, it is essential to develop frameworks that are transparent, revisable, and grounded in the lived experiences of those affected. Beyond classification, institutional responses to politically motivated crime must avoid reinforcing the very dynamics that give rise to political violence. Like stereotypes, excessive surveillance and collective punitive measures can fuel resentment and increase the risk of radicalization. Addressing political violence, therefore, requires not only effective legal responses but also the sustained involvement of civil society actors, whose work is vital to prevention and disengagement.
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