Author: Marzena Oliveira Ribas

Research covering the role of religion in the right-wing populist discourse often adopts the frame of “instrumentalization”, hijacking, exploitation, or even weaponization to explain the strategic use of religion for political gain (Giorgi, 2022). For instance, Samaras (2025) analyses and compares how three far-right Greek parties – Greek Solution, Victory, and Voice of Reason – draw on religious narratives to advance exclusionary politics between 2019 and 2024. He goes on to claim weaponization of Greek Orthodox Christianity by the far-right parties to adopt nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-progressive ideologies, often framed as resistance to so-called “woke” movements (Cammaerts, 2022). 

In 2016, a book called: Saving the people: how populists hijack religion (Marzouki et al.) analyzed mobilization of religion by the right-wing populists in 8 different countries: United States, Britain, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Poland and Israel. The authors concluded that for populists and their supporters, religion is not as much about belief as it is about belonging. But what if some of them see themselves as true believers—and reject this interpretation? 

This question has been taken up by scholars like Alberta Giorgi (2022), who examined how Salvini’s supporters themselves understand their religious identity. She challenged the common view that radical-right populist parties “instrumentalize” religion. She looked closely at what supporters of Matteo Salvini had to say—and found that they strongly reclaimed the legitimacy of their Christian identity. They openly opposed the “religion of the elites,” criticized the Catholic Church’s hierarchy, and promoted a form of “people’s religion” instead.

As Giorgi points out, this reclaiming of religion—positioned against traditional religious authorities and institutions—combined with an emphasis on the cultural side of Christianity, reflects a broader transformation in how religion functions today. In post-secular societies, both religion and politics have undergone processes of de-institutionalization and disintermediation. This means people are moving away from relying on established religious leaders and institutions and gaining more direct control over how they interpret and practice their faith.

From this perspective, political leaders aren’t simply “hijacking” religion—because religion is already active outside of traditional institutions. Supporters of radical-right populist parties aren’t just passive victims of political manipulation—they often share the same personal and cultural understanding of religion. In other words, religion isn’t so much “hijacked” as it is freed from institutional constraints and reinterpreted in new ways. 

This insight connects to a wider debate today about who has the right to speak for and about religion. According to Giorgi’s analysis, Salvini’s supporters reject the idea that religion is being politicized or polarized against their interests. Instead, they claim the legitimacy of being religious while voting for a party whose positions don’t always align with those of institutional religious authorities. The key argument is that the Catholic Church and official religious leaders are not the only legitimate representatives of Catholicism or religious faith.

While Giorgi’s analysis restores agency to social actors and challenges simplistic views, the concept of “instrumentalization” remains useful for understanding populist leaders’ strategies and messages. It helps explain how political actors navigate political and discursive opportunities and how discourse functions in the political arena. Moreover, it highlights the contradictions between the policies radical right parties promote and the religious values they often invoke in various ways.

Interestingly, the relationship between right-wing populist parties and Church leaders varies significantly across countries. For example, while Matteo Salvini’s supporters openly criticize “church elites” in Italy and promote a form of popular religion distinct from institutional Catholicism, in Poland influential religious figures like Tadeusz Rydzyk, a powerful priest who runs a business empire centered around the media outlets Radio Maryja and TV Trwam, maintain close ties with the populist Law and Justice (PiS) party. In fact, the party has been accused of “buying” Rydzyk’s support by using public funds to finance political agitation through his media outlets. This contrast shows how the entanglement of religion and populism can take very different forms depending on national and cultural contexts. 

In conclusion, the relationship between right-wing populist politics and religion is complex and multi-layered. Moving beyond the idea of simple “instrumentalization” allows us to better understand how religion functions as a living, evolving part of identity and culture, shaped both by leaders and supporters alike. Recognizing these dynamics—and the variations across different countries—can help us understand the nuanced role religion plays in today’s political landscape.

References

Cammaerts, B. (2022). The abnormalisation of social justice: The ‘anti-woke culture war’discourse in the UK. Discourse & Society,33(6), 730-743. 

Giorgi, A. (2022). Hijack or release? On the heuristic limits of the frame of instrumentalization of religion for discussing the entanglements of populism, religion, and gender. Identities, 29(4), 483-499. 

Marzouki, N., McDonnell, D., & Roy, O. (2016). Saving the people: How populists hijack religion. Hurst. 

Samaras, G. (2025). Weaponising Religion in Greece Post Economic Crisis: An Analysis of Far-Right Political Discourse from 2019 to 2024. Journal of Empirical Theology, 1-28. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1163/15709256-20240018

The appeal of radical groups often lies in creating a strong sense of belonging and a possibility of identification with other group members (Ebner, 2017). Extremist movements often thrive on societal divisions and grievances to promote a narrative of cultural and racial superiority, offering simple solutions to complex issues and cultivating a sense of belonging among their members. Forming interpersonal relationships and being a part of a group are essential aspects of human life. However, it might be harder to experience a sense of belonging for those ostracized by their communities for not fulfilling their roles or for those who are socially marginalized based on their social identities. It can attract these individuals to seek social connection and acceptance elsewhere and a sense of belonging is often emphasized as a pull factor that can drive people to join extremist groups. When journalists ask former extremists how they joined jihadist groups or far-right groups, it usually only takes a few minutes before they mention that they were ‘in search of belonging’ or ‘looking for community’ (Amarasingam, 2024). 

Yet, the community aspects are often implied rather than explicitly analyzed in scientific research. One of the few studies that engage with the literature on ‘sense of community’ is the one conducted by Willem De Koster and Dick Houtman (2008). They found that Dutch right-wing extremists who experienced stigmatization in offline social life regarded the Dutch branch of the international Stormfront forum (the largest right-wing extremist internet forum in the Netherlands) as an ‘online refuge,’ where they could experience a sense of community. The authors point out that part of the value of extremist online communities is that it allows individuals to feel like they are part of a broader ‘embattled’ sub-group whose members are linked transnationally and undergo the same struggle. Additionally, Bowman-Grieve (2009) found that Stormfront members place themselves in vulnerable psychological and emotional positions as they recount how they found the far-right movement, openly discuss struggles in their own lives, and talk about how this online community has provided them with a safe space of support. 

Some researchers suggest that the online space serves as a platform for ‘identity experimentation,’ where individuals can freely express themselves behind the anonymity of a username. This allows them to say things they wouldn’t in public and adopt personas that differ significantly from their real-world identities, essentially putting on an act or wearing a mask that hides their true selves. However, for members of extremist groups, the opposite is often the case. An IS supporter from the United Kingdom, interviewed by Amarasingam (2024), expressed that his online community is equivalent to his ‘whole life’ and that he never felt like he belonged anywhere except within that community. He also said: “Sometimes it’s like the person online is the real you”. For extremists, it is often in their interactions with their families, at school, or at work where they are putting on an act and not being their true selves – sometimes for the simple reason that they do not want to be ostracized or arrested for being a ‘jihadist’ or a ‘neo-Nazi’. But online, they become part of a likeminded collective, a transnational brotherhood and sisterhood that truly understands them.

There is psychological evidence suggesting that the need for belonging is strong enough for individuals to accept the goals of a group as their own, and it seems that organizations such as Islamic State have exploited this mechanism in their propaganda, calling for the union of all Muslims, regardless of race and ethnicity (Khader, 2016). This allows them to appeal to those who do not experience such acceptance in their own communities. Despite that, the importance of community for individuals who are radicalizing in the online space is still relatively understudied (Amarasingam, 2024). While numerous articles mention ‘online community’ or ‘virtual community’ in passing, there are only a handful of studies that truly unpack the concept or explore its significance in the field. Recently, this area of research has begun to receive further attention and is increasingly seen as an important field that needs further investigation. 

Extremism studies should integrate existing research on the sense of community to see if extremist communities are somehow unique. Also, an important research question would be to explore whether extremist communities online are providing individuals with the much-needed sense of belonging that, according to research on modern community trends, is slowly being lost in our everyday life (Amarasingam, 2024; Putnam, 2000). 

Amarasingam, A. (2024). Belonging is just a click away: Extremism, radicalisation, and the role of online communities. In The Routledge Handbook on Radicalisation and Countering Radicalisation (pp. 196-212). Routledge. 

Bowman-Grieve, L. (2009). Exploring “Stormfront”: A virtual community of the radical right. Studies in conflict & terrorism,32(11), 989-1007. 

De Koster, W., & Houtman, D. (2008). ‘STORMFRONT IS LIKE A SECOND HOME TO ME’ On virtual community formation by right-wing extremists. Information, Communication & Society, 11(8), 1155-1176. 

Ebner, J. (2017). The rage: The vicious circle of Islamist and far-right extremism. Bloomsbury Publishing. 

Khader, M. (2016). Combating violent extremism and radicalization in the digital era. IGI Global. 

Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon and Schuster. 

Although narratology as an academic discipline has only recently been invented, people have been interested in how we tell stories for millennia (Plummer, 2012). Stories help us understand and make sense of the world around us. They can be personal but also social, collective, belonging to the group. We need stories in order to live a human life, construct, and reconstruct yesterday and tomorrow. They provide us with coherence and meaning and have the capability to turn chaos into order. They also play an important role universally, becoming road maps and key clues to unraveling cultures. On one hand stories can stimulate empathy, create connecting bonds with others, and develop dialogues, and on the other, they can raise challenges, critique, and provoke change.  

It would not be possible to achieve a long-lasting change in social structures with the sole use of force and coercion, and without the support of ‘true believers’, who share an objective based on a common story (Harari, 2014). Both far-right and Islamist extremists seem to be aware of that and have been using stories to influence the public and make them act according to the principles of their ideological framework. As Julia Ebner wrote in her book (2017) studying extremism without studying stories is like studying the brain without studying neurons. Narratives have the potential to disseminate extreme ideologies. They serve as the connecting element between non-violent and violent forms of extremism and bridge the ideological spaces between far-right and Islamist extremism. The ex-English Defence League (EDL) community manager, which Ebner interviewed for her book said: ‘Radicalizing people was easy; I just had to tell better stories than the Establishment.’ 

 Ebner (2017) identifies five key elements that contribute to the efficacy of their extremist narratives: simplicity, consistency, responsiveness, identification, and inspiration. Firstly, the simplicity of black-and-white narratives can bring comfort by eliminating the complexities and ambiguities of life. Extremists provide clear and simple answers to complex phenomena observed in our global environment (Ebner, 2017). People are often drawn to simple, binary answers for several reasons such as cognitive ease, certainty, and security, as well as emotional appeal. Complex issues can be difficult to understand and deal with. Binary answers offer a sense of cognitive ease because they provide clear solutions without the need for deep thought or analysis (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Kahneman, 2011; Korteling et al., 2023) . Such dichotomy also provides a sense of certainty and security in an uncertain world (Fisher & Keil, 2018). It offers clear guidelines and directions, which can be comforting in times of confusion or chaos. Furthermore, simple answers often appeal to people’s emotions, offering straightforward narratives that resonate with their fears, frustrations, or desires. This emotional connection can make binary solutions more compelling than nuanced, complex ones. Although we attempt to structure our understanding of the world through rational analysis, we often rapidly and instinctively engage in emotional binary framing (Kahneman, 2011). Pejorative, fear-based binary framing of the other is the most protective Darwinist response we can have, which keeps us alert and cautious (Bishop, 2023). Evolutionarily derived fear triggers and the cognitive preference for dichotomy do not need to wait for sophisticated arguments. 

Secondly, compelling stories are characterized by consistency, which is critical not only in maintaining a coherent and uniform narrative over time to build trust and credibility, but also in ensuring that actions align with the narrative to preserve legitimacy (Ebner, 2017). This consistency can sharply contrast with the often-observed inconsistency within established institutions. When mainstream groups fail to maintain narrative consistency or align their actions with their words, it can foster public distrust. In contrast, groups that maintain consistency can leverage these institutional failures, positioning themselves as more trustworthy or genuine alternatives, thereby attracting those disillusioned with the establishment. 

Thirdly, responsiveness refers to the ability to address the grievances and aspirations of the population—issues often neglected by those in power (Ebner, 2017). Extremist narratives often exploit societal dissatisfaction presenting themselves as the solution to perceived injustices and promising radical change. By addressing the concerns of marginalized groups, extremists can gain support and legitimacy, further strengthening their narrative.

Additionally, the appeal of radical groups lies in creating a strong sense of belonging and a possibility of identification with other group members (Ebner, 2017). Homogeneity of the in-group is fostered through common language, customs, and symbols. The narratives often provoke empathy for certain protagonists and hatred for antagonists. For instance, the now archived, Facebook page of the German neo-Nazi terrorist group Oldschool Society, shows pictures of its members hugging each other and celebrating together. 

Lastly, the capacity of extremist narratives to inspire action is critical. The successful stories create a desire to resolve a real or perceived conflict (Burke, 1989). Extremists often build on the narrative of victimhood and imply that solving the threat is only possible by eliminating the other, whether metaphorically or literally. The desired ‘happy end’ may involve the annihilation of a race, religion, or a social class, often expected after the ‘final battle’, the ‘inevitable war’, or the ‘final solution’ (Ebner, 2017). This is demonstrated in an extract from the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine: “We target the crusaders, and we will eradicate and distinguish them, for there are only two camps: the camp of truth and its followers, and the camp of falsehood and its factions” (“A Call to Hijrah,” September 2014). 

References

A Call to Hijrah. (September 2014). Dabiq. 

Bishop, K. R. (2023). American Binary Thinking: Psychological Foundations, Religious Framing, and Media Reinforcement. 

Burke, K. (1989). On symbols and society. University of Chicago Press. 

Ebner, J. (2017). The rage: The vicious circle of Islamist and far-right extremism. Bloomsbury Publishing. 

Fisher, M., & Keil, F. C. (2018). The Binary Bias: A Systematic Distortion in the Integration of Information. Psychological Science, 29(11), 1846-1858. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797618792256

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social Cognition. In: Random House, New York.

Harari, Y. N. (2014). Sapiens: A brief history of humankind. Random House. 

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. macmillan. 

Korteling, J. E., Paradies, G. L., & Sassen-van Meer, J. P. (2023). Cognitive bias and how to improve sustainable decision making. Frontiers in Psychology, 14, 1129835. 

Plummer, K. (2012). A manifesto for stories: Critical Humanist notes for a narrative wisdom. In.