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Problematising the political response to the Oulu attacks 

In June of this year, two attacks took place in the Northern Finnish city of Oulu 6 days apart. The first involved the stabbing of a 12-year-old boy of immigrant background by an adult man with known connections to the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM). The second involved the stabbing of an adult man, also of immigrant background, this time by a 15-year-old boy in what was suspected to be a ‘copycat’ action of the first attack. Both attacks received substantial media coverage within Finland, and several government ministers made statements in response. This blogpost will examine these statements to unearth some of the ways in which ‘right-wing extremism’ is problematised in Finnish political discourse. 

The theoretical basis of this post is what Foucault (1977: 186) called ‘thinking problematically’. To ‘think problematically’ is to problematise a concept – in this case ‘right-wing extremism’ – to demonstrate that it is a construct within political discourse rather than something that exists ‘out there’ as an objective phenomenon that we can discover (Jarvis, 2022). My purpose here is not to ‘deny the reality’ of these attacks nor suggest that they didn’t have concrete, traumatic impacts on their victims and emotional impacts on many people of colour living in Finland – including myself. My purpose is rather to demonstrate that how we think about things, and thus respond to them, is never inevitable, and in doing so, to open up ways of thinking about, and responding to, things differently. The Oulu attacks could be, and indeed were, problematised in several different ways, and this matters because what the problem is represented to be determines what the possible solutions are (Bacchi, 2009). And the ‘solutions’ can have significant impacts on far more people than were directly impacted by the attacks themselves. 

On the day of the attack, the Deputy Prime Minister Rikka Purra, of the far-right Finns Party, tweeted: ‘With street crime, gangs, etc., we are unfortunately following the same trend as in other countries. The government is working, but it is horrible what it is already like in this country!’. The next day, after it was confirmed by police that the attacker had a neo-Nazi background, Purra (sort of) corrected herself, tweeting: ‘Extremism, drugs, robberies, gangs – the problems are growing. We must take the deterioration in security seriously, increase penalties and stop shying away from violence of all kinds’. Minister of the Interior Mari Rantanen, also of the Finns Party, tweeted: ‘Violence in general is totally unacceptable, but violence against children is inexcusable. Not to mention the horror that the motive apparently comes from extremism’. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, of the right-wing National Coalition Party (NCP), tweeted: ‘Far-right violence is a real threat in Finland. There is no room for extremism of any kind in this country. The government is determined to combat extremism and violence’. The same day, Orpo was also interviewed by the newspaper Ilta-Sanomat, where he said: ‘This has to be taken very seriously. Also extreme movements on the left. All extremism is reprehensible’.

We can identify three main ways in which the first Oulu attack was problematised by government ministers. Firstly, as a ‘street crime and gangs’ problem, secondly, as a problem of a ‘deterioration of security’ and thirdly, as a problem of ‘extremism’. 

The first problematisation requires some context. The issue of ‘street crime and gangs’ has been a hot topic in the Finnish parliament in recent years and frequent debates have taken place on the subject. Members of parliament from both the NCP and the Finns have been keen to connect this problem with what they see as a ‘failed immigration policy’ and a ‘lack of integration’ by immigrants, and the solutions that have been proposed have usually been along the lines of limiting immigration and increasing deportations. Within this context, and alongside Purra’s political agenda as leader of the anti-immigration Finns Party, it’s not hard to see why she would have had a political incentive to assume the attack was related to ‘street crime’ and ‘gangs’ before the identity of the attacker had been revealed.  

Furthermore, by assuming the attack was associated with ‘street crime and gangs’ – and therefore, by implication, someone with an immigrant background – Purra was continuing a long trend by people in power of associating non-white people with violence. This is not the first time an attack has been wrongly attributed to a non-white person. A famous example is from 2011 when, after the massacre in Norway by a white supremacist, the Wall Street Journal went to press before his identity had been revealed, publishing an editorial in which it was assumed the attacker was a Muslim who had targeted Norway because it was a ‘liberal democracy committed to all the freedoms that define the West’ (Kundnani, 2012: 1). The media plays a central role in representing violence as a problem of non-white people. The sexual abuse of minors scandal of 2018, also in Oulu, for example, was widely reported in Finnish media with articles often emphasising the foreign background of the perpetrators. 

Purra’s theory about ‘street crime and gangs’ didn’t last long, because the police revealed that the perpetrator had a background in the neo-Nazi NRM. But her follow up tweet is also interesting. Because rather than retracting her mistake, Purra doubled down – arguing that this attack was just one aspect of a broader ‘deterioration in security’ faced by Finland which also includes ‘extremism’, ‘drugs’, ‘robberies’ and again, ‘gangs’. Now this problem representation is significant because Purra takes a racist attack, connects it to other unrelated crimes to create a broader ‘deterioration of security’ narrative – to which one of the solutions is limiting immigration – and therefore manages to both condemn the attack and, at the same time, fuel a narrative which advocates the same political objectives as the attacker. 

What we represent the problem to be determines what the possible solution is. If we represent this attack as a ‘deterioration of security’ then this invites securitising solutions – and that’s exactly what happened. In a press conference following the attack, Mari Rantanen announced her intention to expand police powers, including introducing ‘stop and search’. ‘Stop and search’ is a highly controversial policy which allows police to stop and search individuals in the street, on often tenuous grounds. In the places where it is used, it often disproportionately targets people from ethnic minority backgrounds. In the UK for example, black men are 3.7 times more likely to be stopped and searched by police than white men (Home Office, 2024). With an almost exclusively white police force in Finland, there’s good reason to suspect it might be used in a similar way here. Again, we see a racist attack problematised in a way that legitimises a racist response. The communities harmed by the attack end up being the ones who suffer most from the solution.

The third way in which the attacks were problematised was as an act of ‘extremism’. ‘Extremism’ is another popular word in political circles which has its roots in counterterrorism policy after 9/11 and is often used almost interchangeably with ‘terrorism’. But, while ‘terrorism’ usually refers to a method of political violence, ‘extremism’ refers to the ideas and ideologies that supposedly lead someone to violent action. There is very little convincing empirical evidence that violence is caused solely by people’s ideological views and indeed, most people with ‘extreme views’ never commit violent acts. The replacement of ‘terrorism’ with ‘extremism’ means that nowadays, most governments have taken it upon themselves to prevent – not only ‘extremist’ violence – but also the ‘extreme ideas’ that supposedly lead to them. The state has thus moved into monitoring the ‘pre-criminal space’ in a development that is arguably deeply undemocratic.

The ‘extremism’ label also depoliticises. By designating the Oulu attacker as ‘extreme’, Orpo and Rantanen invisibilise his actual politics and their racist, sexist and authoritarian character. And it’s this depoliticisation that enables Orpo to bring the so-called ‘extreme left’ into this discussion, despite them having nothing to do with what took place. The label thus functions similarly to Purra’s invocation of ‘security’ – it’s a way of connecting the Oulu attacks to something that they’re arguably not really connected to. One of the key differences between the so-called ‘extreme right’ and ‘extreme left’ in Finland, is that the former has historically been more prone to direct violence than the latter. If we really think about what the word ‘extreme’ means, it’s just a deviation from the norm, and clamping down on ‘extreme ideas’ thus functions to narrow the window of acceptable political opinion. The ‘extremism’ label can thus be used as a tool to suppress any kind of political dissent and maintain and narrow the status quo. It is not arguably a sufficient basis for defining a security threat (Ford & Jackson, 2023).  

6 days later, another very similar attack took place, but this time police suspected that it had what they called ‘racist motive’, and this aspect was reflected in the responses of government ministers. Rantanen tweeted: ‘According to the police, the last stabbing was racially motivated. This has to stop’, while Orpo tweeted ‘There is no place for racism in Finland’. Purra tweeted: ‘According to initial reports, the motive is racist. This is unacceptable’, while President Alexander Stubb also waded in, tweeting: ‘I strongly condemn racism in all its forms. There must be no place for racism or racist violence in Finland’. 

Because of the suspicions of the police, we see in the above tweets a unanimous tendency to problematise the attacks as an act of ‘racism’, although the degrees to which that was condemned varied. When an attack has a ‘racist motive’, it is usually considered by police in Finland to be a ‘hate crime’, which is defined as 

‘crime targeted at a person, group, a person’s property, institution or a representative of these, motivated by prejudice or hostility towards the victim’s real or perceived ethnic or national origin, religion or belief, sexual orientation, gender identity or appearance or disability’ (Ministry of the Interior, 2020: 88). 

This definition of ‘hate crime’ – that such attacks are motivated by ‘prejudice’ or ‘hostility’ on the part of the perpetrator – aligns with what Kundnani (2023) calls ‘the liberal theory of antiracism’ and Henriques (1984) calls ‘cognitivism’. Within this theory, racism is conceived of as an individual problem of irrationally held beliefs and prejudices. Since racism is a product of individual attitudes, the implied anti-racist solution is to change people’s attitudes – by challenging unconscious biases, reducing micro-aggressions, better representation for diverse identities and educating people out of individual prejudices (Kundnani, 2023). According to the liberal theory of racism, it is also an outdated mindset – a ‘remnant of past historical racial situations’ (Bonilla-Silva, 1997: 468) – and, although some individuals still hold racist views, racism at the societal level is generally seen to have been defeated by liberal democracy. This is the commonsense understanding of racism in today’s liberal, Western societies – and it’s the same understanding of racism that Orpo and Stubb evoke when they say ‘there is no place for racism in Finland’.  

However, there is a different understanding of racism which has its roots in the thinking of decolonial and abolitionist scholars, many of which came from the Global South. This understanding of racism sees it as an economic and political structure that privileges whites over non-whites in almost every area of life. As Charles Mills writes, 

‘racism (or, as I will argue, global white supremacy) is itself a political system, a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties’ (Mills, 2022: 3). 

Mill’s definition is useful in that, by emphasising the differential distribution of socioeconomic privilege and material wealth, it highlights the relationship between white supremacy and capitalism. Within this understanding, racism or white supremacy can no longer be seen as a relic from the past. Instead, it is a structure that has organised the world for centuries and continues to do so today. It’s the fact that, if you order a taxi or food delivery, you’ll likely be served by a brown or black person – people working precarious, low paid jobs in the ‘gig economy’. It’s the fact that Finnish Somalis were more vulnerable to catching covid because they were more likely to work in customer facing roles such as bus drivers, cleaners and nurses. It’s the fact that the materials in our phones, and the clothes we wear, are produced by people working in slave-like conditions in Global South countries. Prejudiced, racist attitudes are of course still a part of this problem, but crucially they are just one part. Global white supremacy is a far bigger structure – a political and economic system that transcends national borders and shapes most of the world. Problematising it this way implies a need for much bigger solutions than simply educating people out of their prejudiced attitudes. It means completely restructuring – or indeed dismantling – those economic and political systems that maintain the supremacy of whites over non-whites. 

So how do we connect this to the Oulu attacks? Structural white supremacy can be easy to ignore if you’re white and live somewhere like Finland where you’re not confronted by its effects every day. The stabbing of a child in a Finnish city is of course much less easy to ignore – and this brings us to an important concept that we haven’t yet problematised: ‘violence’. 

The Peace Studies scholar Johan Galtung (1990) thought of violence as having three forms: direct violencewhich can be attributed to an individual perpetrator, structural violence which is built into political systems and manifests as unequal power, life chances and social injustice, and cultural violence (also called ‘symbolic violence’ by others) which is those aspects of ideology and language which can be used to justify direct or structural violence. Galtung (1990: 291) argued that cultural violence makes ‘direct and structural violence look and feel right – or at least not wrong’. Applying Galtung’s framework to white supremacy, we can situate the Oulu attacks as an act of direct white supremacist violence. This kind of violence can be attributed to an individual perpetrator, is often shocking and overt and is generally condemned by politicians – as was the case in the tweets above. But this act of direct violence can be seen as just one dimension of a broader system of white supremacist violence in which the Finnish state – who’s government ministers denounced the attack – is also complicit in. 

Structural white supremacist violence in Finland can be seen in the ‘emergency law’ on migration which was voted through just weeks after the Oulu attacks and which was deemed to break European and international asylum law by human rights lawyers. But it can also be seen in the welfare budget cuts which will disproportionately impact people with immigrant backgrounds who are more likely to be on low-income jobs and face discrimination in the job market. Cultural white supremacist violence is seen in the ideology and language used by both the Finns and NCP. Great Replacement Theory for example, the idea that the white native population of Europe is being forcibly replaced by non-whites, has been regularly evoked by ministers in parliament. So too has the idea that Finland’s national identity is under threat, that immigrants are treated more favourably than the majority population and that they are ‘naturally’ prone to violence. These ideas and language, as Galtung described, make the direct violence of the Oulu attack and the structural violence of migration laws and benefits cuts look and feel right – or at least not completely wrong. And in this way, direct, structural and cultural violence are closely connected in a web of linkages and causal flows. 

This ‘disconnection’ (Meier, 2024) that is made by politicians between direct white supremacist violence, and the structural and cultural violences they themselves perpetuate, can be seen as an example of what Mills (2022) called white ‘epistemologies of ignorance’. Mills argued that the continuation of structural white supremacy depends on these knowledge systems, writing that:

white misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race are among the most pervasive mental phenomena of the past few hundred years, a cognitive and moral economy psychically required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement. And these phenomena are in no way accidental, but prescribed by the terms of the Racial Contract, which requires a certain schedule of structured blindnesses and opacities in order to establish and maintain the white polity’ (Mills, 2022: 19).  

Mills argues that white supremacy relies on racism being framed as a problem of individual attitudes, or occasional acts of direct violence, rather than as a political and economic system. It is these ‘epistemologies of ignorance that allow politicians – like Stubb and Orpo – to say that ‘there is no place for racism in Finland’ when in fact racism and white supremacy are everywhere in Finland and beyond it. At the border, on the street and in the parliament.

Žižek (2008) argues that structural and cultural violence are rendered invisible by direct violence because they sustain the non-violent ‘zero-level’ against which violence is measured, and I would argue that white supremacy functions in a similar way. This doesn’t mean that direct white supremacist violence isn’t real and terrifying, but it does provide an opportunity for the government to invisibilise their own role in maintaining white supremacy by denouncing ‘racism’ and ‘violence’. If we let ourselves believe that this is a problem of ‘deteriorating security’ and ‘extremism’, we find ourselves inviting policies – increased police powers, stop and search, anti-immigration policies and counter-extremism policies against political dissent – that increase structural and cultural white supremacist violence. And that benefits none of us.  

References

Bacchi, C. (2009). Analysing policy: What’s the problem represented to be? Frenchs Forest, NSW: Pearson Education.

Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo (1997), ‘Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation’, American Sociological Review, 62(3): 465–80.

Ford, K. & Jackson, R. (2023). ‘Problematising Radicalisation’ in Lewis, J. R. & Awan, A. N. (eds) (2023) Radicalisation : a global and comparative perspective. London, England: Hurst Publishers.

Foucault, M. (1977). Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews. In D. F. Bouchard (Ed.), D. F. Bouchard, & S. Simon (Trans.). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.  

Galtung, J. (1990). ‘Cultural violence’, Journal of Peace Research, 27(3), 291–305.

Henriques, J. (1984). ‘Social psychology and the politics of racism’. In J. Henriques, W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn e V. Walkerdine (Eds.), Changing the subject, psychology, social regulation and subjectivity. London: Routledge.

Home Office (2024). ‘Accredited official statistics: Police powers and procedures: Stop and search, arrests and mental health detentions, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2024’. Accessed 30.9.2024 via https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/stop-and-search-arrests-and-mental-health-detentions-march-2024/police-powers-and-procedures-stop-and-search-arrests-and-mental-health-detentions-england-and-wales-year-ending-31-march-2024

Jarvis, L. (2022) Critical terrorism studies and the far-right: beyond problems and solutions?, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15:1, 13-37

Kundnani, A. (2012). “Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-right Violence in Europe.” ICCT Research paper.

Kundnani, A. (2023). What is anti-racism: and why it means anti-capitalism. London: Verso.

Meier, AA. (2024): Whiteness as expertise in studies of the far right, Critical Studies on Terrorism. 

Mills, C. W. (2022). The racial contract: twenty-fifth anniversary edition. Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press.

Ministry of the Interior, Finland (2020). NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM 2019–2023. Internal security | Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 2020: 3.

Žižek, S. (2008). Violence: Six Sideways Reflections. Verso Books: London.

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Reflections from the first module of the Europaeum Scholars Programme

During a rainy week at the University of Oxford in early March, I joined 29 other doctoral students from across Europe for the first module of the Europaeum Scholars Programme. Taken alongside PhD studies, in 8 modules over an 18 month period, this is a policy and leadership programme for the ‘most talented, energetic and committed doctoral candidates from within the Europaeum network – the people who will make a difference to Europe’. During the next 18 months, we’ll take part in workshops, seminars and discussions on issues pertaining to policymaking and leadership, before coming up with our own policy proposal to ‘make Europe a better place’ in small, multidisciplinary groups.

Each module has a different theme, and this first one was on societal problems and ethics. Over the course of an action-packed 4 days we heard from experts on everything from ethics in AI to the impact of Brexit to embodied leadership. For me though, the highlight was hearing from the heads of three charities – Aspire Oxford, Refugee Resource and Abianda – about the vital work they are doing to support homeless people, refugees and gang-affected women respectively, in the face of a crumbling welfare state in the UK. As is often the case with these sorts of issues, its easy to get caught up in the important, but nevertheless more abstract, high-level political processes. Hearing from these inspiring individuals who are carrying out direct and impactful work at a grassroots level was a reminder that these processes have concrete, often adverse, effects on some of society’s most marginalised people.

Beyond the programme content itself, it was an absolute pleasure to spend the week with such a lovely group of people. It’s no secret that doing a PhD is lonely, so to spend time with others going through the same thing was just what I needed. The fact that people come from a wide range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences made discussions multifaceted and intellectually stimulating. I won’t pretend that everyone in the group agreed on everything, in fact we often didn’t, but it was good for me to have my views challenged and to have to defend them in a way that I don’t in my usual echo chamber. 

We ate all our meals together with the teaching fellows, the highlight of which was the dinner on the last evening in the beautiful dining hall of Balliol College. I had some great company at my table and the food – especially the banging deconstructed pavlova for dessert – was delicious. I’m already looking forward to the second module – on EU institutions and policymaking – in Brussels in June. 

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The ‘terrorist’ label: the implications of (not) calling extreme right-wing violence terrorism

Alexandre Bissonnette – who shot and killed 6 people in a Quebec City Mosque in 2019 – was not charged with terrorism offences, despite his attack being described as ‘terrorist’ by both Prime Minster Justin Trudeau and the Quebec Premier[i]. Neither was Dylann Roof, the white supremacist who killed 9 African Americans in a Charleston, South Carolina Church[ii]. In Canada, between 2001 and 2019, 56 individuals were charged under terrorism legislation but not one was associated with extreme right-wing (ERW) ideology, despite it being behind more deaths than Islamist extremism[iii]. In Portugal, none of the 5 terrorism convictions to date have been linked to ERW ideology, despite a ‘not insignificant’[iv] number of crimes caused by it. Similar trends have been identified in the US, Germany and Spain[v].

Why is there such ‘penal selectivity’[vi] when it comes to criminalising ERW violence, in comparison to, for example, Islamist extremist or ethnonationalist separatist violence? Some scholars[vii] have pointed to legal complexities that make it challenging and resource-intensive to prove terrorist intent in comparison to the evidence requirements for more ‘ordinary’ crimes such as murder. This doesn’t, however, account for the disparity between treatment of ERW and other forms of violence. Others look to Donald Black’s[viii] idea of the ‘behaviour of law’ which posits that the operation of law is ‘directly proportional to social status, inequality and social distance between authorities and offenders’[ix], while more critical approaches[x] see counterterrorism as having racialised – usually Islamophobic – foundations. Based on these two theories, the widespread institutionalisation of white dominance[xi], and unconscious cognitive biases amongst legal personnel[xii], would influence decision-making across the criminal justice system.

Terrorism-related sentences often don’t exceed those for murder or hate crimes[xiii]. Nonetheless, scholars have pointed to the ’expressive function of law’[xiv] and the ’performative power of counterterrorism’[xv] to argue that legislative decisions can have discursive and symbolic impacts that extend beyond the nature and length of the punishment itself. Daniel Koehler[xvi], for example, has suggested that not labelling ERW violence as terrorism could a) make its victims feel that they are ’second-class victims’, b) create a distorted public perception of what ’terrorism’ is, and c) impact official terrorism statistics and, by extension, the formation of counterterrorism policy. He continues that under-classifying ERW violence risks creating the impression amongst its victims that states are ’blind on the right side’, thereby undermining public trust in both the monopoly of force and the rule of law[xvii].

Such arguments have led several scholars[xviii] to advocate for improved consistency when it comes to the application of the ’terrorist’ label in the legislative arena. Criminalising ERW violence under terrorism legislation could establish its policy relevance, improve government accountability, encourage better distribution of counterterrorism resources, delegitimise racism, stimulate more balanced media coverage, encourage early prevention and motivate tech companies to more proactively remove ERW social media content[xix]. Others have, however, pointed to both the limitations and potential harms of using terrorism legislation to counter ERW violence.  The proscription of ERW groups, for example, may simply lead actors to other forms of political activism that are harder to do away with[xx], while the increased ’securitisation’ of ERW actors could lead to a ’backlash’ in the form of increased violence[xxi]. Indeed, as Jacob Aasland Ravndal[xxii] suggests, ‘while repression and stigmatisation may discourage some people from joining radical and extreme right groups, they may also push some of the most ardent activists onto more clandestine and revolutionary paths, ultimately leading to violence and terrorism’.

Such critiques raise important questions about the wisdom of extending often ineffective, counterproductive and even damaging counterterrorism measures to target even more citizens. Calls to securitise ERW violence, for example, could lead to an expansion of policing and legitimisation of surveillance which may ultimately target communities of colour disproportionately[xxiii]. Like counterterrorism policies past, securitising ERW violence could create more ’suspect communities’ of, for example, young people, or reinforce existing ones. As one Muslim activist[xxiv] has argued, ’when politicians and the media call on us to take white violence as seriously as violence perpetrated by Muslims, they actually reinforce the trope of Muslims as terrorists, injecting Muslims into a discussion that should have nothing to do with them’. Furthermore, because ERW actors are often ’lone wolves’ radicalised online, some countries are increasingly, pre-emptively criminalising non-violent acts that take place in the online sphere, such as viewing terrorist-related content, in a move that risks ’chilling effects’ on freedom of speech, journalistic enquiry, academic freedoms and public debate[xxv]. This increased policing of non-violent extremism is one symptom of what Richard Jackson has described as the ’epistemological crisis of counterterrorism’ characterised by a ‘particular paranoid logic’ whereby security officials increasingly engage in the ‘contemplation of nightmares rather than identifiable social, political and climatological realities’[xxvi].

Following these critiques of counterterrorism practices more broadly, Lee Jarvis[xxvii] has thus advocated for the ’desecuritisation’ of ERW violence. Such an approach, he argues, could reduce alarmism and provide reassurance to those feeling threatened by ERW violence , provide opportunities for better engagement with ERW groups and individuals and facilitate a shift in emphasis towards more ’pressing‘ public policy concerns, such as education, healthcare and the environment[xxviii]. He does concede, however, that such an approach risks being seen as ‘diminishing the insecurities’ of those at risk of ERW violence, and ‘may not satisfy those committed to a more emancipatory ethic’ in critical terrorism studies[xxix].

We stand at a critical juncture in the evolution of counterterrorism policy and practice, at which decisions need to be made about how best to respond to ERW violence. It’s a juncture that provides a valuable opportunity to take stock of existing counterterrorism frameworks and to think critically about their usefulness in responding, not only to ERW violence, but to all forms of ‘terrorism’. As this article has attempted to demonstrate, the implications of labelling (or not labelling) ERW violence as ‘terrorism’ are manifold and complex. Nonetheless, it is paramount that they receive sufficient consideration if we are to avoid similar mistakes to the counterterrorism measures of yesteryear.  


[i] Nesbitt, M. (2021); Violent crime, hate speech or  terrorism? How Canada views  and prosecutes far-right  extremism (2001–2019), Common Law World Review, Vol 50(1) 38–56

[ii] Norris, J. (2017); WHY DYLANN ROOF IS A TERRORIST UNDER  FEDERAL LAW, AND WHY IT MATTERS, Harvard Journal on Legislation, Vol. 54: 501–541.

[iii] Nesbitt (2021)

[iv] da Silva, R., Paulo Ventura, J., Moreira de Carvalho, C. & Reis Barbosa, M. (2022): “From street soldiers to political soldiers”:  assessing how extreme right violence has been criminalised in Portugal, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15:1, 102-120

[v] See Norris (2017); Koehler, D. (2019): Violence and Terrorism from the Far Right: Policy Options to Counter an   Elusive Threat, ICCT Policy Brief; Fernández de Mosteyrín, L. & Martini, A. (2022): Meaning and context in analysing extremism:  the banalisation of the far-right in Spanish public  controversies, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15:1, 38-60

[vi] da Silva et al (2022)

[vii] Koehler (2019)

[viii] Black, D. (2010): The Behavior of Law. Bingly, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.

[ix] Black (2010), quoted in Norris, J. (2010): When (and where) can right-wing terrorists be  charged with terrorism?, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 13:4, 519-544

[x] Corbin, C. M. (2017): Terrorists are Always Muslim but Never White: At the Intersection of Critical Race   Theory and Propaganda, Fordham L. Rev. 86: 455–485.

[xi] Meier, AA. (2022): Terror as justice, justice as terror:  counterterrorism and anti-Black racism in the  United States, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15:1, 83-101

[xii] Corbin (2017)

[xiii] Koehler (2019)

[xiv] Sunstein, C. R. (1996): On the Expressive Function of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144  (5): 2021–2053.

[xv] de Graaf, B. (2011): Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A comparative study. Oxford/New York: Routledge

[xvi] Koehler (2019)

[xvii] Koehler (2019: 1)

[xviii] See Koehler (2019); Norris (2017); da Silva et al (2022); Byman, D. (2018): When to Call a Terrorist a Terrorist,  Foreign Policy, Oct. 27. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/27/when-to-call-a-terrorist-a-terrorist/

[xix] Norris (2017); Byman (2018)

[xx] da Silva et al (2022)

[xxi] Argomaniz, J. & Vidal Diez, A. (2015): Examining Deterrence and Backlash Effects  in Counter-Terrorism: The Case of ETA, Terrorism and Political Violence, 27:160–181,

[xxii] Aasland Ravndal, J. (2018: 859): Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances,  opportunities and polarisationEuropean Journal of Political Research 57: 845–866,

[xxiii] Zerkel, M. (2021): Why We Should Rethink Calling White Supremacist Violence ‘Terrorism’. https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/problem-labeling-violence-domestic-terrorism 

[xxiv] Maha Hilal, quoted in Zerkel (2021): n.p.

[xxv] Zedner, L. (2021): Countering Terrorism or Criminalizing Curiosity? The Troubled History of UK Responses to Right-wing and Other Extremism, Common Law World Review 50: 57–75.

[xxvi] Ghamari-Tabrizi (2006: 22), quoted in Jackson, R. (2015: 33): The epistemological crisis of counterterrorism, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 8:1, 33-54. 

[xxvii] Jarvis, L. (2022): Critical terrorism studies and the far-right: beyond problems and solutions?, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15:1, 13-37.

[xxviii] Jarvis (2022)

[xxix] Jarvis (2022: 30)