Author: Lotta Rahlf

This VORTEX blog post complements the piece ‘Democracy under threat: The increasing normalisation of threats and violence directed at politicians and electoral candidates’ published by Joshua Farrell-Molloy in June. He reported on ‘(a) string of incidents that occurred in Germany and Ireland during May and early June’ and identified this as a ‘worrying trend of mounting hostility and aggression directed towards politicians in what has become an increasingly incendiary political environment’. He also addressed the consequences of these attacks, which are damaging to democracy: Electoral candidates and especially female and non-white candidates ‘risk reducing their democratic participation due to intimidation’. He therefore concludes that ‘defending the democratic process may require installing measures to better protect these elected representatives and candidates from threats and physical harm’. This VORTEX blog post will build on these thoughts in the German context. It will look at some of the figures published on attacks against politicians in Germany to date, giving an idea of the extent of the problem and its development, even if the number of unreported cases is estimated to be high. It will also discuss some of the factors that contribute to this phenomenon such as widespread feelings of being overwhelmed in the face of multiple crises and disappointment with the political handling of these, feelings that can be catered for with enemy images against political actors. A following blog post in October will deal with the consequences of these attacks on those affected, as well as concrete measures that are available and necessary to prevent further damage to the foundations of our democracy.

The number of attacks on politicians in recent years and the rising trend in the number of cases is evident in several sources. The most intuitive, albeit imprecise, source are crime statistics. According to the Federal Criminal Police Office,for example, the number of offences against holders of a political office or mandate tripled from 1527 to 4458 cases between 2017 and 2021. When presenting the number of cases of politically motivated crime in the past year, 2023, the head of the Federal Criminal Police Office spoke of around 5,400 attacks in 2023, an increase of 29% compared to the previous year and also a tripling of attacks within the past five years. However, not everyone affected reports the attack, meaning that many attacks are not even included in these crime statistics. Yet, reporting statistics also show high figures. According to preliminary figures, a total of 2,790 attacks on representatives or members of the parties represented in the Bundestag were reported in 2023. Of these, representatives of Alliance 90/The Greens were most frequently affected in 1,219 cases, representatives of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in 478 cases and representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 420 cases. 

The most reliable source for assessing the extent of violence are scientific surveys. Various studies in Germany have focussed on different political offices or placed a particular geographical focus. A few selected studies from the last three years serve as examples. In 2022, the Motra network and its transfer partners published a municipal monitoring study on hatred, hate speech and violence towards municipal officials. Of the 1,495 people surveyed, 46% stated that they had experienced hostility towards themselves or their relatives between May and October 2021. Of these, 70% were verbal or written hostilities, 26% were hate postings and 4% were physical assaults. The respondents themselves experienced direct hostility or attacks in the digital space once or twice a month. According to a representative, nationwide survey of 1,641 mayors commissioned by the Körber Foundation (2020-21), 57% of respondents had been insulted, threatened or physically attacked at least once. Finally, a study conducted by the University of Duisburg-Essen in cooperation with the Heinrich Böll Foundation (2022) came to a similar conclusion: 2166 people involved in local government (councillors, mayors and political election officials) in major German cities were surveyed. Around 60% had already experienced hostility or aggression directed at them at least once.

What is behind these high numbers and this increase in violence? There is no simple and all-encompassing explanation. Yet, feelings such as anger or disappointment with current politics and the state are currently widespread and are often the result of multiple and intertwined crisis experiences in recent years. The so-called refugee crisis, coronavirus pandemic, climate crisis or inflation are putting citizens in a situation that makes them dissatisfied and triggers feelings of powerlessness, as their situation is often neither self-inflicted nor is there any possibility of self-efficacy to solve their problems. Expectations that ‘those at the top’ will help to solve their own problems swiftly are disappointed, since there are no such swift solutions. Population surveys show that trust in the state’s ability to act is increasingly declining. According to a 2023 survey, only 27% of citizens still believe that the state is capable of fulfilling its tasks. The key question therefore is how such feelings of powerlessness and dissatisfaction can increasingly lead to hostility and violence against politicians.

One explanatory factor lies in the narratives of populist and right-wing actors, who respond to feelings of being overwhelmed with simple solution narratives and finger-pointing. Threat scenarios are fuelled by right-wing actors via social media and an alleged culprit is identified as an ‘enemy’ that needs to be confronted to improve one’s own situation and prevent worse things from happening. Politicians are increasingly becoming the enemy, as they are the ones who have had to make difficult political decisions in the context of the coronavirus pandemic or refugee crisis. It often becomes less abstract and more personal when local politicians, for example, are held responsible for a decision to open a new refugee centre in their community. The head of the Federal Criminal Police Office recently said commented recently about the politics of right-wing parties that employ such enemy stereotypes: ‘Every political actor who does not contribute to an objective discourse but instead creates scapegoats – the keywords being ‘foreigner problem’ and ‘remigration’ – contributes to this polarisation.’

Echo chambers on social media and a continuous stylisation of scapegoats can cause individuals to see verbal and, in the worst cases, physical violence as a legitimate or even necessary means of resistance or change. How people become radicalised in this way is a complex and non-linear process, but when it leads to violence against politicians, it is essentially based on such enemy images. The aim is then rarely to harm a particular person. On the contrary, as with many acts of violence and especially those that are categorised as extremist, these are signal acts against representatives of a hated political system that are also intended to intimidate others. However complex the individual process leading to violence may be, it usually begins with feelings of powerlessness, which make people susceptible to scapegoating narratives and can lead in one way or another to the conviction that action must be taken against those people, in the case of violence against politicians either individual culprits or abstract representatives of the system (for literature on this topic, see for example Berger 2018, Mølmen and Ravndal 2021 or Herath and Whittaker 2021).

The next VORTEX blog post in October will focus on the consequences of these developments that endanger democracy and describe what measures have already been taken in Germany to counter this phenomenon both preventively and repressively as well as to support those affected.

Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has become a label summarising an array of initiatives united by the very goal it describes. Yet such initiatives take on varying forms in different European countries. The measures deemed effective, the specific threats targeted, and the stakeholders involved can differ greatly from one nation to another (cf. Maniscalco and Rosato 2019). How countries in Europe currently differ in their P/CVE efforts and in the production and management of knowledge about it and why lies at the centre of Lotta Rahlf’s country-comparative VORTEX dissertation project. Specific approaches, such as multi-agency arrangements, seem to work very well in some contexts, for example in the Nordic countries, where they have already been established for general crime prevention and are embedded in close-knit societies (cf. Sivenbring and Malmros 2019). In other countries, a clear division of roles between public and civil society actors can be observed (cf. Hardy 2019). Despite these differences and context dependencies, similarities can be identified when experts are asked what they perceive as problematic or challenging about their P/CVE landscape. This is precisely what the researcher did as part of an expert survey in which 41 experts from 20 European countries had taken part by the time of the analysis. This blogpost summarises the most frequently mentioned tensions, offering a snapshot of current tensions facing P/CVE efforts in Europe.

A first look at the responses suggests that tensions are always identified when a variety of different actors are engaged in P/CVE initiatives in a given country. In nations where P/CVE efforts are primarily or exclusively managed by public or state authorities, such as Belgium, Austria, Greece, and Slovakia, this approach is often viewed as insufficient. Experts argue that violent extremism cannot be effectively countered with predominantly repressive measures, as these do not target individuals who have not yet committed offenses. In addition, many countries face unclear delineation of competencies among various state actors, and this is not limited to federally organised nations. In federal or decentralised states, such as Austria or Spain, ambiguity often arises between local, regional, and national authorities, affecting both steering and planning responsibilities as well as policing duties. In centralised and unitary states, the division of labour between intelligence services and the police, such as in Norway, or among different police authorities, as seen in Portugal, remains unclear.

Where civil society actors carry out P/CVE initiatives alongside security authorities, the tensions and challenges described by the experts are similar in many European countries. The most frequently cited issue by experts is the clash of different logics between these groups. This divergence not only complicates cooperation but also exacerbates structural problems, such as the financial insecurity faced by many civil society P/CVE actors. What logic does preventing and countering violent extremism follow? Should it aim to prevent individuals from posing a risk to society, or should it seek to strengthen resilience against extremist recruitment attempts? Security and law enforcement agencies typically favour the former approach, aligning with their mandate to protect society and prosecute criminal offenses. In contrast, civil society organisations, which do not have such a mandate, adopt a care logic. Their focus is on supporting individuals to become more resilient to extremist narratives and to fulfil their needs in ways other than joining extremist organisations. In several European countries, these different logics conflict with each other, sometimes to such an extent that they hinder effective cooperation, for example in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, or Germany. As one participant from the Netherlands observed, actors ‘don’t always speak the same language or have the same objectives or visions related to P/CVE’. 

Experts from various countries also highlight issues with implementing an ‘inter-agency’ or ‘multi-agency’ approach to P/CVE in their countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Slovakia). One significant problem is the inability or unwillingness of different actors to share confidential data and information with each other. Social services and counselling organisations, for instance, prioritise protecting their clients’ privacy, which is crucial for their effectiveness and trustworthiness. Meanwhile, security authorities often withhold information referring to security concerns (e.g., Denmark, Norway, Austria). Another challenge lies in standardising information while ensuring it is communicated in a situation-specific manner without data loss, as an Austrian respondent noted. Lastly, mutual mistrust stemming from past negative experiences can hinder cooperation among stakeholders (e.g., Romania). Despite these challenges, some countries have made notable progress. In Denmark, for example, coordination between the state, research institutions, and practice has improved significantly over the past decade. Furthermore, despite all the tensions, the added value of such multi-agency collaborations remained emphasised.

Another problem identified by the experts in several countries concerns the insecure financial footing of P/CVE measures. This structural problem often ties back to the conflicting logics between different actors. Experts from some countries, e.g. Belgium, emphasise that repressive measures are generally allocated more funds by security authorities than P/CVE measures, that tend to follow a care logic. In other countries, however, there appears to be a fundamental lack of funding for P/CVE, without the experts specifying what type of P/CVE is concerned (e.g. Austria, Spain). Temporary funding is seen as problematic. It forces projects to continuously prove their worth to funders, hindering their ability to build on experience and develop long-term strategies. This challenge is evident both in countries where P/CVE projects are generally state-funded (e.g., Germany) and in those where the EU also acts as a funding body (e.g., Greece).

Overall, despite the varied P/CVE landscapes across Europe, experts identified tensions or problems in almost every country surveyed, with many countries experiencing similar issues. In some countries, P/CVE remains the sole responsibility of state authorities, a situation often deemed insufficient and leading to uncertainty about who is accountable. In countries where civil society actors are also involved, conflicting logics—particularly care versus control—create significant tensions. Additionally, ongoing uncertainties and reservations about cooperation between different actors exacerbate these issues and project-based funding hinders meaningful development of the field. However, none of these challenges are new. They have been extensively identified and discussed in existing literature (e.g. Davies 2015; Mattson and Säljö 2017; Hardyns et al. 2022). The experts’ responses in the current survey reaffirm that these problems persist, offering fresh insights into the shared challenges across different countries. Nevertheless, these challenges do not necessarily mean that some approaches should be avoided. On the contrary, the multi-agency approach, for example, or the development of a strong civil society P/CVE practice can work very well in certain contexts – but there seem to be certain implementation hurdles that could be overcome in order to maximise the potential of specifically structured P/CVE landscapes.

Further reading:

As part of the German PrEval project (Evaluation and Quality Management in Extremism Prevention, Democracy Promotion and Civic Education: Analysis, Monitoring, Dialogue), the Global Public Policy Institute will soon publish a report, analysing an international survey on P/CVE practice and evaluation: https://gppi.net/project/preval

References

Davies, Lynn. 2015. “Security, Extremism and Education: Safeguarding or Surveillance?” British Journal of Educational Studies 64 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2015.1107022 .

Hardy, Keiran. 2019. ‘Countering Right-Wing Extremism: Lessons from Germany and Norway’. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 14 (3): 262–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2019.1662076 .

Hardyns, Wim, Noel Klima, and Lieven Pauwels. 2022. Evaluation and Mentoring of the Multi-Agency Approach to Violent Radicalisation. Vol. 4. IDC Impact Series. Antwerpen: Maklu Publishers.

Maniscalco, Maria Luisa, and Valeria Rosato. 2019. Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publisher.

Mattsson, Christer, and Roger Säljö. 2017. “Violent Extremism, National Security and Prevention. Institutional Discourses and Their Implications for Schooling.” British Journal of Educational Studies 66 (1): 109–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2017.1337870 .

Sivenbring, Jennie, and Robin Andersson Malmros. n.d. ‘Organizational Structures’. In Mixing Logics: Multiagency Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism, 49–76. Göteborg: Segerstedinstitutet, Göteborgs Universitet.

For family members and friends, the radicalisation of a loved one can cause considerable ‘grief, anxiety, despair and upset’ (Gielen 2015, 23). Fortunately, alongside those directly involving radicalising individuals, there are also counselling services that offer support to their relatives and friends (Koehler 2013; 2015). Family counselling is often used as an element of a systemic prevention approach or within exit programmes. It focuses on the person who is believed to be radicalising and seeks to intervene in this process or support a rehabilitation by supporting the person’s systemic environment, which includes relatives and friends but also the professional and social environment in a broader sense. The counselling aims to support them in gaining agency and building skills that enable them to maintain a relationship with the radicalising person or to have a preventative influence on them (Cragin, Robinson, and Steinberg P.S. 2015; Williams, Horgan, and Evans 2016). In Germany, such counselling as part of a systemic approach to prevention is currently offered by several organisations, albeit with different emphases, such as Legato, the Violence Prevention Network, Grüner Vogel e.V. and BeRATen e.V. Another example is the former Hayat model, which advised family members of people who intended to join a terrorist group in the Middle East (Köhler 2015, 9).

The benefits of supporting relatives in this way are manifold: First, in the best-case scenario, relatives and friends still have informal, possibly even daily or recurring access to the radicalising person. Secondly, they may have an intrinsic interest in the person’s well-being or in maintaining family or friendly relationships (Ellefsen and Sandberg 2022). Relatives are thus uniquely positioned to recognise and report early signs of radicalisation (cf. Gielen 2015), a potential that can be strengthened through counselling: ‘By teaching the relative of radicalised individuals about arguments and ideological narratives used by radical groups, the family will be able to counter them’ (Koehler 2015, 5).

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, similar family counselling services have emerged to support relatives and friends in dealing with people within their personal environment who turn to conspiracy theories. The development of a referral system for counselling with the focus on people attracted to conspiracy narratives and their environment aims to further support the professionalisation and network building of this field and is supported in the scope of the federal program ‘Demokratie leben!’. In the German context, examples of such services include ‘Entschwört’ or ‘Veritas’, which focus on the psychological needs of the person receiving counselling beyond the purpose of intervention, in addition to developing skills to intervene. Counselling of the social environment of radicalising individuals in extremism prevention always aims at emotionally stabilising the person seeking counselling and encouraging them to further seek support and build up their own resilience in dealing with the emotional burden and stress of the situation they find themselves in. However, this aspect is rarely prioritised by policymakers who instead focus on the use of family counselling for extremism prevention. As will now be described, sole focus on the latter is problematic in multiple respects, making a stronger awareness for the consideration of relatives’ and friends’ needs mandatory when planning and funding entire extremism prevention programmes. 

From a deontological perspective, for example, one could argue that it is not appropriate to make family members agents of change in a radicalisation process. When counselling relatives of conspiracy believers, it is often children who seek advice on how to deal with their parents, and they in particular do not have positive duties towards their parents, as could perhaps be argued in the parent-child relationship. Yet, in cases where parents seek advice on their children, for example, where they suspect a radicalisation, it is equally questionable whether an intervention in a radicalisation process constitutes such a ‘positive duty’ or whether it places too much responsibility on relatives given the multifactorial nature of radicalisation processes. Some authors doubt that relatives and friends can play a decisive role in prevention (Weggemans, Liem, and van der Zwan 2021; Sikkens et al. 2017). The intentions of the security authorities behind such counselling services can be particularly problematic: Relatives could be assigned ‘heavy responsibilities in nation-states counter-terrorism’ (Haugstvedt 2022) or not use counselling services at all because they are worried about security authority consequences for their relatives or fundamentally distrust the state.

This is echoed by a consequentialist perspective: The success of the intervention may be low or counterproductive and the psychological consequences for relatives who fail in their attempts to intervene can be great. In the case of conspiracy theories, for example, counter-evidence is even said to have a reinforcing effect on conspiracy ideology (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 223). At the same time, it is also possible that counselling fulfils a natural desire of the relative to acquire skills to help the radicalising relative and preserve relationships (Noddings 1986). In accordance with the intrinsic interest of the person seeking counselling in the well-being of the radicalising individual, one could also argue from an ethics-of-care perspective that relatives are in a reciprocal caring relationship and that counselling is necessary to support relatives in this.

However, the latter requires a shift in the focus of counselling for relatives: instead of seeing counselling for relatives as a means to the end of preventing radicalisation, the needs of those seeking counselling should come to the fore to meet the need for psychosocial support and competence development. This will ultimately have the same effect in the best-case scenario, but will also buffer any negative effects if an intervention is not successful. For example, a nuanced two-track counselling model could be possible, in which counselling acts as a stress reliever and competency provider (Haugstvedt 2022, 9). On the one hand, counselling services should meet the possible desire of some relatives to acquire skills with which they can intervene. The focus should be on the relative as ‘the one caring’ and the opportunities to act as an agent of change should be explored, while at the same time preparing them for the risks involved. Despite the potential that such counselling services have for the prevention of radicalisation, it must also be possible for relatives to simply seek psychosocial support without being held responsible as agents of change. This includes, for example, counselling on how to maintain family relationships and support in developing coping strategies. The focus here is on the relative as ‘the one caring for themselves’. Such a two-track model also allows those seeking counselling to switch back and forth between the two tracks. If an attempt at intervention fails or the relative is overwhelmed despite initially expressing a desire for intervention, it is sensible to abandon the intervention logic and instead focus solely on the well-being of the person seeking counselling. On the other hand, psychological support can also trigger a motivation to intervene.

In conclusion, relatives and friends of radicalising individuals have a variety of needs that counselling should fulfil in some way. Some relatives wish to help their loved ones and try to intervene in a radicalisation process. However, despite all the potential that relatives have as ‘agents of change’, it can lead to ethical problems if feelings of responsibility arise, counselling becomes a tool for the purpose of prevention and potential risks for relatives are not sufficiently considered. Hence, when planning and promoting extremism prevention programmes that seek to take advantage of the undisputed benefits of family counselling, care should be taken to ensure that psychosocial support of family members and friends is offered, which is already often the case in systemic counselling or counselling for relatives of conspiracy theorists. Policymakers should acknowledge the ethical difficulties of regarding relatives and friends of a radicalising individual solely as potential intervention actors and thus make sure that future prevention programmes always contain both: Support regarding the advice seeker’s confidence and agency in dealing with their radicalising relative and psychosocial support for the advice seeker themselves.

Named organisations and projects offering counselling for relatives and friends in Germany (non-exhaustive list):

• Legato: https://legato-hamburg.de/
• Violence Prevention Network: https://violence-prevention-network.de/menschen/eltern-angehoerige/
• Grüner Vogel e.V.: https://gruenervogel.de/
• BeRATen e.V: https://beraten-niedersachsen.de/
• Entschwört: https://entschwoert.de/
• Veritas: https://www.veritas-beratung.de/

References

Cragin, Bradley K., M.A. Robinson, and Steinberg P.S. 2015. ‘What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank’. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corportation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1118.html.

Ellefsen, Rune, and Sveinung Sandberg. 2022. ‘Everyday Prevention of Radicalization: The Impacts of Family, Peer, and Police Intervention’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, February, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2037185.

Gielen, Amy-Jane. 2015. ‘Supporting Families of Foreign Fighters. A Realistic Appraoch for Measuring the Effectiveness’. Journal for Deradicalization, no. 2: 21–48.

Haugstvedt, Håvard. 2022. ‘What Can Families Really Do? A Scoping Review of Family Directed Services Aimed at Preventing Violent Extremism’. Journal of Family Therapy, February, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6427.12392.

Koehler, Daniel. 2013. ‘Family Counselling as Prevention and Intervention Tool against “Foreign Fighters”. The German “Hayat” Program’. Journal EXIT-Deutschland 3: 182–204.

———. 2015. ‘Using Family Counselling to Prevent and Intervene Against Foreign Fighters: Operational Perspectives, Methodology and Best Practices for Implementing Codes of Conduct’. In Understanding Deradicalization: Pathways to Enhance Transatlantic Common Perceptions and Practices, edited by Middle East Institute.

Noddings, Nel. 1986. Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics & Moral Education. Oakland: University of California Press, 2013.

Sikkens, Elga, Marion van San, Stijn Sieckelink, and Micha de Winter. 2017. ‘Parental Influence on Radicalization and De-Radicalization According to the Lived Experiences of Former Extremists and Their Families’. Journal for Deradicalization 12.

Sunstein, Cas, and Adrian Vermeule. 2009. ‘Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures’. The Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2): 202–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00325.x.

Weggemans, Daan, Marieke Liem, and Marieke van der Zwan. 2021. ‘A Family Affair? Exploratory Insights into the Role of Family Members of Those Who Joined Jihadist Groups’. Security Journal. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-021-00302-5.

Williams, Michael J., John G. Horgan, and William P. Evans. 2016. ‘The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking’. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 8 (1): 45–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2015.1101147.