Author: Lotta Rahlf

Projects run by civil society are believed to be particularly valuable in preventing and countering violent extremism and in fostering democracy more broadly. For example, they can reach target groups that harbour opposition to state actors and they often possess valuable knowledge about local needs allowing for tailored services. For these and many other reasons, some countries, such as Germany, rely heavily on civil society efforts for promoting democracy and diversity as well as preventing and countering violent extremism. However, for such a diverse civil society landscape to flourish, the predictability of its financial support needs to be strengthened. This blog post explains why financial dependence on public funding, while useful and without alternative, can sometimes be dangerous, and what should be done to prevent such scenarios.

Federal programmes to promote democracy and prevent and counter violent extremism have a fairly long tradition in Germany. Since the early 1990s, federal programmes have provided public funding for projects to promote democracy and, initially, to combat racism. The largest and currently probably best-known federal programme established in 2015 is the ‘Live Democracy!’ programme. In its second funding period, 182 million euros were distributed to various civil society actors to implement projects to promote democracy and prevent and counter violent extremism of all kinds. A third funding period was due to start in early 2025. But then Germany was plunged into a budget crisis triggered by a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court on the unconstitutional retroactive use of climate and transformation funds, which left a funding gap of 60 billion euros. The federal government was faced with the challenge of revising existing spending plans while at the same time complying with the constitutional requirements of the debt brake. The tense political situation led to heated debates within the governing coalition, with no agreement being reached on savings and priorities. As a result of the deadlock, a federal budget for 2025 was not adopted in time and the budget crisis even ultimately led to the collapse of the German federal government. Although a provisional agreement on the 2025 budget was reached in July 2024, the differences within the so-called ‘traffic light coalition’ remained and led to the dissolution of the coalition and the scheduling of new elections in February 2025.

For the civil society projects funded by ‘Live Democracy!’, this again translated into existential fears. With funding due to expire at the end of the year and no federal budget set for 2025, many projects for which federal funding was a financial cornerstone were threatened with closure. Although this was only a fear and not yet a fact, civil society projects faced many challenges: How, for example, to retain qualified staff in the face of these prospects? The scenario of a shrinking supply of civil society projects promoting democracy and preventing and countering violent extremism would have mainly played into the hands of those actors for whom these projects were already a thorn in their side. A specialist from the Federal Association for Mobile Counselling expressed great concern to researchers at ‘Netzpolitik.org’, stating that if the services were to disappear, ‘what the AfD has wanted for a long time would have been achieved through the back door’. In short, it suddenly became a tangible scenario that the German democracy would lose some of its ‘Wehrhaftigkeit’ [defensibility]. 

It was not until mid-November 2024 that the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs sent a circular to the funded projects stating that the projects selected for funding would receive at least a pro rata allocation of the funding requested for 2025 until the newly elected federal government had passed a budget for 2025. The Ministry also held out the prospect of an extension of the approval period and an increase in funding. This was made possible by provisional budget management. As a result, the federal government retained its ability to act and fulfil its legal obligations even without an adopted budget. This also made it possible to publish a new funding guideline on 24 November 2024, which came into force on 1 January 2025. Since summer 2024, civil society organisations have been able to apply for funding from 2025 and many projects have been selected to be considered for funding and can now submit funding applications. These must now be reviewed and approved so that the promised funds are available to the projects in a legally binding manner. Importantly, one of the new features is the extension of the funding phase to eight years to provide more planning certainty.

How should this situation in Germany be viewed? On the one hand, state support for a large and diverse civil society PCVE practice in Germany is absolutely necessary. After all, this wealth of projects could not be sustained by private funding alone, and private funding would be even more volatile than state funding. The fact that there are such large federal programmes for the prevention of extremism in Germany is a great advantage in international and European comparison. On the other hand, recent developments also show the need for regular funding structures that are less affected by such political crises. Extending the funding period to eight years is a step in the right direction. Another could be to fund organisations rather than individual projects, so that they can plan for the longer term and are not under pressure to innovate. Such longer planning periods could also provide an incentive to evaluate activities and thus make the whole practice more effective. Some time ago, a so-called ‘Democracy Promotion Act’ was proposed in Germany to provide a legal basis for federal funding to create long-term and transparent funding that is more sustainable and less dependent on government crises and changes. However, this law has not yet been passed due to political disputes over its content and the distribution of funds. It remains to be seen whether the new governing parties will be able to agree on such an important solution to strengthen Germany’s diverse PCVE landscape.

In a follow-up to a blog post on violence against politicians by Joshua Farrell-Molloy, a previous VORTEX piece reported on the development of these attacks in Germany and reflected on possible causes. This blog post will now focus on the consequences of these attacks and possible strategies to deal with this phenomenon.

Attacks on politicians have both immediate and long-term consequences that threaten democracy. All the studies listed in the previous VORTEX blog post on violence against politicians in Germany show that politicians are increasingly considering giving up their political careers or are less willing to speak out on certain political issues in public because of experiences of verbal hostility or physical attacks against them. According to the MOTRA study, more than one in ten of those affected have considered resigning from office or have stated that they will not run for local political office again. In the Körber Foundation study, 19% of the mayors surveyed had considered withdrawing from politics and finally, in the study by the University of Duisburg-Essen and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, which focused on large cities, the figure was still around 5%.

Behavioural changes by politicians due to fears that they might (in future) be subject to hostility or attacks are particularly problematic. According to the Körber Foundation study, 68% of the mayors surveyed have already changed their behaviour due to concerns about hostility or insults. Even among those who have not yet been affected by hostility and attacks, for example, 35% (mostly) refrain from using social media out of concern about hostility and attacks and 29% express themselves less frequently on certain topics than before. Both withdrawal because of attacks and preventive changes in behaviour cause lasting damage to democracy. Local political activity becomes less attractive, especially for those who are more likely to be targeted by right-wing scapegoating narratives because of their political stances. Withdrawal from social networks also means that democratic voices are increasingly disappearing, and anti-democratic voices are gaining ground.

So, what can be done to reduce the number of such attacks and prevent further consequences that threaten democracy? A first measure would certainly be to strengthen police investigation and prosecution capacities. But this can only go hand in hand with educating those affected about what kind of online and offline threats can be reported under criminal law and how. Those affected by hate speech on the internet need to be informed, for example, about how to secure evidence in the digital space, what kind of screenshots they need to take, that they should also secure URLs and metadata such as the IP address and how to report the platforms. Moreover, there is a need to simplify reporting channels and criminal charges as well as providing generally accessible support structures for those affected. Since this year, the German Forum for Crime Prevention has been a nationwide point of contact for those affected thanks to funding from the Federal Ministry of the Interior and acts as a coordinating guide (Starke Stelle). Some federal states in Germany have already set a good example by establishing central contact points for those affected, e.g. Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, Saxony and Bavaria. Those affected can also be referred to civil society organisations, which can help them develop concrete strategies to increase their confidence or take individual preventive measures (e.g. apply for a ban on disclosure).

One example of such a civil society organisation is HateAid. This is a not-for-profit organisation that supports those affected by digital violence. It helps people who experience hate, hate speech or threats online – be it on social media, in forums or via direct messages. The aim is to provide them with legal, psychological and financial support and to show them how to defend themselves against digital attacks. The organisation offers free advice and assistance with gathering evidence and making a complaint. In certain cases, HateAid will also pay for legal action against the perpetrators and help to enforce claims for damages. As well as providing direct help, HateAid also lobbies politically for tougher laws against digital violence and campaigns for better protection online. Through awareness campaigns and education programmes, the organisation raises awareness of the dangers of hate speech and strengthens digital civil society

Other examples are the Federal Association for Mobile Counselling, which also offers mobile counselling for municipal officials and elected representatives in every federal state and published a guide on the topic of threats against local politicians in 2021, together with the Association of counselling centres for victims of right-wing, racist and anti-Semitic violence. The National Centre for Crime Prevention published similar guide in 2020. Since April 2021, there has also been the ‘Stark im Amt’ portal, which is operated by the Körber Foundation together with the municipal umbrella organisations and is aimed at those affected by local politics. It provides both networking and prevention work by showing how local politicians can prepare themselves for potential threats and how to behave in the event of attacks.

However, in addition to providing support for those affected and criminal prosecution, the problem of threats and physical attacks against politicians must also be tackled preventively. Germany has a particularly diverse range of civic education, democracy promotion and extremism prevention measures that contribute in various ways to making society more resilient to scapegoating narratives, for example. In the area of extremism prevention, many civil society organisations also provide advice in cases of potential radicalisation. Such services are indispensable, especially in times of multiple interlinked crises, which is why it would only be a welcome development if the financial support for such projects were secured in the long term.  

This VORTEX blog post complements the piece ‘Democracy under threat: The increasing normalisation of threats and violence directed at politicians and electoral candidates’ published by Joshua Farrell-Molloy in June. He reported on ‘(a) string of incidents that occurred in Germany and Ireland during May and early June’ and identified this as a ‘worrying trend of mounting hostility and aggression directed towards politicians in what has become an increasingly incendiary political environment’. He also addressed the consequences of these attacks, which are damaging to democracy: Electoral candidates and especially female and non-white candidates ‘risk reducing their democratic participation due to intimidation’. He therefore concludes that ‘defending the democratic process may require installing measures to better protect these elected representatives and candidates from threats and physical harm’. This VORTEX blog post will build on these thoughts in the German context. It will look at some of the figures published on attacks against politicians in Germany to date, giving an idea of the extent of the problem and its development, even if the number of unreported cases is estimated to be high. It will also discuss some of the factors that contribute to this phenomenon such as widespread feelings of being overwhelmed in the face of multiple crises and disappointment with the political handling of these, feelings that can be catered for with enemy images against political actors. A following blog post in October will deal with the consequences of these attacks on those affected, as well as concrete measures that are available and necessary to prevent further damage to the foundations of our democracy.

The number of attacks on politicians in recent years and the rising trend in the number of cases is evident in several sources. The most intuitive, albeit imprecise, source are crime statistics. According to the Federal Criminal Police Office,for example, the number of offences against holders of a political office or mandate tripled from 1527 to 4458 cases between 2017 and 2021. When presenting the number of cases of politically motivated crime in the past year, 2023, the head of the Federal Criminal Police Office spoke of around 5,400 attacks in 2023, an increase of 29% compared to the previous year and also a tripling of attacks within the past five years. However, not everyone affected reports the attack, meaning that many attacks are not even included in these crime statistics. Yet, reporting statistics also show high figures. According to preliminary figures, a total of 2,790 attacks on representatives or members of the parties represented in the Bundestag were reported in 2023. Of these, representatives of Alliance 90/The Greens were most frequently affected in 1,219 cases, representatives of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in 478 cases and representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 420 cases. 

The most reliable source for assessing the extent of violence are scientific surveys. Various studies in Germany have focussed on different political offices or placed a particular geographical focus. A few selected studies from the last three years serve as examples. In 2022, the Motra network and its transfer partners published a municipal monitoring study on hatred, hate speech and violence towards municipal officials. Of the 1,495 people surveyed, 46% stated that they had experienced hostility towards themselves or their relatives between May and October 2021. Of these, 70% were verbal or written hostilities, 26% were hate postings and 4% were physical assaults. The respondents themselves experienced direct hostility or attacks in the digital space once or twice a month. According to a representative, nationwide survey of 1,641 mayors commissioned by the Körber Foundation (2020-21), 57% of respondents had been insulted, threatened or physically attacked at least once. Finally, a study conducted by the University of Duisburg-Essen in cooperation with the Heinrich Böll Foundation (2022) came to a similar conclusion: 2166 people involved in local government (councillors, mayors and political election officials) in major German cities were surveyed. Around 60% had already experienced hostility or aggression directed at them at least once.

What is behind these high numbers and this increase in violence? There is no simple and all-encompassing explanation. Yet, feelings such as anger or disappointment with current politics and the state are currently widespread and are often the result of multiple and intertwined crisis experiences in recent years. The so-called refugee crisis, coronavirus pandemic, climate crisis or inflation are putting citizens in a situation that makes them dissatisfied and triggers feelings of powerlessness, as their situation is often neither self-inflicted nor is there any possibility of self-efficacy to solve their problems. Expectations that ‘those at the top’ will help to solve their own problems swiftly are disappointed, since there are no such swift solutions. Population surveys show that trust in the state’s ability to act is increasingly declining. According to a 2023 survey, only 27% of citizens still believe that the state is capable of fulfilling its tasks. The key question therefore is how such feelings of powerlessness and dissatisfaction can increasingly lead to hostility and violence against politicians.

One explanatory factor lies in the narratives of populist and right-wing actors, who respond to feelings of being overwhelmed with simple solution narratives and finger-pointing. Threat scenarios are fuelled by right-wing actors via social media and an alleged culprit is identified as an ‘enemy’ that needs to be confronted to improve one’s own situation and prevent worse things from happening. Politicians are increasingly becoming the enemy, as they are the ones who have had to make difficult political decisions in the context of the coronavirus pandemic or refugee crisis. It often becomes less abstract and more personal when local politicians, for example, are held responsible for a decision to open a new refugee centre in their community. The head of the Federal Criminal Police Office recently said commented recently about the politics of right-wing parties that employ such enemy stereotypes: ‘Every political actor who does not contribute to an objective discourse but instead creates scapegoats – the keywords being ‘foreigner problem’ and ‘remigration’ – contributes to this polarisation.’

Echo chambers on social media and a continuous stylisation of scapegoats can cause individuals to see verbal and, in the worst cases, physical violence as a legitimate or even necessary means of resistance or change. How people become radicalised in this way is a complex and non-linear process, but when it leads to violence against politicians, it is essentially based on such enemy images. The aim is then rarely to harm a particular person. On the contrary, as with many acts of violence and especially those that are categorised as extremist, these are signal acts against representatives of a hated political system that are also intended to intimidate others. However complex the individual process leading to violence may be, it usually begins with feelings of powerlessness, which make people susceptible to scapegoating narratives and can lead in one way or another to the conviction that action must be taken against those people, in the case of violence against politicians either individual culprits or abstract representatives of the system (for literature on this topic, see for example Berger 2018, Mølmen and Ravndal 2021 or Herath and Whittaker 2021).

The next VORTEX blog post in October will focus on the consequences of these developments that endanger democracy and describe what measures have already been taken in Germany to counter this phenomenon both preventively and repressively as well as to support those affected.

Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has become a label summarising an array of initiatives united by the very goal it describes. Yet such initiatives take on varying forms in different European countries. The measures deemed effective, the specific threats targeted, and the stakeholders involved can differ greatly from one nation to another (cf. Maniscalco and Rosato 2019). How countries in Europe currently differ in their P/CVE efforts and in the production and management of knowledge about it and why lies at the centre of Lotta Rahlf’s country-comparative VORTEX dissertation project. Specific approaches, such as multi-agency arrangements, seem to work very well in some contexts, for example in the Nordic countries, where they have already been established for general crime prevention and are embedded in close-knit societies (cf. Sivenbring and Malmros 2019). In other countries, a clear division of roles between public and civil society actors can be observed (cf. Hardy 2019). Despite these differences and context dependencies, similarities can be identified when experts are asked what they perceive as problematic or challenging about their P/CVE landscape. This is precisely what the researcher did as part of an expert survey in which 41 experts from 20 European countries had taken part by the time of the analysis. This blogpost summarises the most frequently mentioned tensions, offering a snapshot of current tensions facing P/CVE efforts in Europe.

A first look at the responses suggests that tensions are always identified when a variety of different actors are engaged in P/CVE initiatives in a given country. In nations where P/CVE efforts are primarily or exclusively managed by public or state authorities, such as Belgium, Austria, Greece, and Slovakia, this approach is often viewed as insufficient. Experts argue that violent extremism cannot be effectively countered with predominantly repressive measures, as these do not target individuals who have not yet committed offenses. In addition, many countries face unclear delineation of competencies among various state actors, and this is not limited to federally organised nations. In federal or decentralised states, such as Austria or Spain, ambiguity often arises between local, regional, and national authorities, affecting both steering and planning responsibilities as well as policing duties. In centralised and unitary states, the division of labour between intelligence services and the police, such as in Norway, or among different police authorities, as seen in Portugal, remains unclear.

Where civil society actors carry out P/CVE initiatives alongside security authorities, the tensions and challenges described by the experts are similar in many European countries. The most frequently cited issue by experts is the clash of different logics between these groups. This divergence not only complicates cooperation but also exacerbates structural problems, such as the financial insecurity faced by many civil society P/CVE actors. What logic does preventing and countering violent extremism follow? Should it aim to prevent individuals from posing a risk to society, or should it seek to strengthen resilience against extremist recruitment attempts? Security and law enforcement agencies typically favour the former approach, aligning with their mandate to protect society and prosecute criminal offenses. In contrast, civil society organisations, which do not have such a mandate, adopt a care logic. Their focus is on supporting individuals to become more resilient to extremist narratives and to fulfil their needs in ways other than joining extremist organisations. In several European countries, these different logics conflict with each other, sometimes to such an extent that they hinder effective cooperation, for example in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, or Germany. As one participant from the Netherlands observed, actors ‘don’t always speak the same language or have the same objectives or visions related to P/CVE’. 

Experts from various countries also highlight issues with implementing an ‘inter-agency’ or ‘multi-agency’ approach to P/CVE in their countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Slovakia). One significant problem is the inability or unwillingness of different actors to share confidential data and information with each other. Social services and counselling organisations, for instance, prioritise protecting their clients’ privacy, which is crucial for their effectiveness and trustworthiness. Meanwhile, security authorities often withhold information referring to security concerns (e.g., Denmark, Norway, Austria). Another challenge lies in standardising information while ensuring it is communicated in a situation-specific manner without data loss, as an Austrian respondent noted. Lastly, mutual mistrust stemming from past negative experiences can hinder cooperation among stakeholders (e.g., Romania). Despite these challenges, some countries have made notable progress. In Denmark, for example, coordination between the state, research institutions, and practice has improved significantly over the past decade. Furthermore, despite all the tensions, the added value of such multi-agency collaborations remained emphasised.

Another problem identified by the experts in several countries concerns the insecure financial footing of P/CVE measures. This structural problem often ties back to the conflicting logics between different actors. Experts from some countries, e.g. Belgium, emphasise that repressive measures are generally allocated more funds by security authorities than P/CVE measures, that tend to follow a care logic. In other countries, however, there appears to be a fundamental lack of funding for P/CVE, without the experts specifying what type of P/CVE is concerned (e.g. Austria, Spain). Temporary funding is seen as problematic. It forces projects to continuously prove their worth to funders, hindering their ability to build on experience and develop long-term strategies. This challenge is evident both in countries where P/CVE projects are generally state-funded (e.g., Germany) and in those where the EU also acts as a funding body (e.g., Greece).

Overall, despite the varied P/CVE landscapes across Europe, experts identified tensions or problems in almost every country surveyed, with many countries experiencing similar issues. In some countries, P/CVE remains the sole responsibility of state authorities, a situation often deemed insufficient and leading to uncertainty about who is accountable. In countries where civil society actors are also involved, conflicting logics—particularly care versus control—create significant tensions. Additionally, ongoing uncertainties and reservations about cooperation between different actors exacerbate these issues and project-based funding hinders meaningful development of the field. However, none of these challenges are new. They have been extensively identified and discussed in existing literature (e.g. Davies 2015; Mattson and Säljö 2017; Hardyns et al. 2022). The experts’ responses in the current survey reaffirm that these problems persist, offering fresh insights into the shared challenges across different countries. Nevertheless, these challenges do not necessarily mean that some approaches should be avoided. On the contrary, the multi-agency approach, for example, or the development of a strong civil society P/CVE practice can work very well in certain contexts – but there seem to be certain implementation hurdles that could be overcome in order to maximise the potential of specifically structured P/CVE landscapes.

Further reading:

As part of the German PrEval project (Evaluation and Quality Management in Extremism Prevention, Democracy Promotion and Civic Education: Analysis, Monitoring, Dialogue), the Global Public Policy Institute will soon publish a report, analysing an international survey on P/CVE practice and evaluation: https://gppi.net/project/preval

References

Davies, Lynn. 2015. “Security, Extremism and Education: Safeguarding or Surveillance?” British Journal of Educational Studies 64 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2015.1107022 .

Hardy, Keiran. 2019. ‘Countering Right-Wing Extremism: Lessons from Germany and Norway’. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 14 (3): 262–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2019.1662076 .

Hardyns, Wim, Noel Klima, and Lieven Pauwels. 2022. Evaluation and Mentoring of the Multi-Agency Approach to Violent Radicalisation. Vol. 4. IDC Impact Series. Antwerpen: Maklu Publishers.

Maniscalco, Maria Luisa, and Valeria Rosato. 2019. Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publisher.

Mattsson, Christer, and Roger Säljö. 2017. “Violent Extremism, National Security and Prevention. Institutional Discourses and Their Implications for Schooling.” British Journal of Educational Studies 66 (1): 109–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2017.1337870 .

Sivenbring, Jennie, and Robin Andersson Malmros. n.d. ‘Organizational Structures’. In Mixing Logics: Multiagency Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism, 49–76. Göteborg: Segerstedinstitutet, Göteborgs Universitet.

For family members and friends, the radicalisation of a loved one can cause considerable ‘grief, anxiety, despair and upset’ (Gielen 2015, 23). Fortunately, alongside those directly involving radicalising individuals, there are also counselling services that offer support to their relatives and friends (Koehler 2013; 2015). Family counselling is often used as an element of a systemic prevention approach or within exit programmes. It focuses on the person who is believed to be radicalising and seeks to intervene in this process or support a rehabilitation by supporting the person’s systemic environment, which includes relatives and friends but also the professional and social environment in a broader sense. The counselling aims to support them in gaining agency and building skills that enable them to maintain a relationship with the radicalising person or to have a preventative influence on them (Cragin, Robinson, and Steinberg P.S. 2015; Williams, Horgan, and Evans 2016). In Germany, such counselling as part of a systemic approach to prevention is currently offered by several organisations, albeit with different emphases, such as Legato, the Violence Prevention Network, Grüner Vogel e.V. and BeRATen e.V. Another example is the former Hayat model, which advised family members of people who intended to join a terrorist group in the Middle East (Köhler 2015, 9).

The benefits of supporting relatives in this way are manifold: First, in the best-case scenario, relatives and friends still have informal, possibly even daily or recurring access to the radicalising person. Secondly, they may have an intrinsic interest in the person’s well-being or in maintaining family or friendly relationships (Ellefsen and Sandberg 2022). Relatives are thus uniquely positioned to recognise and report early signs of radicalisation (cf. Gielen 2015), a potential that can be strengthened through counselling: ‘By teaching the relative of radicalised individuals about arguments and ideological narratives used by radical groups, the family will be able to counter them’ (Koehler 2015, 5).

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, similar family counselling services have emerged to support relatives and friends in dealing with people within their personal environment who turn to conspiracy theories. The development of a referral system for counselling with the focus on people attracted to conspiracy narratives and their environment aims to further support the professionalisation and network building of this field and is supported in the scope of the federal program ‘Demokratie leben!’. In the German context, examples of such services include ‘Entschwört’ or ‘Veritas’, which focus on the psychological needs of the person receiving counselling beyond the purpose of intervention, in addition to developing skills to intervene. Counselling of the social environment of radicalising individuals in extremism prevention always aims at emotionally stabilising the person seeking counselling and encouraging them to further seek support and build up their own resilience in dealing with the emotional burden and stress of the situation they find themselves in. However, this aspect is rarely prioritised by policymakers who instead focus on the use of family counselling for extremism prevention. As will now be described, sole focus on the latter is problematic in multiple respects, making a stronger awareness for the consideration of relatives’ and friends’ needs mandatory when planning and funding entire extremism prevention programmes. 

From a deontological perspective, for example, one could argue that it is not appropriate to make family members agents of change in a radicalisation process. When counselling relatives of conspiracy believers, it is often children who seek advice on how to deal with their parents, and they in particular do not have positive duties towards their parents, as could perhaps be argued in the parent-child relationship. Yet, in cases where parents seek advice on their children, for example, where they suspect a radicalisation, it is equally questionable whether an intervention in a radicalisation process constitutes such a ‘positive duty’ or whether it places too much responsibility on relatives given the multifactorial nature of radicalisation processes. Some authors doubt that relatives and friends can play a decisive role in prevention (Weggemans, Liem, and van der Zwan 2021; Sikkens et al. 2017). The intentions of the security authorities behind such counselling services can be particularly problematic: Relatives could be assigned ‘heavy responsibilities in nation-states counter-terrorism’ (Haugstvedt 2022) or not use counselling services at all because they are worried about security authority consequences for their relatives or fundamentally distrust the state.

This is echoed by a consequentialist perspective: The success of the intervention may be low or counterproductive and the psychological consequences for relatives who fail in their attempts to intervene can be great. In the case of conspiracy theories, for example, counter-evidence is even said to have a reinforcing effect on conspiracy ideology (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 223). At the same time, it is also possible that counselling fulfils a natural desire of the relative to acquire skills to help the radicalising relative and preserve relationships (Noddings 1986). In accordance with the intrinsic interest of the person seeking counselling in the well-being of the radicalising individual, one could also argue from an ethics-of-care perspective that relatives are in a reciprocal caring relationship and that counselling is necessary to support relatives in this.

However, the latter requires a shift in the focus of counselling for relatives: instead of seeing counselling for relatives as a means to the end of preventing radicalisation, the needs of those seeking counselling should come to the fore to meet the need for psychosocial support and competence development. This will ultimately have the same effect in the best-case scenario, but will also buffer any negative effects if an intervention is not successful. For example, a nuanced two-track counselling model could be possible, in which counselling acts as a stress reliever and competency provider (Haugstvedt 2022, 9). On the one hand, counselling services should meet the possible desire of some relatives to acquire skills with which they can intervene. The focus should be on the relative as ‘the one caring’ and the opportunities to act as an agent of change should be explored, while at the same time preparing them for the risks involved. Despite the potential that such counselling services have for the prevention of radicalisation, it must also be possible for relatives to simply seek psychosocial support without being held responsible as agents of change. This includes, for example, counselling on how to maintain family relationships and support in developing coping strategies. The focus here is on the relative as ‘the one caring for themselves’. Such a two-track model also allows those seeking counselling to switch back and forth between the two tracks. If an attempt at intervention fails or the relative is overwhelmed despite initially expressing a desire for intervention, it is sensible to abandon the intervention logic and instead focus solely on the well-being of the person seeking counselling. On the other hand, psychological support can also trigger a motivation to intervene.

In conclusion, relatives and friends of radicalising individuals have a variety of needs that counselling should fulfil in some way. Some relatives wish to help their loved ones and try to intervene in a radicalisation process. However, despite all the potential that relatives have as ‘agents of change’, it can lead to ethical problems if feelings of responsibility arise, counselling becomes a tool for the purpose of prevention and potential risks for relatives are not sufficiently considered. Hence, when planning and promoting extremism prevention programmes that seek to take advantage of the undisputed benefits of family counselling, care should be taken to ensure that psychosocial support of family members and friends is offered, which is already often the case in systemic counselling or counselling for relatives of conspiracy theorists. Policymakers should acknowledge the ethical difficulties of regarding relatives and friends of a radicalising individual solely as potential intervention actors and thus make sure that future prevention programmes always contain both: Support regarding the advice seeker’s confidence and agency in dealing with their radicalising relative and psychosocial support for the advice seeker themselves.

Named organisations and projects offering counselling for relatives and friends in Germany (non-exhaustive list):

• Legato: https://legato-hamburg.de/
• Violence Prevention Network: https://violence-prevention-network.de/menschen/eltern-angehoerige/
• Grüner Vogel e.V.: https://gruenervogel.de/
• BeRATen e.V: https://beraten-niedersachsen.de/
• Entschwört: https://entschwoert.de/
• Veritas: https://www.veritas-beratung.de/

References

Cragin, Bradley K., M.A. Robinson, and Steinberg P.S. 2015. ‘What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank’. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corportation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1118.html.

Ellefsen, Rune, and Sveinung Sandberg. 2022. ‘Everyday Prevention of Radicalization: The Impacts of Family, Peer, and Police Intervention’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, February, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2037185.

Gielen, Amy-Jane. 2015. ‘Supporting Families of Foreign Fighters. A Realistic Appraoch for Measuring the Effectiveness’. Journal for Deradicalization, no. 2: 21–48.

Haugstvedt, Håvard. 2022. ‘What Can Families Really Do? A Scoping Review of Family Directed Services Aimed at Preventing Violent Extremism’. Journal of Family Therapy, February, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6427.12392.

Koehler, Daniel. 2013. ‘Family Counselling as Prevention and Intervention Tool against “Foreign Fighters”. The German “Hayat” Program’. Journal EXIT-Deutschland 3: 182–204.

———. 2015. ‘Using Family Counselling to Prevent and Intervene Against Foreign Fighters: Operational Perspectives, Methodology and Best Practices for Implementing Codes of Conduct’. In Understanding Deradicalization: Pathways to Enhance Transatlantic Common Perceptions and Practices, edited by Middle East Institute.

Noddings, Nel. 1986. Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics & Moral Education. Oakland: University of California Press, 2013.

Sikkens, Elga, Marion van San, Stijn Sieckelink, and Micha de Winter. 2017. ‘Parental Influence on Radicalization and De-Radicalization According to the Lived Experiences of Former Extremists and Their Families’. Journal for Deradicalization 12.

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