Author: Lotta Rahlf

Evaluation fulfils a variety of roles in the field of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), which often involves a range of non-state and civil society actors in primary, secondary and tertiary prevention activities. Against the backdrop of evaluation’s historical role in public policy, where evaluation often informed budget decisions (cf. Derlien, 1998), it is often associated with a legitimising function. This is particularly true in a highly competitive funding landscape, in which projects often compete for limited funds (Malet 2021; KN:IX 2020). When state funding bodies request evaluations, this can create the impression that evaluations are primarily control instruments (Sivenbring and Andersson Malmros 2019; cf. Treischl and Wolbring 2020).

However, evaluation can also be emancipatory. Self-evaluation in particular has the potential to professionalise the practice of preventing and countering violent extremism and to establish a stronger professional self-image (von Berg et al. 2024, 216). This opportunity contrasts with a reality in which the topic of evaluation has only increasingly come into focus in the past years (cf. Uhl and Kattein 2024; Bressan et al. 2024) yet it is still often criticised as inadequate in terms of scope and quality (cf. Feddes and Gallucci 2015; van Hemert et al. 2014). There are many reasons for this: On the one hand, there is frequently a lack of evaluation skills at an individual level, and, on the other hand, there is often a lack of institutionalised procedures and conditions at a structural level. The latter is currently being investigated as part of a country-comparative dissertation within the VORTEX doctoral network under the provisional title ‘Evaluation and Quality Management in the Field of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism – Twelve European Countries in Comparison’. However, there are also starting points at an organisational level to make evaluations more practicable: Appropriate structures and processes can, for example, demystify external evaluations and make the potential of self-evaluations more valuable and achievable. This blog post outlines three such levers at the organisational level: a systematic and impact-oriented practice, a monitoring system and a guideline for the case of evaluation within the organisation.

Systematic and impact-oriented practice

A P/CVE practice that is systematically structured and impact-oriented is much easier to evaluate than practice in which impact assumptions, intervention goals and success criteria have not been defined in advance. The development of a theory of change for the overall strategy is a fundamental first step, as it creates a common understanding of how and why certain measures should contribute to the achievement of objectives (INDEED 2023, 16).

However, it is also crucial to address the level of specific measures: Impact assumptions and intervention objectives should be precisely formulated and operationalised with measurable success criteria. In the evaluation of federally funded counselling centres in Germany, Karliczek et al. (2023) propose a model that differentiates objectives in disengagement work. The nine-field matrix structures goals both in terms of the reference level – i.e. whether they relate to the radicalised person themselves, to their interfaces with the environment or to the social environment – and in terms of the level of disengagement work, which distinguishes between pragmatic aspects, socio-affective-emotional dynamics and ideological-normative convictions.

If such intervention goals have been systematically developed and concretised using success criteria, counsellors can use them to reflect on the results of their work with clients, for example through measuring how their clients fare on each of them before and after an intervention (Karliczek et al. 2023, 106). A practice that works on this basis makes it much easier to document the impact of disengagement work in a comparable way across many cases. However, this is not about rigid standardisation, but about structured flexibility: in other words, a framework concept that guides professional action but does not restrict individual casework. One example of such a systematic procedure is the social diagnostic model adapted by the Violence Prevention Network e. V. for disengagement work. It combines a holistic analysis of cases with needs-oriented interventions and creates a sound basis for making impact both visible and assessable (von Berg et al. 2024). Importantly, it leaves flexibility to counsellors within the model so that they can decide which measures are necessary and appropriate in a given context. 

Establishing a monitoring system

Such a systematic approach naturally lends itself to monitoring, i.e. the ongoing, systematic recording of data. Applied to the aforementioned possibilities of measuring the results of disengagement work, this means regularly documenting whether a positive change has taken place for a client in relation to a specific intervention goal based on the specified impact assumptions and intervention goals. If we move away from the counselling example and towards trainings with multipliers on how to handle situations related to violent extremism, a key question might be whether participants feel more knowledgeable after the training. Tracking these self-assessments over time is essential for meaningful evaluation. While monitoring focuses on ongoing data collection, evaluation can go a step further: it may ask how effective the intervention is in achieving its intended goals and makes a judgement about its impact. In doing so, evaluation can build on the data collected through monitoring and analyse it to assess overall effectiveness (Junk 2021).

Being prepared for evaluation

Even if an organisation structures its work systematically and monitoring is firmly anchored in practice, conducting a self-evaluation – and especially an external evaluation – can be perceived as overwhelming. If the organisation is not sufficiently prepared, there is a risk that the potential of an impact-oriented approach to monitoring will remain unused. It is therefore advisable to think about responsibilities and coordination processes within the organisation at an early stage. Klöckner et al. (2021), for example, describe the benefits of an evaluation working group within civil society organisations focused on supporting clients with disengaging from violent extremist groups. Such a group can represent a recurring early exchange format within the organisation in preparation for an external evaluation. With regard to an upcoming external evaluation, such a working group offers a protected framework in which expectations, fears and specific needs can be openly addressed. In this way, the organisation can collect and communicate its needs and objectives at an early stage (expectation management) and discuss the possibilities of practical feasibility and already look at how evaluation results can be transferred into practice (cf. Klöckner et al. 2021, 7). The overarching goal of the evaluation working group is to strengthen the organisation’s identification with the evaluation process and thus ensure the greatest benefit of the evaluation for the organisation (INDEED 2023, 28). However, such an evaluation working group is also suitable for the preparation and coordination of self-evaluations. Here, too, it can be a recurring structure that accompanies the process of harnessing monitoring data for evaluation. 

This blogpost sought to explore how P/CVE organisations can better harness the potential of evaluation by embedding three structural levers into their work: First, developing systematic, impact-oriented practices, second, establishing monitoring systems to track progress over time, and third, preparing for evaluation through internal coordination processes such as a working group on evaluation. These strategies help make both self-evaluation and external evaluation more meaningful and manageable, thus transforming evaluation from a perceived burden into a valuable learning opportunity.

Sources

Bressan, Sarah, Sophie Ebbecke, and Lotta Rahlf. 2024. ‘How Do We Know What Works in Preventing Violent Extremism? Evidence and Trends in Evaluation from 14 Countries’. Berlin: GPPi; PrEval (PRIF). https://gppi.net/assets/BressanEbbeckeRahlf_How-Do-We-Know-What-Works-in-Preventing-Violent-Extremism_2024_final.pdf.

Derlien, Hans-Ulrich. 1998. ‘Le Développement Des Évaluations Dans Un Contexte International’. In Politiques Publiques: Évaluation, 7–11. Paris: Economica.

Feddes, Allard R., and Marcello Gallucci. 2015. ‘A Literature Review on Methodology Used in Evaluating Effects of Preventive and De-Radicalisation Interventions’. Journal for Deradicalization, no. 5 (December), 1–27.

Hemert, Dianne van, Helma van den Berg, Tony van Vliet, Maaike Roelofs, and Mirjam Huis in ’t Veld. 2014. ‘Synthesis Report on the State-of-the-Art in Evaluating the Effectiveness of Counter-Violent Extremism Interventions’. Deliverable 2.2. IMPACT Europe.

INDEED. 2023. ‘How to Design PVE/CVE and De-Radicalisation Initiatives and Evaluations According to the Principles of Evidence-Based Practice’. INDEED Consortium. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/eu-knowledge-hub-prevention-radicalisation/welcome-package/learning-resources/indeed-e-guidebook-2-how-design-pvecve-and-de-radicalisation-initiatives-and-evaluations-according_en.

Junk, Julian. 2021. Quality Management of P/CVE Interventions in Secondary and Tertiary Prevention: Overview and First Steps in Implementing Monitoring and Reporting. Radicalisation Awareness Network. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-12/ran_ad-hoc_quality_management_of_p-cve_interventions_122021_en.pdf.

Karliczek, Kari-Maria, Vivienne Ohlenforst, Dorte Schaffranke, Dennis Walkenhorst, und Juliane Kanitz. 2023. Evaluation bundesfinanzierter Beratungs-stellen: Abschlussbericht der Evaluation der Beratungsstellen zur Distanzierung und Deradikalisierung vom islamistischen Extremismus. Beiträge zu Migration und Integration, Band 12. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. Junk, Julian. 2021. Quality Management of P/CVE Interventions in Secondary and Tertiary Prevention: Overview and First Steps in Implementing Monitoring and Reporting. Radicalisation Awareness Network. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-12/ran_ad-hoc_quality_management_of_p-cve_interventions_122021_en.pdf.

Klöckner, Mona, Svetla Koynova, Johanna Liebich, and Lisa Neef. 2021. ‘Erfahrungen aus der Evaluationsplanung eines Aussteigerprogramms. Voraussetzungen für Wirksamkeitserfassung in der tertiären Extremismusprävention’. PRIF Report 6. Frankfurt am Main: PrEval Consortium. https://www.prif.org/fileadmin/Daten/Publikationen/Prif_Reports/2021/PRIF0621_barrierefrei.pdf  

KN:IX. 2020. ‘Kompetenznetzwerk “Islamistischer Extremismus” (KN:IX) – Herausforderungen, Bedarfe und Trends im Themenfeld’. Berlin: Kompetenznetzwerk Islamistischer Extremismus. https://kn-ix.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/KNIX-Report-2020.pdf.

Malet, David. 2021. ‘Countering Violent Extremism: Assessment in Theory and Practice’. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 16 (1): 58–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2021.1889017.

Sivenbring, Jennie, and Robin Andersson Malmros. 2019. Mixing Logics: Multiagency Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism. Göteborg: Segerstedinstitutet, Göteborgs Universitet. https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2020-03/1764750_korrekt-versionmixing-logics_digital_korrekt.pdf.

Treischl, Edgar, Tobias Wolbring. 2020. Wirkungsevaluation. Grundlagen, Standards, Beispiele, Weinheim/Basel: Beltz. 

Uhl, Andreas, and Ian Kattein. 2024. ‘Monitoring von Evaluationskapazitäten in der Extremismusprävention, Demokratieförderung und Politischen Bildung’. In PrEval Monitor: PrEval Zukunftswerkstätten. https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/PrEval/PrEval_Monitor_2024_engl..pdf

Von Berg, Annika, Dennis Walkenhorst, Gloriett Kargl, and Maximilian Ruf. 2023. Soziale Diagnostik in der Extremismusprävention – Diagnose, Fallverstehen, Intervention und Wirkungsmessung. Ideologie und Gewalt – Schriften zur Deradikalisierung. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42427-5.

Germany’s professional practice in the fields of extremism prevention, democracy promotion, and civic education is characterised by a notably high number and diversity of knowledge networks. These networks aim to connect civil society and state actors, facilitate professional exchange, and thereby strengthen the overall professionalisation of the field. In a European study on national and regional P/CVE networks, Dzhekova et al. (2024) highlight the unique German context:

‘In some countries, such as Germany, the multitude of actors involved in this work at state (province) level and the diversity of P/CVE programmes require stronger networking and exchange of experience between practitioners (but also with research and policy) to ensure the professionalisation of the field.’

During the 2020–2024 funding period of the federal programme ‘Live Democracy’, a total of fourteen so-called competence centres were funded, including the Competence Network on Right-Wing Extremism (KompRex) and the Competence Centre for the Prevention of Islamism (KN:IX). In the new funding period which began in 2025, these centres turned into the cooperation networks Competent in Right-Wing Extremism Prevention(KompRex, n.d.) and KN:IX connect (KN:IX connect, n.d.). Additionally, these phenomenon-specific networks are supplemented by others that deal specifically with counselling practice for exit and distancing/deradicalisation work, mobile counselling and counselling for victims and others affected by violent extremism. 

The the very same federal programme has seen the building of a comprehensive evaluation infrastructure. While ‘scientific company’ of individual funded projects and the programme as a whole has been an integral part of the federal programme from the beginning, as well as in previous programmes, the third funding period is accompanied by an evaluation network, consisting of six research institutes (BMI, n.d.).

A significant contribution to professionalising German prevention practice in recent years regarding evaluation, importantly also beyond such programme structures as  ‘Live democracy!’, has been the research and transfer project PrEval Zukunfswerkstätten. For the first time, it systematically surveyed evaluation capacities both nationally (Uhl et al. 2022) and internationally, with a view to deriving recommendations for Germany (Baykal et al. 2021; Bressan et al. 2024). It also identified the needs of practitioners regarding evaluation (Koynova et al. 2022), presented relevant methods (e.g. Klemm and Strobl 2024), and conducted pilot studies (e.g. Kindlinger et al. 2025). In addition, PrEval developed various support formats to foster methodological capacity-building and facilitate knowledge transfer within the field. Internationally, the project is considered exemplary for advancing the professionalisation of evaluation and quality assurance in the fields of extremism prevention, democracy promotion, and civic education.

One particular study analysed the need for support formats among practitioners and how they could be integrated into existing knowledge networks (Koynova et al. 2024). A visibility analysis showed that although various networks exist in the fields of extremism prevention, democracy promotion and civic education, there are hardly any publicly visible references to evaluation or quality assurance (Ibid., 26; cf. Tschöp et al. 2023). Nevertheless, in a follow-up survey, which primarily reached evaluators, six networks were named as relevant networks dealing with the topics of evaluation and quality assurance (ibid.). However, there were specific preferences regarding the type of network in which such topics were discussed. The authors found that ‘while practitioners (…) tend to describe access to thematically relevant networks in which they also exchange information on other issues in their fields of work, participants from academia or evaluation (…) predominantly describe access to networks focussing on evaluation and quality assurance, with which they are already familiar due to their focus of work […]’ (Tschöp et al. 2023, 8; translated from German; Koynova et al. 2024, 27). 

While no explicit reference to evaluation was found in the networks most frequently used by practitioners, it was assumed that internal exchanges on these topics do occur. Yet, the needs assessment clearly demonstrated practitioners’ need for exchange on evaluation and quality assurance, as well as for concrete support for evaluation projects (Koynova et al. 2022). To fill this gap, the authors of the PrEval study recommended to systematically strengthen the visibility and discoverability of relevant evaluation expertise within existing networks (Koynova et al., 2024, 27-28). Drawing on both the needs assessment and the visibility analysis of existing networks, several support formats were developed that can either be integrated into existing knowledge networks or serve to strengthen connections between them (ibid., 33). One such format is the ongoing counselling series ‘Evaluation and Quality Assurance’, currently piloted by the Violence Prevention Network and i-unito. The initiative is designed to support civil society organisations in developing and implementing evaluation and quality assurance processes. The programme offers modular support in areas such as designing impact models, defining indicators, developing data collection instruments, and analysing evaluation data (Giel 2025).

Another complementary project dealt with the conception of a helpdesk for evaluation and quality assurance in the fields of extremism prevention, democracy promotion and civic education in Germany. Surveying for needs among practitioners revealed that some would like to link such a service to established civil society organisations or networks in order to avoid any competitive dynamics (Ruf et al. 2024, 13). It was found that these networks already function as trustworthy contact points (ibid., 20) and that their use could help to avoid duplicate structures in the already complex prevention landscape (ibid., 27).

With the conclusion of the PrEval project at the end of 2025, a comprehensive body of knowledge is now available, both on the needs of practitioners and other stakeholders, and on how to implement practice-oriented support formats. Moreover, there are early experiences with piloting these formats. Key ‘products’ of the project such as the ideas and pilots of an evaluation database, low-threshold support formats, and the counselling series represent essential tools that can advance the professionalisation of evaluation and quality assurance in the field. 

The next crucial step is to maintain these formats and embed them institutionally. Since PrEval opened spaces to discuss evaluation beyond specific funding structures, existing knowledge networks lend themselves well for this purpose. While networks such as KN:IX are financed by ‘Live Democracy!’, they are not limited to projects of this funding structure. Moreover, their bottom-up character are well suited to discuss sensitive topics such as evaluation in an environment that is perceived as ‘safe’. Research on the institutionalisation of evaluation shows that such a process cannot succeed without a broader system of professionalisation (Meyer, Stockmann and Taube, 2020; cf. Stockmann and Meyer, 2016). Core components of such a system include structured training opportunities, peer learning formats, and shared professional standards. As several PrEval studies have highlighted, linking emerging support formats to established thematic knowledge networks could offer a practical pathway to strengthening a ‘system of professionalisation’. 

However, the success of this transfer largely depends on the capacities and resources available within those networks. The expertise developed within PrEval since 2020 is therefore more than just an output of the project – it is a critical enabler for future institutionalisation efforts. In other European countries, where civil society plays a less prominent role in prevention, there are typically fewer knowledge networks in the P/CVE field and related areas, as well as fewer research projects that explicitly research evaluation and invest in capacity building. Some isolated initiatives exist, such as institutionalised helpdesks in the Netherlands or best practice exchange formats in Denmark, but these are usually state-led and primarily target municipalities. By contrast, Germany’s knowledge networks provide alternative avenues to embed exchange and support formats for evaluation within civil society practice. The challenge now is to fully leverage this potential.

Sources

Baykal, Asena, Sarah Bressan, Julia Friedrich, Giulia Pasquali, Philipp Rotmann, and Marie Wagner. 2021. ‘Evaluating P/CVE: Institutional Structures in International Comparison’. GPPi; PrEval (PRIF). https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK_Preval/GPPi_2021_Extremismuspraevention_evaluieren_Institutionelle_Strukturen_i….pdf.

BMI. n.d. ‘Evaluation’. https://www.demokratie-leben.de/dl/programm/evaluation.

Bressan, Sarah, Sophie Ebbecke, and Lotta Rahlf. 2024. ‘How Do We Know What Works in Preventing Violent Extremism? Evidence and Trends in Evaluation from 14 Countries’. Berlin: GPPi; PrEval (PRIF). https://gppi.net/assets/BressanEbbeckeRahlf_How-Do-We-Know-What-Works-in-Preventing-Violent-Extremism_2024_final.pdf.

Dzhekova, Rositsa, Maximilian Ruf, Sophie Kuijper, Margareta Wetchy, and David Tschöp. 2024. ‘National and Regional Networks Focusing on P/CVE across the EU’. Radicalisation Awareness Network. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b70fc126-5856-498b-a5c6-abb5d88299b3_en?filename=ran_national_regional_networks_focusing_on_P-CVE_across_EU_en.pdf.

Giel, Susanne. 2025. ‘Beratungsreihe Evaluation und Qualitätssicherung’. Frankfurt am Main: PrEval Consortium. https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/PrEval/PrEval-Beratungsreihe/PrEval-Beratungsreihe_Evaluation_und_Qualit%C3%A4tssicherung_gesamt.pdf.

Kindlinger, Marcus, Lucy Huschle, and Hermann Josef Abs. 2025. ‘Entwicklung eines integrierten Modells und Selbsteinschätzungsinstruments für Digital Citizenship Literacy’. PrEval Studie 1. Frankfurt am Main: PrEval Consortium. https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/PrEval/PrEval_Studie_1_2025.pdf.

Klemm, Jana, and Rainer Strobl. 2024. ‘Wirkungsmodelle und ihr Potenzial für Evaluation und Qualitätssicherung in der Demokratieförderung’. PrEval Expertise. Frankfurt am Main: PrEval Consortium. https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/PrEval/PrEval_Expertise_01_2024.pdf.

KN:IX connect. n.d. ‘Islamistische Radikalisierung geschieht nicht im luftleeren Raum’. KN:IX Connect. n.d. https://kn-ix.de/.

Kober, Marcus, Lotta Rahlf, Mikhail Logvinov, Julian Junk, Helle Becker, and Marcus Kindlinger. 2024. ‘Zukunftswerkstatt “Evaluationsdatenbank”: Bericht’. Frankfurt am Main: PrEval Consortium. https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/PrEval/Bericht_ZW_Evaluationsdatenbank.pdf.

KompRex. n.d. ‘Das Netzwerk’. Kompetenz Netzwerk Rechtsextremismus Prävention. n.d. https://kompetenznetzwerk-rechtsextremismuspraevention.de/das-netzwerk/.

Koynova, Svetla, Lina Hartmann, Moritz Lorenz, David Tschöp. 2024. ‚Bericht der Zukunftswerkstatt Wissensnetzwerke‘. Frankfurt am Main: PrEval Consortium. https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/PrEval/Bericht_ZW_Wissensnetzwerke.pdf.

Koynova, Svetla, Alina Mönig, Matthias Quent, and Vivienne Ohlenforst. 2022. ‘Monitoring, Evaluation und Lernen: Erfahrungen und Bedarfe der Fachpraxis in der Prävention von Rechtsextremismus und Islamismus’. 7. Frankfurt am Main: Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK). https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/PRIF_Report_7_2022_barrierefrei.pdf.

Meyer, Wolfgang, Reinhard Stockmann, and Lena Taube. 2020. ‘The Institutionalisation of Evaluation: Theoretical Background, Analytical Concept and Methods’. In The Institutionalisation of Evaluation in Europe, edited by Wolfgang Meyer, Reinhard Stockmann, and Lena Taube, 3–36. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32284-7_1.

Ruf, Maximilian, David Tschöp, Janusz Biene-Clément, Moritz Lorenz, Alina Mönig, Toqa Hilal. 2024. ‚Bericht der Zukunftswerkstatt Helpdesk.‘ Frankfurt am Main: PrEval Consortium. https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/PrEval/Bericht_ZW_Helpdesk.pdf.

Stockmann, Reinhard, and Wolfgang Meyer. 2016. ‘The Future of Evaluation: Global Trends, New Challenges and Shared Perspectives’. In The Future of Evalaution: Global Trends, New Challenges, Shared Perspectives, edited by Reinhard Stockmann and Wolfgang Meyer, 9–19. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137376374.

Tschöp, David, Emma van Heeswijk, Lina Hartmann, Benedikt Büchsenschütz. 2023. ‚Auf der Suche nach Expertise. Die Schwierigkeiten bei der Auffindbarkeit von Wissensnetzwerken und Evaluationsexpertise in der Demokratieförderung, Extremismusprävention und politischen Bildung.‘ PrEval Working Paper 1. Frankfurt am Main: PrEval Consortium. https://preval.hsfk.de/fileadmin/PrEval/Working_Paper_AP5_21.09..pdf

Uhl, Andreas, Manuela Freiheit, Benjamin Zeibig, and Andreas Zick. 2022. ‘Evaluationskapazitäten im Bereich der Extremismusprävention und der politischen Bildung in Deutschland’. 9. Frankfurt am Main: Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK). https://doi.org/10.48809/prifrep2209.

Certain topics naturally bring together not only academics but also policymakers and professionals who work on them. Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and, by extension also terrorism, is one example, where research intersects with real-world challenges faced by law enforcement, civil society actors, and policymakers. These professionals, who often enough work in their own filter bubbles, have much to gain from networking. Yet, opportunities for cross-sectoral mutual learning and networking often remain limited due to structural as well as professional hurdles. This blog post describes the opportunities, but also the challenges, of these rare occasions of coming together. 

The most common format for meetings are thematic conferences, which are open to researchers as well as representatives from politics and practice. One example of this is the recently held 6th annual conference of Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) in April 2025, titled “Rank and Files or Memes and Likes? Terrorist Organisations, Groups, Networks.” As the title suggests, the conference centred on violent extremists’ and terrorists’ activities in the online sphere – a particularly complex and evolving challenge for policymakers and law enforcement agencies but also a topic that has caught increased scholarly attention. This is a commonality of such networking conferences: They tend to focus on those topics that are felt as the most pressing and emerging challenges in countering violent extremism and terrorism. Networking events, therefore, serve as a marketplace for informational demand and supply, ensuring that discussions remain relevant and forward-looking. In this marketplace, policymakers and practitioners seek insights on current and future threats and face challenges on dealing with them. Many so-called national action plans, strategic policy documents on preventing and countering violent extremism, emphasise the need for evidence-based decision-making. Even when policymakers do not immediately recognise the relevance of academic research, exposure to new insights can have indirect but significant effects on policy formulation. Likewise, practitioners, whether from law enforcement or civil society, can share their experiences and provide feedback on how existing P/CVE policies or research resonates with their work. Lastly, for researchers, such a conference offers the opportunity to influence policy and practice with their research findings, either by offering new insights or by providing critical perspectives.

Two examples from the ECTC conference can be highlighted since the programme of the conference was published and both projects are publicly described. One example for research influencing policy and practice is the VEOMAP research project funded by the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange and realised at the ITSTIME research centre in Milan, which drew on open-source intelligence and used social network analysis to explore the pro-Islamic State (IS) information ecosystem and its evolution on the surface web (July 2023-March 2024) (see Lakomy 2024). By showing the structure, among others the quite centralised nature of this ecosystem, such research may resonate with similar findings from law enforcement agencies, go beyond them or inspire practice methodologically. A different example, showing the possibility of sharing experiences with P/CVE policy, albeit without going too much into the detail of this process, is the proscription of the Terrorgram collective as terrorist organisation on 26 April 2024 in the United Kingdom (see Home Office 2024). Sharing the steps and implications of this progress as well as perspectives on its effectiveness allowed policymakers and law enforcement agents from other countries to contemplate whether similar efforts could be realised in their respective national contexts.

While the picture painted here sounds promising, it is not without its problems in reality. Two interlinked problems will be discussed here. Firstly, professional differences between the actors often stand in the way of learning from one another and fruitful dialogue. Policymakers and law enforcement agents are often said to ‘think’ differently from prevention actors, as the former focus strongly on eliminating security risks and the latter have a broader understanding of prevention that also looks at the strengths of individuals and society against violent extremism. It seems counterintuitive at first, but to bridge these differences, which is necessary to enable a fruitful exchange and learning from each other, a lot of dialogue and trust is needed. One conference alone will not be able to create this. Instead, regular formats are needed that enable interpersonal relationships and a ‘meeting again’, an important basis for building trust. Only in such a setting is it conceivable that P/CVE practitioners in particular, some of whom have a special relationship with P/CVE policymakers due dependency relationships caused by public funding programmes, will be encouraged to share their experiences and criticism. Only when trust has been established do researchers get the impression that they are met with honest interest and open ears. However, structural bottlenecks in the P/CVE field, especially a lack of more stable funding, mean that exchange formats tend to appear sporadically rather than being permanent. Without naming examples here, there are some of these kinds of exchange formats that started promisingly and then fizzled out due to domestic political changes in the country that funded the event or due to the expiry of the one-off funding period. Others have been good spaces for exchange for years, where both new and the same people have been able to meet again and again, and which are now at risk of dissolution due to an administrative change, and it remains unclear to what extent previous formats will be continued. Those who want to secure the benefits of these exchange formats would do well to ensure that they are not a one-off event or that their future is uncertain, but that they take place regularly and thus allow some trust-building in the P/CVE and counterterrorism field. 

After a government collapse in 2024, Germany faced another federal election on February 23, 2025. In the 2021 federal elections, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a party that is now even listed by German federal security authorities as a case of a suspected right-wing extremist organisation, entered the German Bundestag for the first time while more than doubling its result in the previous election with 12.6%. In this year’s federal election, the AfD received 20.8% of all votes, making it the second strongest party behind the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In the federal states of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia, the respective state Office for the Protection of the Constitution has categorised the state associations of the AfD as ‘definitely right-wing extremist’. However, all three are also examples of federal states in which the AfD enjoys particular support. In the federal elections, the party received 37.3%, 32.5% and 38.6% respectively. 

However, instead of clearly distancing themselves from the party in their campaigns, some democratic parties, those that had long perceived themselves as representatives of a ‘centre of society’, increasingly tapped into narratives that the AfD is strongly capitalising on, especially during the run-up to the elections. The reaction to deadly attacks in recent months with a debate on migration and asylum is just one example of this. Moreover, the so-called ‘firewall’ against the far-right, an agreement that democratic parties would not cooperate with far-right parties, started to crumble just before the federal elections. In early February, the candidate for chancellor of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) tabled a motion in the Bundestag aimed at limiting irregular immigration to Germany, which found a majority with the votes of the AfD parliamentary group. It is a novelty in German post-war history that the votes of an extreme right-wing party have helped such a motion to gain a majority. This step has benefited one party in particular: It showed the AfD that it can influence conventional politics and is accepted by other parties – albeit indirectly – as a majority procurer. Lastly, another current example is a formal question from the CDU/CSU parliamentary group to the federal government on the political neutrality of state-funded organisations, which was submitted two days before the federal election. Numerous organisations, whose ‘political neutrality’ the CDU/CSU would like to have examined, had organised demonstrations against right-wing extremism and in response to the fall of the ‘firewall’ before the election. At present, there is a wave of criticism that this represents an attempt to intimidate civil society protest against right-wing extremism and for democratic values. The CDU/CSU’s questions also relate to organisations that receive funding as part of Germany’s largest funding programme for democracy and against violent extremism, namely ‘Live Democracy!’. This is a sinister sign, as it shows that civil society engagement against the far and extreme right is becoming politically unpopular or that attitudes that were originally reserved for the AfD are being ‘normalised’. This blog post takes this as an opportunity to present three doomsday scenarios of what the future of measures to prevent and counter violent extremism (PCVE) could look like if the AfD continues to gain power.

One possible scenario is the participation of the AfD in government, potentially as a junior partner in a coalition. This could, for example, influence federal budget decisions and federal education policy, which could in turn lead to a restructuring of the federal ‘Live Democracy!’ programme. Historically, the roots of today’s diverse German PCVE landscape, the bulk of which is implemented by civil society, lie in federal programmes for the prevention of right-wing extremism and racism. It is thanks to this history, as well as the country’s general dark history, that despite an increased focus on PCVE measures against religiously motivated extremism after 9/11, many measures are still explicitly aimed at preventing right-wing extremism. However, if the AfD were in government, it may influence the allocation of public funds to PCVE projects, with a shift towards those addressing left-wing and religiously-motivated extremism, arguing that these are the ‘real’ threats to our present society. Notably, as these terms are already inherently normative, they could also be given a new interpretation causing, for example, actors who currently promote democratic values to be labelled as ‘left-wing extremists’. Consequently, PCVE projects against right-wing extremism would decrease in number, and the respective projects would come under increasing pressure to seek funding elsewhere or reorient themselves. Any PCVE project that seeks to receive public funding in the future under such a government will need to swim with the current. However, it is not only the increasing lack of measures to prevent right-wing extremism that represent a collapse of an important pillar of a resilient democracy. PCVE measures to prevent religiously motivated extremism, which only ‘dance to the tune’ of a right-wing extremist party’s demands, will presumably be designed in such a way that they are highly stigmatising and thus not what we today understand as ‘effective’. 

In a second scenario, the AfD could one day even become part of the federal government. In this case, it might even have the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of the Interior under its control. If that were to happen, it would even be possible for ‘Live Democracy!’ to be abolished altogether or replaced by a new ideologically driven programme. A ‘blacklist’ for civil society organisations that take a clear stance against right-wing extremism could be part of this doomsday scenario and be excluded from funding. As a result, some civil society organisations would not even have the opportunity to reorient themselves, they would have to close or rely on donations only. Lastly, a final and the darkest scenario is an AfD-led government in which the AfD holds key ministries such as the Ministry of the Interior, Justice or Education. Not only would the work of civil society organisations against right-wing extremism no longer be supported, it could also be defamed and criminalised as agitations against the state and endangering national security. Repressive measures against such ‘criminal actors’ represent the pinnacle of this scenario. Where security authorities no longer work against right-wing structures, but with them, there is no longer any room at all for what we understand as PCVE today. There could be measures under this banner, yet these would themselves be right-wing extremist in nature and based on a concept of extremism that is directed against enemies of a right-wing extremist government. Although even today it is not entirely undisputed what the kind of ‘extremism’ PCVE measures are directed against, such an understanding of PCVE would only be an instrument legitimising violence and discrimination, a perversion of its original function. 

What can be done to prevent these doomsday scenarios? On the one hand, active efforts must be made to ensure that the AfD’s rise to political power does not materialise. This requires decisive action from democratic parties, which must reinforce the ‘firewall’ against extremist influence. Ironically, it also calls for strengthening the very PCVE measures that combat radicalisation. If these measures were funded by the democratic parties currently in power, with the longest possible legally secured funding periods, their preventative impact could be significantly enhanced. On the other hand, democratic parties must also fortify or change the institutional frameworks in which PCVE measures operate, ensuring they remain resilient against potential political interference. One critical step would be to guarantee financial stability for civil society organisations, rather than leaving them reliant on annually approved funding. A democracy promotion law, which could have provided such security, was blocked in 2021 by the CDU and again in 2023 by federal states led by the CDU and the CSU. Their objections centred on concerns about potential support for so-called ‘left-wing’ extremist organisations and ambiguities in the definition of extremism – similar arguments to those we are seeing again today. Another step could therefore be to provide better financial support to the federal states and local authorities so that they can embed tried-and-tested and ‘effective’ PCVE measures in regular structures. This would also take some of the political attention away from the PCVE landscape. Moreover, it would also be a sensible structural development of Germany’s highly experimental PCVE landscape with its numerous ‘model projects’, as those that have proven successful could enjoy a longer-term future.

Projects run by civil society are believed to be particularly valuable in preventing and countering violent extremism and in fostering democracy more broadly. For example, they can reach target groups that harbour opposition to state actors and they often possess valuable knowledge about local needs allowing for tailored services. For these and many other reasons, some countries, such as Germany, rely heavily on civil society efforts for promoting democracy and diversity as well as preventing and countering violent extremism. However, for such a diverse civil society landscape to flourish, the predictability of its financial support needs to be strengthened. This blog post explains why financial dependence on public funding, while useful and without alternative, can sometimes be dangerous, and what should be done to prevent such scenarios.

Federal programmes to promote democracy and prevent and counter violent extremism have a fairly long tradition in Germany. Since the early 1990s, federal programmes have provided public funding for projects to promote democracy and, initially, to combat racism. The largest and currently probably best-known federal programme established in 2015 is the ‘Live Democracy!’ programme. In its second funding period, 182 million euros were distributed to various civil society actors to implement projects to promote democracy and prevent and counter violent extremism of all kinds. A third funding period was due to start in early 2025. But then Germany was plunged into a budget crisis triggered by a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court on the unconstitutional retroactive use of climate and transformation funds, which left a funding gap of 60 billion euros. The federal government was faced with the challenge of revising existing spending plans while at the same time complying with the constitutional requirements of the debt brake. The tense political situation led to heated debates within the governing coalition, with no agreement being reached on savings and priorities. As a result of the deadlock, a federal budget for 2025 was not adopted in time and the budget crisis even ultimately led to the collapse of the German federal government. Although a provisional agreement on the 2025 budget was reached in July 2024, the differences within the so-called ‘traffic light coalition’ remained and led to the dissolution of the coalition and the scheduling of new elections in February 2025.

For the civil society projects funded by ‘Live Democracy!’, this again translated into existential fears. With funding due to expire at the end of the year and no federal budget set for 2025, many projects for which federal funding was a financial cornerstone were threatened with closure. Although this was only a fear and not yet a fact, civil society projects faced many challenges: How, for example, to retain qualified staff in the face of these prospects? The scenario of a shrinking supply of civil society projects promoting democracy and preventing and countering violent extremism would have mainly played into the hands of those actors for whom these projects were already a thorn in their side. A specialist from the Federal Association for Mobile Counselling expressed great concern to researchers at ‘Netzpolitik.org’, stating that if the services were to disappear, ‘what the AfD has wanted for a long time would have been achieved through the back door’. In short, it suddenly became a tangible scenario that the German democracy would lose some of its ‘Wehrhaftigkeit’ [defensibility]. 

It was not until mid-November 2024 that the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs sent a circular to the funded projects stating that the projects selected for funding would receive at least a pro rata allocation of the funding requested for 2025 until the newly elected federal government had passed a budget for 2025. The Ministry also held out the prospect of an extension of the approval period and an increase in funding. This was made possible by provisional budget management. As a result, the federal government retained its ability to act and fulfil its legal obligations even without an adopted budget. This also made it possible to publish a new funding guideline on 24 November 2024, which came into force on 1 January 2025. Since summer 2024, civil society organisations have been able to apply for funding from 2025 and many projects have been selected to be considered for funding and can now submit funding applications. These must now be reviewed and approved so that the promised funds are available to the projects in a legally binding manner. Importantly, one of the new features is the extension of the funding phase to eight years to provide more planning certainty.

How should this situation in Germany be viewed? On the one hand, state support for a large and diverse civil society PCVE practice in Germany is absolutely necessary. After all, this wealth of projects could not be sustained by private funding alone, and private funding would be even more volatile than state funding. The fact that there are such large federal programmes for the prevention of extremism in Germany is a great advantage in international and European comparison. On the other hand, recent developments also show the need for regular funding structures that are less affected by such political crises. Extending the funding period to eight years is a step in the right direction. Another could be to fund organisations rather than individual projects, so that they can plan for the longer term and are not under pressure to innovate. Such longer planning periods could also provide an incentive to evaluate activities and thus make the whole practice more effective. Some time ago, a so-called ‘Democracy Promotion Act’ was proposed in Germany to provide a legal basis for federal funding to create long-term and transparent funding that is more sustainable and less dependent on government crises and changes. However, this law has not yet been passed due to political disputes over its content and the distribution of funds. It remains to be seen whether the new governing parties will be able to agree on such an important solution to strengthen Germany’s diverse PCVE landscape.

In a follow-up to a blog post on violence against politicians by Joshua Farrell-Molloy, a previous VORTEX piece reported on the development of these attacks in Germany and reflected on possible causes. This blog post will now focus on the consequences of these attacks and possible strategies to deal with this phenomenon.

Attacks on politicians have both immediate and long-term consequences that threaten democracy. All the studies listed in the previous VORTEX blog post on violence against politicians in Germany show that politicians are increasingly considering giving up their political careers or are less willing to speak out on certain political issues in public because of experiences of verbal hostility or physical attacks against them. According to the MOTRA study, more than one in ten of those affected have considered resigning from office or have stated that they will not run for local political office again. In the Körber Foundation study, 19% of the mayors surveyed had considered withdrawing from politics and finally, in the study by the University of Duisburg-Essen and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, which focused on large cities, the figure was still around 5%.

Behavioural changes by politicians due to fears that they might (in future) be subject to hostility or attacks are particularly problematic. According to the Körber Foundation study, 68% of the mayors surveyed have already changed their behaviour due to concerns about hostility or insults. Even among those who have not yet been affected by hostility and attacks, for example, 35% (mostly) refrain from using social media out of concern about hostility and attacks and 29% express themselves less frequently on certain topics than before. Both withdrawal because of attacks and preventive changes in behaviour cause lasting damage to democracy. Local political activity becomes less attractive, especially for those who are more likely to be targeted by right-wing scapegoating narratives because of their political stances. Withdrawal from social networks also means that democratic voices are increasingly disappearing, and anti-democratic voices are gaining ground.

So, what can be done to reduce the number of such attacks and prevent further consequences that threaten democracy? A first measure would certainly be to strengthen police investigation and prosecution capacities. But this can only go hand in hand with educating those affected about what kind of online and offline threats can be reported under criminal law and how. Those affected by hate speech on the internet need to be informed, for example, about how to secure evidence in the digital space, what kind of screenshots they need to take, that they should also secure URLs and metadata such as the IP address and how to report the platforms. Moreover, there is a need to simplify reporting channels and criminal charges as well as providing generally accessible support structures for those affected. Since this year, the German Forum for Crime Prevention has been a nationwide point of contact for those affected thanks to funding from the Federal Ministry of the Interior and acts as a coordinating guide (Starke Stelle). Some federal states in Germany have already set a good example by establishing central contact points for those affected, e.g. Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, Saxony and Bavaria. Those affected can also be referred to civil society organisations, which can help them develop concrete strategies to increase their confidence or take individual preventive measures (e.g. apply for a ban on disclosure).

One example of such a civil society organisation is HateAid. This is a not-for-profit organisation that supports those affected by digital violence. It helps people who experience hate, hate speech or threats online – be it on social media, in forums or via direct messages. The aim is to provide them with legal, psychological and financial support and to show them how to defend themselves against digital attacks. The organisation offers free advice and assistance with gathering evidence and making a complaint. In certain cases, HateAid will also pay for legal action against the perpetrators and help to enforce claims for damages. As well as providing direct help, HateAid also lobbies politically for tougher laws against digital violence and campaigns for better protection online. Through awareness campaigns and education programmes, the organisation raises awareness of the dangers of hate speech and strengthens digital civil society

Other examples are the Federal Association for Mobile Counselling, which also offers mobile counselling for municipal officials and elected representatives in every federal state and published a guide on the topic of threats against local politicians in 2021, together with the Association of counselling centres for victims of right-wing, racist and anti-Semitic violence. The National Centre for Crime Prevention published similar guide in 2020. Since April 2021, there has also been the ‘Stark im Amt’ portal, which is operated by the Körber Foundation together with the municipal umbrella organisations and is aimed at those affected by local politics. It provides both networking and prevention work by showing how local politicians can prepare themselves for potential threats and how to behave in the event of attacks.

However, in addition to providing support for those affected and criminal prosecution, the problem of threats and physical attacks against politicians must also be tackled preventively. Germany has a particularly diverse range of civic education, democracy promotion and extremism prevention measures that contribute in various ways to making society more resilient to scapegoating narratives, for example. In the area of extremism prevention, many civil society organisations also provide advice in cases of potential radicalisation. Such services are indispensable, especially in times of multiple interlinked crises, which is why it would only be a welcome development if the financial support for such projects were secured in the long term.