Author: Laura Stritzke

Editor note: This article was originally published on the PRIF Blog and co-authored with Isabelle Stephanblome.

Following the violent incidents in Aschaffenburg (2025), Mannheim (2025), and Magdeburg (2024), public debate increasingly revolved around the unclear motives and the mental health of the perpetrators. In all three cases, investigators from the security authorities found no clear motive, but did determine the presence of mental illness. In response, several political advances were made calling for the registration of individuals undergoing psychiatric treatment by security agencies and for an expansion of the “dangerous person”^[i] (Gefährder) categories. Within research, diffuse motives for extremist violence and the role of mental health have been discussed for several years. However, the recent conflation of mental health and threat falls short of the complexity of the issue.

In the past three years, there has been a noticeable increase in public acts of violence in Germany. Whether they were driven by extremist motives has not always been clear. While some acts, such as the 2023 attack on a city festival in Solingen, could be assigned to a specific phenomenon area (in that case: Islamist terrorism), others, such as the Magdeburg attack of 2024, were more difficult to fit into established patterns. Moreover, it remained unclear what role the perpetrators’ mental health had played.

Unclear Motives, Mental Health, and the Role of Security Authorities

Political responses varied, but many linked motive and mental health, calling for more repressive security measures. For instance, following the attack on the Magdeburg Christmas market, members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group demanded that violent offenders with mental illnesses be recorded by security authorities and that a new “dangerous person” category be introduced. The Conference of the German Ministers of the Interior also called for an “integrated risk management system for people with mental illnesses”. The Hessian state government recently came under pressure after introducing a controversial draft law to the state parliament that would amend the state’s Mental Health Support Act (Psychisch-Kranken-Hilfe-Gesetz, PsychKHG) by adding a clause requiring psychiatric institutions to share patient data with security authorities. The government defended the measure as a necessary contribution to the “protection of the affected individuals and the community”. Criticism of such initiatives came both from the general public and from professional associations. The German Chamber of Psychotherapists warned that such measures would “stigmatize people with mental illnesses and reduce the likelihood that individuals seek effective treatment.” During the hearing of the Health and Family Affairs Committee in the Hessian parliament, the planned reporting obligation was also met with widespread criticism.

From a scholarly perspective, these developments are noteworthy in that they mirror ongoing yet initially separate debates within extremism research. Central questions include how to classify motives and “dangerous persons,” how to account for mental health factors, and where to draw the boundaries and assign responsibilities for (preventive) measures. Two aspects are of particular importance here: the connection between psychiatric care and public security measures, and the expansion of the already ambiguous term “dangerous person” (Gefährder).

On the One Hand: Mental Health, Violence, and the Logic of Security Agencies

In the wake of attacks, public discourse often focuses not only on ideology and the attributed background of perpetrators but also on their mental health. Aspects of mental health also play a role for law enforcement when investigating motives and assessing criminal responsibility—which can, in turn, complicate categorization. Research broadly agrees that politically motivated violence cannot be explained by a single factor. Pathways into violence are complex and multifaceted; mental health may be one of many contributing components. Public acts of violence in particular highlight how closely society, politics, worldviews, and the psyche are intertwined.

This complexity, however, plays only a secondary role in the work of security authorities. Their task is to classify acts within established legal and phenomenological categories, with the primary aim of protecting public safety and order through risk prevention and law enforcement. This approach differs distinctly from that of psychological care, which centers on building a trusting therapeutic relationship grounded in respect and confidentiality. Psychotherapists and psychiatrists are bound primarily to the well-being of their patients and are subject to professional secrecy (§ 203 StGB, § 11(1) BO-H). Confidentiality, however, is limited when the safety of the patient or others is at risk. Therapists and psychiatrists are therefore legally required to disclose planned crimes or other threats to significant legal interests (§ 138 ff. StGB, § 11(2) BO-H). This safety mechanism is already well established in psychosocial practice.

Assigning psychiatrists a role in repressive threat prevention or granting security authorities access to patient data risks undermining the very principles of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic work. International research shows that the “securitization” of mental health can hinder the establishment of trust and deter individuals from seeking therapy. In addition, many places in Germany already lack the resources and capacity to provide comprehensive psychotherapeutic care. Instead of expanding psychosocial and psychiatric support systems for prevention and intervention, the political proposals discussed above would prioritize security logic and broaden the scope of state control.

On the Other Hand: Unclear Motives, “Potential Threats,” and New Categories

The second key aspect emerging from these debates concerns the categorization of attacks by security authorities. In the Magdeburg case, investigators reported no clear motive that would allow classification within the established spectrum of political violence. Although extremist and conspiratorial elements appeared in the perpetrator’s statements, investigators found no coherent ideological framework. The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office therefore did not classify the attack as terrorism. Some scholars, however, have attributed a right-wing extremist ideology to the perpetrator.

Worldwide, an increasing number of politically motivated violent acts no longer fit the traditional typologies of extremism. The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) recently reported that over a quarter of politically motivated crimes fall under the category “other classification.” The rigid categories of right-wing, left-wing, and religiously motivated violence have long been criticized. Moreover, there is a growing “hybridization” of ideological elements: perpetrators and their worldviews often combine disparate ideological fragments and resist clear classification. There is not yet a uniform term for these phenomena, given their diversity. While some scholars refer to “salad-bar extremism,” others emphasize recurring elements such as anti-feminist or antisemitic narratives and anti-governmentalism. Still others highlight the role of conspiracy theories and online subcultures of hate. These developments pose new challenges for intelligence and security services worldwide. In the UK, for instance, the national counterterrorism strategy has introduced the category “mixed, unclear, unstable,” and in Germany, the domestic intelligence agency (Verfassungsschutz) has added the classification “delegitimization of the state relevant to constitutional protection.” Such categorization efforts, however, remain diffuse while simultaneously expanding state intervention powers—leading to recurring criticism.

A similar issue arises with the term “dangerous person”, which featured prominently in post-Magdeburg debates. Since the early 2000s, it has gained increasing prominence in counterterrorism discourse and security practice in Germany, though it remains legally undefined. This ambiguity, combined with the far-reaching powers associated with such classification, has made the term controversial among scholars. The working definition used by security agencies in Germany refers to a persons for whom “specific facts justify the assumption that they will commit politically motivated crimes of considerable significance.” In contrast to convicted offenders, there has been no criminal offence committed yet), rather, it is a prognosis of future wrongdoing. However, in political discourse, the term has often been used as if it denoted certainty, particularly in connection with Islamist terrorism. Introducing a new “dangerous person” category based not on extremist affiliations but on an individual’s mental health would stretch the concept even further and make it prone to political exploitation.

The Need for Differentiation and Far-Sighted Responses

In the aftermath of recent attacks, political debates in Germany have blurred separate aspects: the hybridization of extremist phenomena and the role of mental health in violent acts. Conflating these aspects leads to a problematic simplification of causal relationships and overlooks the complexity of both radicalization processes and mental illness. The introduction of new, imprecise categories risks further eroding the boundaries between psychosocial care and repressive security measures. Public pressure on politicians after violent attacks is high, and the desire for public safety is understandable—but expanding security measures is not a panacea. Hasty demands for widened state competencies disregard the multifaceted causes of political violence and risk stigmatizing those with mental illness. In order to close security gaps, it is rather necessary to improve the psychosocial care and strengthen psychotherapeutic prevention approaches.   

---

^[i] All German quotations have been translated by the authors.

Contemporary attacks bring renewed attention to the factors that drive individuals toward violence. While many media representations condense and dramatize these dynamics, the film Mit der Faust in die Welt schlagen (engl. Punching the World) resists such narrative intensification. Instead, the storyline relies on episodic observations of daily life. Constanze Klaue’s film is a poignant portrayal of two brothers, Philipp and Tobi, growing up in Eastern Germany in the early 2000s. Set in a post-socialist region still adjusting to a new economic and political order, the story captures the lingering effects of systemic transition on everyday life. Many facets have been undergoing visible change – abandoned factory buildings, new teaching approaches and ways of living among others. The Zschornack family, too, tries to build a new home, leaving behind their old apartment block. The construction work on the house becomes a symbol for a promise of progress that slowly collapses. The parents grow increasingly absent, both physically and emotionally exhausted by long working hours or defeated by unemployment. Growing up in this collapsing family structure, Philipp and Tobi find their attempts to stabilize the situation at home futile. With few outlets for support or distraction, the appeal of a local neo-Nazi group begins to fill the void. Although the brothers share the same environment, they follow different paths of radicalization. On closer examination, the divergent trajectories of Tobi and Philipp can be attributed to their distinct developmental stages and the role of social bonds.

Following an incident of right-wing vandalism at school, Philipp connects with a school mate linked to the neo-Nazi group, promising adventures. At first this includes late nights out, drinking, roaming the streets and smashing things – “punching the world”. Philipp experiences a newfound sense of purpose and belonging. However, once the violence is directed toward living beings, his hesitation grows. A pivotal moment occurs when he must kill a dog injured by their car—an act that contrasts with his caring, protective role as an older brother. As Philipp becomes more involved in the group, he spends less time with his younger brother. Meanwhile, Tobi loses other bonds that were important to him: the death of his grandfather, the breakdown of a childhood friendship, and the mysterious disappearance of the beloved neighbor’s dog. The parents are unable to support him in overcoming these ruptures. His father distances himself through alcoholism and an affair and his mother is increasingly overstrained by the burden of work and care. Left alone in his grief, Tobi’s pain transforms into anger. It is right then when his chance for escape appears. The group’s leader invites Tobi to join their forays. He eagerly accepts, not only for a sense of adventure, but in hope of reconnecting with his brother. However, Philipp finds his way out just when Tobi is getting involved. 

Taking a developmental psychological perspective, it is likely that the neo-Nazi group serves different functions for the brothers possibly explaining the different radicalization pathways. While Philipp is in the midst of adolescence, he is in a process of distancing himself from the family not only due to their internal difficulties but also due to his developmental stage (Hazen et al., 2008). Tobi, however, is still a child whose need for secure attachments is unmet and searched for in that extremist group. Particularly the absence of strong social bonds has been identified as a contributing factor in processes of radicalization and the turn to violent extremism (Jasko et al., 2017). Besides, in becoming involved early in right-wing extremist and violent activities, his involvement is more likely to be life-time persistent (Moffitt, 2010). Philipp on the other hand, is able to improve his living conditions, move to a bigger city, own a motorcycle that allows for sporadic visits home and quickly carries him through the vast landscapes of the region. Tobi on the other hand is still stuck in old structures, as he does his training under poor conditions, with little prospect for change. His involvement culminates in the final scenes of the film when he together with the extremist group set their former school on fire that is supposed to become a home for refugees. What becomes evident are their differences likely grounding in developmental discrepancies to rely on the family bonds when the neo-Nazi group appears in their lives. 

In the broader neo-Nazi group, too, the young men share common frustrations: fathers or relatives unable to find work, feelings of abandonment, and rising resentment toward migrants. Their stories show that radicalization is not just about beliefs or actions—it also has a powerful affective dimension not only toward ‘the other’, but also toward the group (Haq et al., 2020). Besides the interplay of the cognitive, behavioral and affective dimensions to radicalization, the movie accomplishes to underscore that radicalization is not linear but rather a dynamic and multifactorial process (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). Certain radicalization pathways — such as radicalization without violence, into violence, or within violence — are the result of a complex combination of different dynamics (Jensen et al., 2020; Knight et al., 2017). This involves not only considering factors such as strong social bonds but also recognizing how these interact with developmental processes across the lifespan. Doing so allows for a more nuanced understanding of radicalization processes during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood.

In sum, Punching the World is the story of two brothers exposed to the same conditions but diverging in their response to loss, stagnation, and emotional neglect. It is also a story about growing up in post-socialist Germany, where adapting to individualist norms, rising competition, and neoliberal ideals clashes with the erosion of previous forms of solidarity. The children witness their parents’ decline under mounting pressures, while faced with their own developmental challenges. Radicalization in each case fills a vacuum. While for Philipp it goes hand in hand with the adolescent urge for adventure and distance from the family, Tobi seeks stable attachments and ways to process his rage and disorientation thereby becoming more deeply and persistently involved. 

Bibliography 

Haq, H., Shaheed, S., & Stephan, A. (2020). Radicalization Through the Lens of Situated Affectivity. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 205. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00205

Hazen, E., Schlozman, S., & Beresin, E. (2008). Adolescent Psychological Development. Pediatrics In Review, 29(5), 161–168. https://doi.org/10.1542/pir.29.5.161

Jasko, K., LaFree, G., & Kruglanski, A. (2017). Quest for Significance and Violent Extremism: The Case of Domestic Radicalization. Political Psychology, 38(5), 815–831. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12376

Jensen, M. A., Atwell Seate, A., & James, P. A. (2020). Radicalization to Violence: A Pathway Approach to Studying Extremism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 32(5), 1067–1090. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1442330

Knight, S., Woodward, K., & Lancaster, G. L. J. (2017). Violent versus nonviolent actors: An empirical study of different types of extremism. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 4(4), 230–248. https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000086

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2017). Understanding political radicalization: The two-pyramids model. American Psychologist, 72(3), 205–216. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000062

Moffitt, T. E. (2010). Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy. In Biosocial Theories of Crime. Routledge.

Extremism prevention work that focuses on universal or the overlap of universal and selective pedagogical prevention often relies on the development and implementation of workshop formats (Ceylan & Kiefer, 2022; Slama & Kemmesies, 2020). These workshops address diverse participants in a group setting, ranging from students in schools to multipliers like teachers in training, social workers, and police or prison officers. During implementation, various forms of resonance are generated (Koynova et al., 2022). Such feedback can serve as a tool for the iterative formative assessment of the implementation process, helping facilitators adjust and improve workshops dynamically (Golding & Adam, 2016; Husain & Khan, 2016). Unlike evaluation, this monitoring offers a descriptive overview of the current state of implementation (Junk, 2021; Koynova et al., 2022).

During my secondment at the Violence Prevention Network (VPN), I worked on a project aimed at refining feedback tools to better fit the demands of prevention practice and enhance their potential for monitoring processes. To achieve this, we collaborated closely with practitioners, incorporating their perspectives and experiences while following a procedure inspired by design thinking (Meinel et al., 2011). This iterative, practice-oriented approach enabled us to systematically analyze the needs of practitioners, identify challenges in feedback collection, and refine tools through testing and incremental adjustments. In line with previous reports, core concerns included limited time, personnel, and financial resources (Koynova et al., 2022). Thus, when designing the feedback tools, time efficiency, integrability into the course of the workshop, and quick and simple documentation were mainly considered (s. also Junk, 2021). In this light, this blog post summarizes the background and development of the project, exploring how feedback can best be used for monitoring in universal and selective prevention contexts.

Across disciplines, feedback is generally understood as information about how something is perceived (e.g., Jacobs et al., 2010; Jug et al., 2019; Voyer et al., 2016). In the context of extremism prevention, the possibilities and use of feedback can vary between individual counseling, typically employed in selective or indicated prevention, and group settings, which are more common in universal or selective prevention (Flückiger, 2021; Slama & Kemmesies, 2020). While the sender and receiver of feedback can also vary, the focus here lies on feedback provided by participants during workshops and how it can inform processes of adapting and developing the programs accordingly. Asking for participant feedback aligns well with the goals of prevention, fostering democratic practices and valuing participants’ opinions. In some settings, such as prisons or schools with strict regulations, it may be unusual for participants to be asked about their impressions (Witt, 2006). Feedback in workshops is predominantly understood as an assessment of the quality of the training and participants’ satisfaction. However, additional aspects can be considered when gathering participant feedback, such as changes in experiences, attitudes, and needs (Jacobs et al., 2010; Sufi Amin et al., 2020).

To enhance practical applications, universal/selective prevention workshops taking place in different contexts were observed in a first step. Many workshops already incorporated elements of participant resonance, such as introductory or final rounds that encourage participants to share associations, wishes, or experiences. Feedback elements can directly impact the composition of the current or a subsequent workshop and allow for follow-up reflections. This indicates that depending on when and how feedback is collected, different conclusions can be drawn. Consequently, observations led to a systematization of the different aspects, considering the course of a workshop (see Table 1). While a final feedback round captures retrospective assessments, it may overlook new needs that emerged during the workshop. In contrast, pre-post feedback distinguishes between participants’ initial expectations and their concluding insights.

Table 1. Overview of possibilities of feedback methods over the course of a workshop

In the next phase, the existing feedback instruments were refined and complemented to facilitate the monitoring of workshops. While feedback is already a common element of workshop formats, small adjustments can help implement, structure, and document feedback sequences more systematically. Feedback tools were structured by implementation timing (beginning, middle, or end of the workshop) and the type of response they generate. In this regard, they were tailored to align with the goals of the workshop formulated beforehand. Additionally, the feedback formats were designed to integrate smoothly into the overall workshop structure to minimize time constraints often expressed by practitioners while also enabling and encouraging different participants to express feedback.

As open-ended feedback questions are common practice in oral introductions and final rounds, this approach was maintained to capture both intended and unintended effects of the workshop, which are essential for monitoring efforts (Koynova et al., 2022). Open-ended questions also encourage references to specific experiences and examples, avoiding overly general statements such as “everything was great.” This approach provides insights into overall satisfaction, as well as the development of needs and experiences, including: What did participants want to remember from the workshop? Which questions were relevant at the beginning? Which new questions arose during the workshop? What topics concern the group? How did attitudes shift over time?

Workshops with trainers who tested preliminary feedback tools revealed the need for two different approaches. Although the scope is similar, younger participants require pedagogically engaging methods, whereas adult participants can be asked more directly through open-ended questionnaire formats. Given the different insights that can be gained from feedback, these different formats were incorporated into a modular framework that enables flexible combinations of feedback methods depending on available time and workshop dynamics. For each method, options for online or offline implementation were designed, allowing for anonymous responses. While online tools simplify data collection, analog formats need to be photographed and compiled at the end. Additionally, participant preferences and potential barriers to either format need to be considered. A structured documentation archive that traces feedback back to specific workshops, target groups, and settings is crucial for clustering responses and making necessary adjustments.

In conclusion, a well-structured feedback system can enable practitioners to identify recurring needs, refine content, and track the demands of specific target groups. Instead of using feedback solely for isolated session assessments, a systematic approach allows for long-term insights into learning experiences and trends across multiple workshops. This ensures that prevention programs remain dynamic and responsive to participant needs.

Bibliography:

Ceylan, R., & Kiefer, M. (2022). Chancen und Risiken der Radikalisierungsprävention. In R. Ceylan & M. Kiefer (Eds.), Der islamische Fundamentalismus im 21. Jahrhundert (pp. 289–301). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37486-0_14

Flückiger, C. (2021). Basale Wirkmodelle in der Psychotherapie: Wer und was macht Psychotherapie wirksam? Psychotherapeut, 66(1), 73–82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00278-020-00478-y

Golding, C., & Adam, L. (2016). Evaluate to improve: Useful approaches to student evaluation. Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education, 41(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/02602938.2014.976810

Husain, M., & Khan, S. (2016). Students’ feedback: An effective tool in teachers’ evaluation system. International Journal of Applied and Basic Medical Research, 6(3), 178. https://doi.org/10.4103/2229-516X.186969

Jacobs, A., Barnett, C., & Ponsford, R. (2010). Three Approaches to Monitoring: Feedback Systems, Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation and Logical Frameworks. IDS Bulletin, 41(6), 36–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2010.00180.x

Jug, R., Jiang, X. “Sara,” & Bean, S. M. (2019). Giving and Receiving Effective Feedback: A Review Article and How-To Guide. Archives of Pathology & Laboratory Medicine, 143(2), 244–250. https://doi.org/10.5858/arpa.2018-0058-RA

Junk, J. (2021). Quality management of P/CVE interventions in secondary and tertiary prevention: Overview and first steps in implementing monitoring and reporting.

Koynova, S., Mönig, A., Quent, M., & Ohlenforst, V. (2022). Monitoring, Evaluation und Lernen: Erfahrungen und Bedarfe der Fachpraxis in der Prävention von Rechtsextremismus und Islamismus. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. https://doi.org/10.48809/PRIFREP2207

Meinel, C., Leifer, L., & Plattner, H. (Eds.). (2011). Design Thinking. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13757-0

Slama, B. B., & Kemmesies, U. (Eds.). (2020). Handbuch EXTREMISMUSPRÄVENTION.

Sufi Amin, Prof. Dr. Samina Malik, & Prof. Dr. N. B. Jumani. (2020). Exploring Socialization Process, Peacebuilding and Value Conflict of Distance Education Students at International Islamic University Islamabad. Sjesr, 3(3), 198–203. https://doi.org/10.36902/sjesr-vol3-iss3-2020(198-203)

Voyer, S., Cuncic, C., Butler, D. L., MacNeil, K., Watling, C., & Hatala, R. (2016). Investigating conditions for meaningful feedback in the context of an evidence-based feedback programme. Medical Education, 50(9), 943–954. https://doi.org/10.1111/medu.13067

Witt, K. (2006). Feedback-Kultur als Strategie demokratischer Veränderung. Fontane-Gymnasium Rangsdorf, Brandenburg (pp. 37, [22] pages). BLK : Berlin. https://doi.org/10.25656/01:197

Collective action research often centres around adolescents and younger adults while the focus on older people’s activism remains scarce (Schwarz, 2022). However, there are many movements that have been sprouting in various countries within and outside Europe “questioning the supposed passiveness associated with older people” (Blanche-T. & Fernández-Ardèvol, 2022, p. 10). What they have in common is that they are organized around a generational identity which becomes apparent in the names of their movement: “Iai@flautas” (iai@, Catalan term for grandparent), “Grannies Against the Right” (Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland), “Raging Grannies” (USA) or “Polish Grannies” (Poland). However, it is not used to fight for their specific generational causes, but it rather creates a “concomitant “family narrative” of generativity, that is, of caring for the younger generations” (Schwarz, 2022, p. 102). In this intergenerational solidarity, they are able to pass on their experiences with democracy which also becomes evident in the following interview with a grandma against the right activist. Tellingly, there are some parallels among these movements although they have risen on different grounds, in different places, at different times.

Grandmas against the Right is a civil society, non-partisan association initially founded in Austria in 2017 in response to a shift to the right following the election of Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and the right-wing populist Freedom Party. Later, similar groups have emerged in Germany, Italy and Switzerland. In this interview, I talk to an activist from the German “Grannies Against the Right” who has decided to remain politically active after her retirement. With many years of experience in political youth work, she has founded a new local group together with a friend. In this interview, she shares her motivations and challenges of her engagement and her wishes for the future of the initiative. She emphasizes the importance of taking action against right-wing tendencies, even in retirement, and describes how the group aims to have an impact not only in its immediate surroundings, but also across cultural and social groups, through courageous and unconventional approaches.

How did you get involved with Grannies Against the Right?

After I retired, I looked for opportunities to get involved as I did not have the time when I was working at the school. What I did there was exhausting enough and also very time-consuming. My experiences in youth education work and my political involvement during my student days motivated me to remain active in retirement. I first came into contact with politics as a student through the student union executive committee, the student council and all the demonstrations that took place there. That was a formative time for me in terms of my attitude and values. Among other things, I became aware of the “Omas gegen Rechts” (grannies against the right) through the newspaper. I was very taken with the idea that the “Omas gegen Rechts” are clearly against the right but are not affiliated with any political party. I found it very appealing that there should be such a broad cross-section of different political views. Together with a long-time friend, we founded our own group in our hometown after taking part in another local group. That was very exciting and was not that long ago. In the meantime, a group of 20 members has come together. 

How is your local group composed?

Some of us already knew each other, as the first group meeting consisted mainly of women we had spoken to personally – friends, colleagues or acquaintances. As we also announced it in the local newspaper, some came who were not directly from our professional field, but whom we knew from the local area or through previous initiatives. With every announcement in the press and our presence at events, the group continued to grow, so that we have now expanded beyond the circle of close friends and became more diverse. This diversity naturally entails different biographical backgrounds, which we see as an enrichment. While it can be more familiar and informal in a group with similar life stories, it is also more restrictive. Discussions are often more or less rehearsed. On the other hand, it becomes more diverse when women join who have previously done something completely different, and we would like that too. We would like to reach even more women from different social and cultural groups.

Do you also get in touch with other generations? 

Before the European elections, for example, we held conversations at train stations and bus stops, before or after school with adolescents. We tried to engage with the adolescents in conversations about the elections and passed on a pamphlet if we felt that the conversation was leading to something. The experience was positive: we were not treated unkindly, which created a good basis for exchange. One person even said she would pass on the letter to his class. We want to continue this experience, especially at secondary schools, where we thought about conducting workshops. Our aim is to talk about democratic values and share experiences in a friendly atmosphere, without lecturing or giving guidelines. We want to raise awareness and emphasize the importance of democracy without excluding justified criticism of social realities. We ourselves also have this criticism of social realities and politics. It is not the case that we agree with everything that happens, even if it is decided and implemented by democratic parties. It is important that we are transparent about that in the school context. We are not yet sure how we will contact schools, whether we will use exhibitions as an opportunity for discussion or find a cooperation with already existing initiatives. In other places, there are already collaborations with elementary schools and daycare centres, engaging with books about diversity and tolerance. In addition to schools, we would also like to be present at demonstrations and events in the city and work together with other initiatives, for example on specific days of remembrance. Our contacts from our professional background offer many opportunities to get involved here.

How are you perceived from the outside? 

We do not have that much experience in the group yet, but the response at previous events has been very positive and we were able to attract new people interested in our next group meeting. Of course, we sometimes come across people who have completely different opinions, especially those who hold conspiracy ideas. In such cases, it is difficult to be perceived positively. Nevertheless, we have learned how to start a conversation in such cases. It is not necessarily about changing someone’s opinion but fostering an exchange that moves away from an aggressive tone and makes it possible to talk about backgrounds and motives. At the same time, we have also received a lot of encouragement. Many people tell us that they think what we do is important, even if they do not want to participate themselves. Also, the municipality supports our initiative and actively approaches us to cooperate with us.

What does this engagement mean to you personally? 

It is definitely a good feeling not to stand idly by and watch the reports on TV or in the media and think, “this is getting worse and worse.” In the past, people might have thought that the AfD (“Alternative for Germany”) would disappear at some point. But that has changed, and the party is very persistent. I also find it a bit difficult that the focus is often placed on the East, while similar problems also exist here in the West. However, we actually have a more comfortable situation in western Germany, as we can fall back on existing contacts and initiatives that defend democratic values in a similar way to us. In East Germany, the commitment is often more dangerous, as right-wing activities have become more established there, as other granny groups report. Especially in the run-up to the state elections, there is therefore a desire for support in the region. The whole thing has also changed my attitude. I have always believed that greater vigilance in the 1930s could have helped prevent the rise of fascism. Today I see the system, the connections and the power behind it and understand how challenging it is to counteract it. That is why I think we all need to take action.

What do you wish for the future of Grannies Against the Right?

I would like our group to be braver and dare to surprise people with a cheeky and colourful appearance. At the moment, we are still a fairly serious group, but I think it would be important to be unexpected and perhaps even a little crazy – something that is not normally expected of grannies. This approach has also often been successful in my work at school because it makes people think and shakes up their expectations. I hope that we in our group will find the courage to present ourselves to the public in a planned but surprisingly creative way.

I also hope that we can reach out to refugees and migrants and integrate them into our group in order to become more culturally diverse. This is the only way we can reach out to other population groups and spread our messages, initiatives and activities more widely in society.

Sources

Blanche-T., D., & Fernández-Ardèvol, M. (2022). (Non-)Politicized Ageism: Exploring the Multiple Identities of Older Activists. Societies, 12(2), 40. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc12020040

Schwarz, C. H. (2022). Collective memory and intergenerational transmission in social movements: The “grandparents’ movement” iaioflautas , the indignados protests, and the Spanish transition. Memory Studies, 15(1), 102–119. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698019856058

With initiatives aimed at countering extremism, their organization and structure exhibit notable differences across nations. This diversity is already evident in Europe, where various countries adopted either rather centralized models with one main actor, such as the United Kingdom and France, or decentralized approaches, as seen in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway (Koehler, 2021). Such variance extends to the involvement of state and civil society actors, as well as the modes of cooperation among affiliated institutions and organizations. In combining rather security-oriented state actors and non-security actors within civil society, prevention has often been regarded to be hybrid in nature. In ultimately working towards a common goal, the diversity of actors, programs, and approaches provides an opportunity to respond to different target groups or specific contexts. At the same time, potential conflicts between the actors may arise on the basis of diverging standards in training or funding as well as different understandings and practices among the professional fields (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2021; Walkenhorst & Ruf, 2018). In addressing the potential tensions, projects like icommit aim to support local collaborations. Nevertheless, the question remains as to how the associated objectives and approaches are ultimately negotiated and implemented in practice. This topic requires further empirical research, which will be taken up within the VORTEX network.

When distinguishing between the approaches of societal security and non-security actors in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) the terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ are often used (Hardy, 2023). So-called soft approaches adhering to civil society organizations conducting largely pedagogical measures compliment hard ones, which encompass legal prosecution and incarceration (Aly et al., 2015). However, the distinction between these approaches is often blurred in practice. Security and non-security approaches to radicalization and extremism often not only coexist, but also intersect to different extents in multi-agency settings (Malmros & Sivenbring, 2023; Ragazzi & de Jongh, 2019). Such temporary or permanent cooperation often involves police officers, social workers and teachers among others allowing “knowledge, information or operational space” to be combined (Haugstvedt & Tuastad, 2023; Sivenbring & Malmros, 2019). Thus, prevention efforts provide a hybrid field that is characterized by distinct but often overlapping responsibilities, objectives and methods (Baaken et al., 2018; Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2023; Sivenbring & Malmros, 2021). 

With this approach, bridges can be built between those differences. It “appears to be a key in pushing forward innovations and securing the most adaptable network for reaching the largest possible target group” (Koehler, 2021, p. 74). As radicalization processes can be very diverse and dynamic, key figures in prevention work can vary over time (Young et al., 2015). Teachers, for example, spend a lot of time with children and adolescents and may notice signs of socio-psychological deviations. However, when it comes to averting criminal incidents of students, taking the police on board becomes a relevant issue. Thereby, it “has increasingly been considered a promising approach to enable the early and effective identification of individuals and communities that are at risk of radicalization and violent extremism” (Hardyns et al., 2022, p. 5). Allowing such overlaps in P/CVE provides the possibility to flexibly adapt to current situations and specific contexts and has become a generally accepted practice in many countries (Haugstvedt & Tuastad, 2023; Koehler, 2021). 

However, there are also challenges that come with this diversity of programs and actors among which are: unequal standards regarding training and financial funding for governmental compared to non-governmental actors, evaluation of preventive effects, and the combination of “values and practices associated with multiple distinct field- or societal-level logics” inherent to hybridity (Battilana et al., 2017, p. 137; s. also Koehler, 2021). In general, police and security services are rather concerned with the security and safety of citizens and public facilities and rely on repressive measures. Whereas non-societal security actors like teachers, social or youth workers focus on the well-being of individuals or groups that practitioners work with and intends to support, help or emancipate. Thus, when those distinct approaches overlap, practitioners might encounter ambivalences and contradictions regarding their role and self-understanding in the programs they are involved in (Pache & Santos, 2013). Besides, it has often been feared that the security approach will dominate pedagogical work and make use of and potentially impede the relationships of trust between civil society organizations and the broader society (Haugstvedt & Tuastad, 2023).

Although these logics appear quite two-pronged and static, logics might co-exist, mix or compete with each other, especially in these hybrid prevention contexts (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2019). However, in mapping the prevention perspectives of the different professional groups in the individual countries on a single continuum, the two logics were conceived as contradictory (Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2023). While this conceptualization allows for an overview on how the logics are regarded on average within different professional fields, it does not reveal in which specific ways they might mix or compete and how they are implemented in turn on the ground. An approach to support practitioners has been developed by icommit, for example, to improve local cooperation and case analyses from a social work perspective. Recommendations include among others to strengthen the ability to switch perspectives, to integrate the diverging logics and to reflect on different approaches to P/CVE (Harris et al., 2023). What still requires further investigation is how logics might be integrated and consequently guide management and implementation of prevention in hybrid settings, offering further insights into and for prevention practice. These open questions are frequently discussed within the Research Area C of VORTEX (Countering Radicalisation). Also, my own dissertation on overlaps of prevention approaches aims to contribute to the understanding of practitioners’ negotiation of P/CVE logics. 

Sources

Aly, A., Balbi, A.-M., & Jacques, C. (2015). Rethinking countering violent extremism: Implementing the role of civil society. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 10(1), 3–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1028772

Baaken, T., Becker, R., Bjørgo, T., Kiefer, M., Korn, J., Mücke, T., Ruf, M., & Walkenhorst, D. (with Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung). (2018). Herausforderung Deradikalisierung: Einsichten aus Wissenschaft und Praxis. Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK).

Battilana, J., Besharov, M., & Mitzinneck, B. (2017). On hybrids and hybrid organizing: A review and roadmap for future research. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, 2, 128–162.

Blomgren, M., & Waks, C. (2015). Coping with contradictions: Hybrid professionals managing institutional complexity. Journal of Professions and Organization, 2(1), 78–102. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/jou010

Gøtzsche-Astrup, O., Lindekilde, L., Maria Fjellman, A., Bjørgo, T., Solhjell, R., Haugstvedt, H., Sivenbring, J., Andersson Malmros, R., Kangasniemi, M., Moilanen, T., Magnæs, I., Wilchen Christensen, T., & Mattsson, C. (2023). Trust in interagency collaboration: The role of institutional logics and hybrid professionals. Journal of Professions and Organization, 10(1), 65–79. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/joac022

Hardy, K. (2023). Rethinking CVE and public health prevention. In J. Busher, L. Malkki, & S. Marsden, The Routledge Handbook on Radicalisation and Countering Radicalisation (1st ed., pp. 355–368). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003035848-27

Hardyns, W., Klima, N., & Pauwels, L. (Eds.). (2022). Evaluation and mentoring of the multi-agency approach to violent radicalisation in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. Maklu.

Harris, G., Korn, A., Ohlenforst, V., Scheuble, S., Selby, A., & White, J. (2023). Walk A Mile—A practice-rooted guide to P/CVE collaboration & casework. https://multiagencycooperation.eu/wp-content/uploads/icommit-final-publication-en.pdf

Haugstvedt, H., & Tuastad, S. E. (2023). “It Gets a Bit Messy”: Norwegian Social Workers’ Perspectives on Collaboration with Police and Security Service on Cases of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 35(3), 677–693. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1970541

Koehler, D. (2021). Deradicalisation in Germany: Preventing and countering violent extremism. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 128, 59–79. https://doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2021.128.2.59

Malmros, R. A., & Sivenbring, J. (2023). Multi-agency approaches to countering radicalisation. In J. Busher, L. Malkki, & S. Marsden, The Routledge Handbook on Radicalisation and Countering Radicalisation (1st ed., pp. 369–383). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003035848-28

Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2013). Embedded in Hybrid Contexts: How Individuals in Organizations Respond to Competing Institutional Logics. In M. Lounsbury & E. Boxenbaum (Eds.), Research in the Sociology of Organizations(pp. 3–35). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X(2013)0039b014

Ragazzi, F., & de Jongh, L.-A. (2019). COUNTERING RADICALIZATION: HIJACKING TRUST? DILEMMAS OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS IN THE NETHERLANDS. In RADICALIZATION IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS – CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENCE AND SECURITY (pp. 147–167). I.B. Tauris.

Sivenbring, J., & Malmros, R. A. (2019). Mixing Logics: Multiagency Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism. Gothenburg: the Segerstedt Institute.

Sivenbring, J., & Malmros, R. A. (2021). Collaboration in Hybrid Spaces: The Case of Nordic Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism.

Walkenhorst, D., & Ruf, M. (2018). „Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle ist besser “? Sicherheitspolitisches vs. Pädagogisches Handeln in der Extremismusprävention. Von Drachenfels, Magdalena/Philipp Offermann/Carmen Wunderlich, Radikalisierung Und De-Radikalisierung in Deutschland, Eine Gesamtgesellschaftliche Herausforderung, 1, 101–106.

Young, H. F., Rooze, M., & Holsappel, J. (2015). Translating conceptualizations into practical suggestions: What the literature on radicalization can offer to practitioners. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 21(2), 212–225. https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000065