Author: Laura Stritzke

Collective action research often centres around adolescents and younger adults while the focus on older people’s activism remains scarce (Schwarz, 2022). However, there are many movements that have been sprouting in various countries within and outside Europe “questioning the supposed passiveness associated with older people” (Blanche-T. & Fernández-Ardèvol, 2022, p. 10). What they have in common is that they are organized around a generational identity which becomes apparent in the names of their movement: “Iai@flautas” (iai@, Catalan term for grandparent), “Grannies Against the Right” (Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland), “Raging Grannies” (USA) or “Polish Grannies” (Poland). However, it is not used to fight for their specific generational causes, but it rather creates a “concomitant “family narrative” of generativity, that is, of caring for the younger generations” (Schwarz, 2022, p. 102). In this intergenerational solidarity, they are able to pass on their experiences with democracy which also becomes evident in the following interview with a grandma against the right activist. Tellingly, there are some parallels among these movements although they have risen on different grounds, in different places, at different times.

Grandmas against the Right is a civil society, non-partisan association initially founded in Austria in 2017 in response to a shift to the right following the election of Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and the right-wing populist Freedom Party. Later, similar groups have emerged in Germany, Italy and Switzerland. In this interview, I talk to an activist from the German “Grannies Against the Right” who has decided to remain politically active after her retirement. With many years of experience in political youth work, she has founded a new local group together with a friend. In this interview, she shares her motivations and challenges of her engagement and her wishes for the future of the initiative. She emphasizes the importance of taking action against right-wing tendencies, even in retirement, and describes how the group aims to have an impact not only in its immediate surroundings, but also across cultural and social groups, through courageous and unconventional approaches.

How did you get involved with Grannies Against the Right?

After I retired, I looked for opportunities to get involved as I did not have the time when I was working at the school. What I did there was exhausting enough and also very time-consuming. My experiences in youth education work and my political involvement during my student days motivated me to remain active in retirement. I first came into contact with politics as a student through the student union executive committee, the student council and all the demonstrations that took place there. That was a formative time for me in terms of my attitude and values. Among other things, I became aware of the “Omas gegen Rechts” (grannies against the right) through the newspaper. I was very taken with the idea that the “Omas gegen Rechts” are clearly against the right but are not affiliated with any political party. I found it very appealing that there should be such a broad cross-section of different political views. Together with a long-time friend, we founded our own group in our hometown after taking part in another local group. That was very exciting and was not that long ago. In the meantime, a group of 20 members has come together. 

How is your local group composed?

Some of us already knew each other, as the first group meeting consisted mainly of women we had spoken to personally – friends, colleagues or acquaintances. As we also announced it in the local newspaper, some came who were not directly from our professional field, but whom we knew from the local area or through previous initiatives. With every announcement in the press and our presence at events, the group continued to grow, so that we have now expanded beyond the circle of close friends and became more diverse. This diversity naturally entails different biographical backgrounds, which we see as an enrichment. While it can be more familiar and informal in a group with similar life stories, it is also more restrictive. Discussions are often more or less rehearsed. On the other hand, it becomes more diverse when women join who have previously done something completely different, and we would like that too. We would like to reach even more women from different social and cultural groups.

Do you also get in touch with other generations? 

Before the European elections, for example, we held conversations at train stations and bus stops, before or after school with adolescents. We tried to engage with the adolescents in conversations about the elections and passed on a pamphlet if we felt that the conversation was leading to something. The experience was positive: we were not treated unkindly, which created a good basis for exchange. One person even said she would pass on the letter to his class. We want to continue this experience, especially at secondary schools, where we thought about conducting workshops. Our aim is to talk about democratic values and share experiences in a friendly atmosphere, without lecturing or giving guidelines. We want to raise awareness and emphasize the importance of democracy without excluding justified criticism of social realities. We ourselves also have this criticism of social realities and politics. It is not the case that we agree with everything that happens, even if it is decided and implemented by democratic parties. It is important that we are transparent about that in the school context. We are not yet sure how we will contact schools, whether we will use exhibitions as an opportunity for discussion or find a cooperation with already existing initiatives. In other places, there are already collaborations with elementary schools and daycare centres, engaging with books about diversity and tolerance. In addition to schools, we would also like to be present at demonstrations and events in the city and work together with other initiatives, for example on specific days of remembrance. Our contacts from our professional background offer many opportunities to get involved here.

How are you perceived from the outside? 

We do not have that much experience in the group yet, but the response at previous events has been very positive and we were able to attract new people interested in our next group meeting. Of course, we sometimes come across people who have completely different opinions, especially those who hold conspiracy ideas. In such cases, it is difficult to be perceived positively. Nevertheless, we have learned how to start a conversation in such cases. It is not necessarily about changing someone’s opinion but fostering an exchange that moves away from an aggressive tone and makes it possible to talk about backgrounds and motives. At the same time, we have also received a lot of encouragement. Many people tell us that they think what we do is important, even if they do not want to participate themselves. Also, the municipality supports our initiative and actively approaches us to cooperate with us.

What does this engagement mean to you personally? 

It is definitely a good feeling not to stand idly by and watch the reports on TV or in the media and think, “this is getting worse and worse.” In the past, people might have thought that the AfD (“Alternative for Germany”) would disappear at some point. But that has changed, and the party is very persistent. I also find it a bit difficult that the focus is often placed on the East, while similar problems also exist here in the West. However, we actually have a more comfortable situation in western Germany, as we can fall back on existing contacts and initiatives that defend democratic values in a similar way to us. In East Germany, the commitment is often more dangerous, as right-wing activities have become more established there, as other granny groups report. Especially in the run-up to the state elections, there is therefore a desire for support in the region. The whole thing has also changed my attitude. I have always believed that greater vigilance in the 1930s could have helped prevent the rise of fascism. Today I see the system, the connections and the power behind it and understand how challenging it is to counteract it. That is why I think we all need to take action.

What do you wish for the future of Grannies Against the Right?

I would like our group to be braver and dare to surprise people with a cheeky and colourful appearance. At the moment, we are still a fairly serious group, but I think it would be important to be unexpected and perhaps even a little crazy – something that is not normally expected of grannies. This approach has also often been successful in my work at school because it makes people think and shakes up their expectations. I hope that we in our group will find the courage to present ourselves to the public in a planned but surprisingly creative way.

I also hope that we can reach out to refugees and migrants and integrate them into our group in order to become more culturally diverse. This is the only way we can reach out to other population groups and spread our messages, initiatives and activities more widely in society.

Sources

Blanche-T., D., & Fernández-Ardèvol, M. (2022). (Non-)Politicized Ageism: Exploring the Multiple Identities of Older Activists. Societies, 12(2), 40. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc12020040

Schwarz, C. H. (2022). Collective memory and intergenerational transmission in social movements: The “grandparents’ movement” iaioflautas , the indignados protests, and the Spanish transition. Memory Studies, 15(1), 102–119. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698019856058

With initiatives aimed at countering extremism, their organization and structure exhibit notable differences across nations. This diversity is already evident in Europe, where various countries adopted either rather centralized models with one main actor, such as the United Kingdom and France, or decentralized approaches, as seen in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway (Koehler, 2021). Such variance extends to the involvement of state and civil society actors, as well as the modes of cooperation among affiliated institutions and organizations. In combining rather security-oriented state actors and non-security actors within civil society, prevention has often been regarded to be hybrid in nature. In ultimately working towards a common goal, the diversity of actors, programs, and approaches provides an opportunity to respond to different target groups or specific contexts. At the same time, potential conflicts between the actors may arise on the basis of diverging standards in training or funding as well as different understandings and practices among the professional fields (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2021; Walkenhorst & Ruf, 2018). In addressing the potential tensions, projects like icommit aim to support local collaborations. Nevertheless, the question remains as to how the associated objectives and approaches are ultimately negotiated and implemented in practice. This topic requires further empirical research, which will be taken up within the VORTEX network.

When distinguishing between the approaches of societal security and non-security actors in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) the terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ are often used (Hardy, 2023). So-called soft approaches adhering to civil society organizations conducting largely pedagogical measures compliment hard ones, which encompass legal prosecution and incarceration (Aly et al., 2015). However, the distinction between these approaches is often blurred in practice. Security and non-security approaches to radicalization and extremism often not only coexist, but also intersect to different extents in multi-agency settings (Malmros & Sivenbring, 2023; Ragazzi & de Jongh, 2019). Such temporary or permanent cooperation often involves police officers, social workers and teachers among others allowing “knowledge, information or operational space” to be combined (Haugstvedt & Tuastad, 2023; Sivenbring & Malmros, 2019). Thus, prevention efforts provide a hybrid field that is characterized by distinct but often overlapping responsibilities, objectives and methods (Baaken et al., 2018; Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2023; Sivenbring & Malmros, 2021). 

With this approach, bridges can be built between those differences. It “appears to be a key in pushing forward innovations and securing the most adaptable network for reaching the largest possible target group” (Koehler, 2021, p. 74). As radicalization processes can be very diverse and dynamic, key figures in prevention work can vary over time (Young et al., 2015). Teachers, for example, spend a lot of time with children and adolescents and may notice signs of socio-psychological deviations. However, when it comes to averting criminal incidents of students, taking the police on board becomes a relevant issue. Thereby, it “has increasingly been considered a promising approach to enable the early and effective identification of individuals and communities that are at risk of radicalization and violent extremism” (Hardyns et al., 2022, p. 5). Allowing such overlaps in P/CVE provides the possibility to flexibly adapt to current situations and specific contexts and has become a generally accepted practice in many countries (Haugstvedt & Tuastad, 2023; Koehler, 2021). 

However, there are also challenges that come with this diversity of programs and actors among which are: unequal standards regarding training and financial funding for governmental compared to non-governmental actors, evaluation of preventive effects, and the combination of “values and practices associated with multiple distinct field- or societal-level logics” inherent to hybridity (Battilana et al., 2017, p. 137; s. also Koehler, 2021). In general, police and security services are rather concerned with the security and safety of citizens and public facilities and rely on repressive measures. Whereas non-societal security actors like teachers, social or youth workers focus on the well-being of individuals or groups that practitioners work with and intends to support, help or emancipate. Thus, when those distinct approaches overlap, practitioners might encounter ambivalences and contradictions regarding their role and self-understanding in the programs they are involved in (Pache & Santos, 2013). Besides, it has often been feared that the security approach will dominate pedagogical work and make use of and potentially impede the relationships of trust between civil society organizations and the broader society (Haugstvedt & Tuastad, 2023).

Although these logics appear quite two-pronged and static, logics might co-exist, mix or compete with each other, especially in these hybrid prevention contexts (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2019). However, in mapping the prevention perspectives of the different professional groups in the individual countries on a single continuum, the two logics were conceived as contradictory (Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2023). While this conceptualization allows for an overview on how the logics are regarded on average within different professional fields, it does not reveal in which specific ways they might mix or compete and how they are implemented in turn on the ground. An approach to support practitioners has been developed by icommit, for example, to improve local cooperation and case analyses from a social work perspective. Recommendations include among others to strengthen the ability to switch perspectives, to integrate the diverging logics and to reflect on different approaches to P/CVE (Harris et al., 2023). What still requires further investigation is how logics might be integrated and consequently guide management and implementation of prevention in hybrid settings, offering further insights into and for prevention practice. These open questions are frequently discussed within the Research Area C of VORTEX (Countering Radicalisation). Also, my own dissertation on overlaps of prevention approaches aims to contribute to the understanding of practitioners’ negotiation of P/CVE logics. 

Sources

Aly, A., Balbi, A.-M., & Jacques, C. (2015). Rethinking countering violent extremism: Implementing the role of civil society. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 10(1), 3–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1028772

Baaken, T., Becker, R., Bjørgo, T., Kiefer, M., Korn, J., Mücke, T., Ruf, M., & Walkenhorst, D. (with Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung). (2018). Herausforderung Deradikalisierung: Einsichten aus Wissenschaft und Praxis. Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK).

Battilana, J., Besharov, M., & Mitzinneck, B. (2017). On hybrids and hybrid organizing: A review and roadmap for future research. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, 2, 128–162.

Blomgren, M., & Waks, C. (2015). Coping with contradictions: Hybrid professionals managing institutional complexity. Journal of Professions and Organization, 2(1), 78–102. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/jou010

Gøtzsche-Astrup, O., Lindekilde, L., Maria Fjellman, A., Bjørgo, T., Solhjell, R., Haugstvedt, H., Sivenbring, J., Andersson Malmros, R., Kangasniemi, M., Moilanen, T., Magnæs, I., Wilchen Christensen, T., & Mattsson, C. (2023). Trust in interagency collaboration: The role of institutional logics and hybrid professionals. Journal of Professions and Organization, 10(1), 65–79. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/joac022

Hardy, K. (2023). Rethinking CVE and public health prevention. In J. Busher, L. Malkki, & S. Marsden, The Routledge Handbook on Radicalisation and Countering Radicalisation (1st ed., pp. 355–368). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003035848-27

Hardyns, W., Klima, N., & Pauwels, L. (Eds.). (2022). Evaluation and mentoring of the multi-agency approach to violent radicalisation in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. Maklu.

Harris, G., Korn, A., Ohlenforst, V., Scheuble, S., Selby, A., & White, J. (2023). Walk A Mile—A practice-rooted guide to P/CVE collaboration & casework. https://multiagencycooperation.eu/wp-content/uploads/icommit-final-publication-en.pdf

Haugstvedt, H., & Tuastad, S. E. (2023). “It Gets a Bit Messy”: Norwegian Social Workers’ Perspectives on Collaboration with Police and Security Service on Cases of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 35(3), 677–693. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1970541

Koehler, D. (2021). Deradicalisation in Germany: Preventing and countering violent extremism. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 128, 59–79. https://doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2021.128.2.59

Malmros, R. A., & Sivenbring, J. (2023). Multi-agency approaches to countering radicalisation. In J. Busher, L. Malkki, & S. Marsden, The Routledge Handbook on Radicalisation and Countering Radicalisation (1st ed., pp. 369–383). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003035848-28

Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2013). Embedded in Hybrid Contexts: How Individuals in Organizations Respond to Competing Institutional Logics. In M. Lounsbury & E. Boxenbaum (Eds.), Research in the Sociology of Organizations(pp. 3–35). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X(2013)0039b014

Ragazzi, F., & de Jongh, L.-A. (2019). COUNTERING RADICALIZATION: HIJACKING TRUST? DILEMMAS OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS IN THE NETHERLANDS. In RADICALIZATION IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS – CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENCE AND SECURITY (pp. 147–167). I.B. Tauris.

Sivenbring, J., & Malmros, R. A. (2019). Mixing Logics: Multiagency Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism. Gothenburg: the Segerstedt Institute.

Sivenbring, J., & Malmros, R. A. (2021). Collaboration in Hybrid Spaces: The Case of Nordic Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism.

Walkenhorst, D., & Ruf, M. (2018). „Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle ist besser “? Sicherheitspolitisches vs. Pädagogisches Handeln in der Extremismusprävention. Von Drachenfels, Magdalena/Philipp Offermann/Carmen Wunderlich, Radikalisierung Und De-Radikalisierung in Deutschland, Eine Gesamtgesellschaftliche Herausforderung, 1, 101–106.

Young, H. F., Rooze, M., & Holsappel, J. (2015). Translating conceptualizations into practical suggestions: What the literature on radicalization can offer to practitioners. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 21(2), 212–225. https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000065

In discussions about preventing extremism, there is a recurring debate between focusing on security measures and providing support. On one side, security agencies like the police intervene to stop criminal activities and prevent potential attacks by arresting offenders for example. On the other side, civil society organizations are rather concerned with the well-being of individuals and aim to promote paths that steer away from extremism. While it is difficult to fully entangle social and security concerns, navigating this balance presents challenges for both prevention strategies and their public perception. Trust in civil society initiatives can be undermined if people fear their information might be shared with the authorities. Discussions often center on different aspects of the tension between security and support at political, organizational, or practitioner level. Although, the tensions become manifest on all these levels, the negotiations taking place do differ. However, the extent to which these levels differ has been addressed much less to date. What is debated politically does not always translate directly to how prevention work is carried out on the ground. This can be attributed to the discretion practitioners have, highlighting not only mentioned top-down influence of policies but also the importance of bottom-up processes.

Starting at the macro level, the focus lies on the direction of policies to prevent extremism. In this regard, the securitization of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is often discussed (Baker-Beall et al., 2014; Ragazzi, 2017; Sivenbring & Malmros, 2019; Walkenhorst & Ruf, 2018). “While social and security policies have always overlapped in complex ways, recent developments in counter-terrorism policy suggest that Western European states […] are accelerating what can be termed the “securitization of social policy” – namely the increased submission of social policy actors and their practices to the logics of security and social control” (Ragazzi, 2017, p. 1). Notions of securitization within P/CVE discussions often imply a link between policy discourse and professional practices, potentially resulting in efforts being perceived as subordinate to societal security concerns. This suggested link will be explored further in the following. 

In addressing radicalization as a complex phenomenon, there is often a request for the involvement of various actors (Christensen et al., 2023). Thus, at the meso level, different institutions are engaged in extremism prevention to varying degrees across many countries. These institutions are distinguished by references to hard and soft approaches, security and non-security actors, as well as societal security and support logics (Christensen et al., 2023; Hardy, 2023; Ragazzi & de Jongh, 2019). Typically, institutions associated with prevention efforts are ascribed to either the ‘support’ or the ‘security logic’ paradigms (Malmros & Sivenbring, 2023; Sivenbring & Malmros, 2019). These logics describe how respective actors engage in preventing extremism. Civil-society actors such as teachers, social workers, and youth workers commonly provide support to foster the well-being or emancipation of individuals. Police and security agencies on the other hand are concerned with the security and safety of citizens and thus aim at stopping criminal behavior via prosecution. 

Despite the differences of these actors, they have also shared responsibilities in some regards. To which degree this is established is however very much country dependent. For example, collaboration between state actors and civil society has been more popular in the Nordic countries. These cases have shown that multiagency collaborations require cross-professional trust as well as convergence of approaches and logics to some extent (Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2023). Such cooperation has been associated with ambivalences in the self-understanding and role clarity of practitioners raising “ethical and professional dilemmas, especially regarding work transparency and client confidentiality, indicating an outside influence of security onto prevention work” (Haugstvedt & Tuastad, 2023, p. 677). The effects are not limited to the practitioners themselves, but also have consequences for the impact on (potential) target groups, which may put trust at stake (s. also Ragazzi & de Jongh, 2019). 

Despite the relevance of these logics in delineating different approaches, the theory of street-level bureaucracy emphasizes the significance of practitioners in shaping prevention practice (Lipsky, 2010). Understanding how institutional logics influence individual actions remains a subject of interest, particularly in P/CVE implementation. It is commonly assumed that institutional logics provide a normative reference that guides social behavior in specific social contexts (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2019, p. 38). However, professionals have also been able to find common ground in multi-agency collaborations. Although concerns about securitization of P/CVE have often been voiced at the political level, multi-agency cooperation in the Nordic countries has shown a shared recognition of supportive approaches (Figlestahler & Schau, 2020; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2023). The dominance of societal security matters in many policy texts may therefore not be directly reflected in the actions of the corresponding agencies (Thomas, 2017). Nevertheless, the margin of discretion may also be used in a way that contributes to social control and promotes bottom-up securitization processes. In these cases, greater emphasis is placed on control and monitoring in prevention efforts, which tends to result in increased general suspicion of potential threats (Ragazzi & de Jongh, 2019; Walkenhorst & Ruf, 2018). 

Nevertheless, discussions around the securitization of extremism prevention work often assume top-down processes of policy implementation. This process implies translations of policies into institutional structures and ultimately into prevention practice. However, taking a closer look at those who implement the programs suggests a space of discretion that may allow to shape prevention to a significant degree highlighting the relevance of bottom-up processes. Thus, although the tensions between security and support are discussed and negotiated in different ways, there are also interactions between the political, organizational and practitioner level. The extent to which such alignments between security and support are balanced and communicated can significantly impact how the public perceives and trusts prevention efforts, ultimately shaping their effect. 

Bibliography:

Baker-Beall, C., Heath-Kelly, C., & Jarvis, L. (Eds.). (2014). Counter-Radicalisation: Critical perspectives (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315773094

Christensen, T. W., Lindekilde, L., Sivenbring, J., Bjørgo, T., Magnæs Gjelsvik, I., Solhjell, R., Haugstvedt, H., Malmros, R. A., Kangasniem, M., & Kallio, H. (2023). “Being a Risk” or “Being at Risk”: Factors Shaping Negotiation of Concerns of Radicalization within Multiagency Collaboration in the Nordic Countries. Democracy and Security, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2023.2220117

Figlestahler, C., & Schau, K. (2020). Zwischen Kooperation und Grenzziehung – Aushandlungen von Sicherheitsbehörden und Akteur*innen Sozialer Arbeit in der Radikalisierungsprävention. Soziale Passagen, 12(2), 421–439. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12592-020-00356-z

Gøtzsche-Astrup, O., Lindekilde, L., Maria Fjellman, A., Bjørgo, T., Solhjell, R., Haugstvedt, H., Sivenbring, J., Andersson Malmros, R., Kangasniemi, M., Moilanen, T., Magnæs, I., Wilchen Christensen, T., & Mattsson, C. (2023). Trust in interagency collaboration: The role of institutional logics and hybrid professionals. Journal of Professions and Organization, 10(1), 65–79. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/joac022

Hardy, K. (2023). Rethinking CVE and public health prevention. In J. Busher, L. Malkki, & S. Marsden, The Routledge Handbook on Radicalisation and Countering Radicalisation (1st ed., pp. 355–368). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003035848-27

Haugstvedt, H., & Tuastad, S. E. (2023). “It Gets a Bit Messy”: Norwegian Social Workers’ Perspectives on Collaboration with Police and Security Service on Cases of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 35(3), 677–693. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1970541

Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services (30th anniversary expanded ed). Russell Sage Foundation.

Malmros, R. A., & Sivenbring, J. (2023). Multi-agency approaches to countering radicalisation. In J. Busher, L. Malkki, & S. Marsden, The Routledge Handbook on Radicalisation and Countering Radicalisation (1st ed., pp. 369–383). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003035848-28

Ragazzi, F. (2017). Countering terrorism and radicalisation: Securitising social policy? Critical Social Policy, 37(2), 163–179. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018316683472

Ragazzi, F., & de Jongh, L.-A. (2019). COUNTERING RADICALIZATION: HIJACKING TRUST? DILEMMAS OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS IN THE NETHERLANDS. In RADICALIZATION IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS – CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENCE AND SECURITY (pp. 147–167). I.B. Tauris.

Sivenbring, J., & Malmros, R. A. (2019). Mixing Logics: Multiagency Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism. Gothenburg: the Segerstedt Institute.

Thomas, P. (2017). Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: The British Prevent experience. Policy & Politics, 45(3), 305–321. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557317X14943145195580

Walkenhorst, D., & Ruf, M. (2018). „Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle ist besser “? Sicherheitspolitisches vs. Pädagogisches Handeln in der Extremismusprävention. Von Drachenfels, Magdalena/Philipp Offermann/Carmen Wunderlich, Radikalisierung Und De-Radikalisierung in Deutschland, Eine Gesamtgesellschaftliche Herausforderung, 1, 101–106.