Category: Blog

Within the VORTEX Doctoral Network, we explore three key dimensions of radicalisation: (1) Pathways of Radicalisation, (2) the Social and Political Contexts of Radicalisation, and (3) Countering Radicalisation. Some time ago, those of us working on the Social and Political Contexts of Radicalisation decided to organise a panel to share our research with fellow scholars, practitioners, and the broader civil society. Last week, Heidi Campana Piva, Violette Mens, and I brought that idea to life at the 5th Helsinki Conference on Emotions, Populism, and Polarised Politics (HEPP5), hosted by the University of Helsinki.

Our panel, Radicalisation as a Challenge to the Liberal Democratic Social Contract, examined how radicalisation fractures liberal democracy across societal, epistemic, and political domains—through conspiracy-fuelled extremism, the research-policy divide, and the mainstream right’s illiberal drift.

Heidi presented her research on the anti-establishment sentiments embedded in conspiracy theories and their role in radicalisation. She argued that conspiracy theories do more than reflect societal tensions—they actively accelerate radicalisation. By demonising enemies, silencing dissent, and framing violence as a necessary wake-up call, they don’t merely spread counter-knowledge; they weaponise it. Her research offers crucial insights into how rising social pressures may erode liberal democracies.

Violette, in turn, took a more applied approach, analysing France’s epistemic community on radicalisation research. As radicalisation studies expand, a stark divide persists between academic insights and political action, often fuelling populist and polarising responses. Her work explores how France’s dual-role researchers—those who straddle academia and policymaking—shape radicalisation discourse, revealing how knowledge translation impacts both the social contract and its fractures.

Finally, I tackled the political dimension by examining the illiberal turn in European (and global) politics—a shift that could reshape liberal democracies for years to come. My central question: Is the mainstream right radicalising? While European mainstream right parties have long radicalised on immigration, is this trend expanding into other policy domains? As far-right parties broaden their battlegrounds, I conceptualise how policymaking functions in liberal versus illiberal democracies and explore whether mainstream right-wing parties are adopting illiberal policymaking strategies. I also outline key areas for future research.

Radicalisation is not just a phenomenon confined to fringe movements or extremist networks—it is reshaping the very foundations of democratic governance. Understanding these dynamics is more urgent than ever. Our panel was just one step in this broader conversation, and the work continues.

Please have a look on my presentation here:

During the Helsinki Conference on Emotions, Populism and Polarised Politics (March 05, 2025), Heidi remotely presented her work entitled “The Anti-Establishment Feelings of Conspiracy Theories in the Process of Radicalization”. Check out the video of her presentation below!

From the 5th to the 7th of March, I had the opportunity to attend HEPP5 in Helsinki. On the first day, I presented in a panel created with my two other Vortex colleagues Heidi Piva and Javid Ibad. Luckily, the conference was recorded so anyone interested can take a look at our work.

The panel examines how radicalization disrupts the liberal democratic social contract by focusing on its political, discursive, and epistemic dimensions. The papers address various aspects of radicalization: the shift of center-right parties towards illiberal policies; the use of conspiracy theories as tools of radicalization, particularly in deepening polarization and justifying extremist actions; and a critique of the gap between academic research and policy on radicalization, which reveals how knowledge production shapes discourses and responses. Together, these contributions shed light on how radicalization, populism, and polarization challenge the liberal democratic consensus in contemporary Europe.

On my side, I explain how academic research on radicalization expands and a significant disconnect persists between scholarly findings and political action, sometimes leading to populistic or polarising positions. My work highlights the formation of diverse epistemic communities, of researchers as policy makers, in the case of France, contributing to the understanding of radicalization. Through bibliographic discussions, interviewees reflect on their roles regarding the dealing of the past attacks and more generally on how they have shaped the discourse surrounding radicalization. This reflection, based on a relational approach, uncovers how knowledge and its translation influence both the social contract and its polarisation. By bridging the gap between these two entities, this research aims to foster more informed and effective policy responses to the challenges posed by radicalization, ultimately contributing to a more nuanced and effective approach to this pressing issue.

Editor note: This article was originally published the Italian Institute for International Studies. 

The Islamist organization in power today in Damascus, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, is grappling with the management of power and the unification of a country divided and torn apart by years of civil war. After having led a lightning advance against the Assad regime, starting from the governorate of Idlib where it had been confined for the last ten years or so and heading for the capital at the beginning of December 2024, it has completely changed its narrative from jihadism to ruling Islamism. A gradual and fundamentally pragmatic change that has the objective of maintaining power. The challenge of HTS is now to include all the components in the new Syria without distinctions between men and women, language and religion. A challenge that the leadership of the organization seems to have pragmatically accepted, but which still needs to be completely accepted by the base of the movement.

Jabhat al-Nusra’s Islamist narrative: lurching between ISIS and al-Qaeda

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, has undergone significant ideological, organizational, and alliance transformations since its foundation in 2012. This evolution occurred gradually, even during its affiliations with the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Qaeda, where its narrative remained distinct. Initially, when it was part of the Islamic State in Iraq (2012-April 2013), its approach was markedly less extreme than ISIS’s. Al-Nusra aimed to mobilize regional fighters to challenge Bashar al-Assad’s regime rather than to govern. Nevertheless, the group attracted thousands of foreign fighters into its ranks, especially in its early stage.  The group focused on supporting fellow Muslims in Syria, without displaying ambitions to rule. During this period, it also sought to forge connections and alliances with local factions and civilians, positioning itself primarily as a movement dedicated to fighting the Syrian regime and its allies.

In April 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra severed ties with the Islamic State in Iraq and aligned itself with al-Qaeda Central, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Contrary to expectations that the group would adopt a less extreme stance given al-Qaeda’s relatively moderated approach compared to the Islamic State in Iraq, Jabhat al-Nusra entered a more radical phase. This shift was largely due to defections by hundreds of foreign fighters who perceived the group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani (later known as Ahmed Al Sharaa, the self-appointed Syrian President), as too lenient. These fighters believed that the Islamic State in Iraq was more aligned with their views, leading to their departure.

To counteract this perception and retain his fighters, al-Jawlani sought to reaffirm Jabhat al-Nusra’s commitment to the Salafi jihadi cause, demonstrating that the group remained resolute and formidable. This period of competitive radicalization is exemplified by a 2015 incident where Shadi al-Waysu, then a judge and now the Minister of Justice under HTS, was filmed supervising public executions of women, underscoring the group’s hardened stance. Despite these actions, the group was internally conflicted about its direction. While it aimed to project strength and adherence to the Salafi jihadi cause to its members and enemies, it also sought to integrate and show solidarity with the local communities it was part of. Thus, during this period, Jabhat al-Nusra grappled with conflicting narratives about its identity and goals.

By 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra realized the high cost of its association with al-Qaeda and consequently severed ties. The group’s public discourse shifted from al-Qaeda’s global agenda to a more localized focus. They began to eliminate phrases with global connotations like “Jihad against the West” or “Jihad against secular states,” replacing them with terms emphasizing their focus on Syria, albeit with an Islamist orientation. This change was symbolically marked by their adoption of the Syrian revolutionary flag, modified only by adding the shahada, the Islamic declaration of faith. The initial signs of change emerged in 2016 when al-Jawlani publicly revealed his face for the first time. Until then, his identity had been concealed, known only by his voice. In this pivotal moment, he announced the severance of ties with al-Qaeda and declared that the group would no longer align with external organizations. This marked the beginning of a shift towards pragmatic moderation. By 2017, the leadership made concerted efforts to blend the Islamist elements of the group with a stronger nationalist focus, emphasizing their commitment solely to Syria.

HTS in power, and jihadism?

When Jabhat al-Nusra broke ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in 2016, it faced internal resistance from pro-al-Qaeda members within the group. Most of these members defected and formed Hurras al-Din, which remained affiliated with al-Qaeda in Syria. Although Hurras al-Din announced its dissolution last month, it had effectively ceased to exist in 2020 after HTS cracked down on it and shut down its military bases. Driven by a desire to survive and dominate northwest Syria, al-Jolani sought to merge with other local factions to integrate his group within the local Islamist opposition. This effort resulted in the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017, a merger that included Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, Army of the Sunna, Ansar al-Din, and Nur al-Din al-Zenki Movement. Some of these factions later defected from HTS, prompting the group to either dismantle or weaken them.

By 2017, HTS began promoting the concept of al-Kayan al-Sunni, or the Sunni entity, encapsulating the group’s narrative as the protector of Sunnis in Syria against the Alawite regime and its allies. This narrative remained largely unchanged until December 2024, when HTS advanced towards Damascus. During this operation, a radical shift occurred in their discourse, moving away from the notion of a Sunni entity to embrace a more inclusive slogan, “Syria for all Syrians.” This marked a significant change in their Islamist narrative as they approached the capital.

Currently the HTS’s state narrative talks about protecting all Syrians, regardless of their gender (here we mean men and women) or sect, which reflects its leadership’s high sense of pragmatic adaptability.  The leadership’s goal is to stabilize and solidify its power to ensure continued governance. Al-Sharaa is prepared to do whatever is necessary to achieve this, including engaging with minorities and forming a nominally inclusive government. This transition from a radical past to a more moderate position has not been smooth or complete. The leadership has responded to dissent within its ranks—those adhering to extreme and violent radicalism—by expelling, imprisoning, or executing them. 

The transformation within HTS was implemented through a top-down approach, with the leadership mandating a new direction and gradually enforcing it among its followers. The group has acknowledged its previous extremist behavior, positioning these actions as part of a past phase in its trajectory and implying a move away from such practices. For instance, when a 2015 video featuring the current Minister of Justice resurfaced and went viral recently, HTS confirmed its authenticity but emphasized that the actions were part of their history, without explicitly condemning them. Significantly, the minister involved was not removed from his position.

The challenge within HTS primarily lies in the relationship between its leadership and the organization’s base—its fighters and rank-and-file members—who have experienced the shift from the global jihadism of ISIS and AQ into to a governance-oriented Islamism. Until November 27, 2024, HTS publicly positioned itself as a defender of Sunni Islam, focusing on protecting the Sunni entity in Idlib. However, as they expanded their control into regions of Syria previously held by Assad, the leadership began advocating on behalf of all Syrians, shifting to a more inclusive rhetoric.This abrupt change in narrative presents a significant adjustment for the rank-and-file, who have been indoctrinated for years with the ideology of protecting Sunni identity. This transition may be challenging for fighters used to a narrower, sectarian viewpoint. Moreover, many HTS fighters, having never left the conservative environment of Idlib, are now encountering less conservative communities in Damascus. These new interactions could potentially foster deeper social changes within Syrian society, as human relationships evolve and influence perspectives and behaviours.

After a government collapse in 2024, Germany faced another federal election on February 23, 2025. In the 2021 federal elections, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a party that is now even listed by German federal security authorities as a case of a suspected right-wing extremist organisation, entered the German Bundestag for the first time while more than doubling its result in the previous election with 12.6%. In this year’s federal election, the AfD received 20.8% of all votes, making it the second strongest party behind the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In the federal states of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia, the respective state Office for the Protection of the Constitution has categorised the state associations of the AfD as ‘definitely right-wing extremist’. However, all three are also examples of federal states in which the AfD enjoys particular support. In the federal elections, the party received 37.3%, 32.5% and 38.6% respectively. 

However, instead of clearly distancing themselves from the party in their campaigns, some democratic parties, those that had long perceived themselves as representatives of a ‘centre of society’, increasingly tapped into narratives that the AfD is strongly capitalising on, especially during the run-up to the elections. The reaction to deadly attacks in recent months with a debate on migration and asylum is just one example of this. Moreover, the so-called ‘firewall’ against the far-right, an agreement that democratic parties would not cooperate with far-right parties, started to crumble just before the federal elections. In early February, the candidate for chancellor of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) tabled a motion in the Bundestag aimed at limiting irregular immigration to Germany, which found a majority with the votes of the AfD parliamentary group. It is a novelty in German post-war history that the votes of an extreme right-wing party have helped such a motion to gain a majority. This step has benefited one party in particular: It showed the AfD that it can influence conventional politics and is accepted by other parties – albeit indirectly – as a majority procurer. Lastly, another current example is a formal question from the CDU/CSU parliamentary group to the federal government on the political neutrality of state-funded organisations, which was submitted two days before the federal election. Numerous organisations, whose ‘political neutrality’ the CDU/CSU would like to have examined, had organised demonstrations against right-wing extremism and in response to the fall of the ‘firewall’ before the election. At present, there is a wave of criticism that this represents an attempt to intimidate civil society protest against right-wing extremism and for democratic values. The CDU/CSU’s questions also relate to organisations that receive funding as part of Germany’s largest funding programme for democracy and against violent extremism, namely ‘Live Democracy!’. This is a sinister sign, as it shows that civil society engagement against the far and extreme right is becoming politically unpopular or that attitudes that were originally reserved for the AfD are being ‘normalised’. This blog post takes this as an opportunity to present three doomsday scenarios of what the future of measures to prevent and counter violent extremism (PCVE) could look like if the AfD continues to gain power.

One possible scenario is the participation of the AfD in government, potentially as a junior partner in a coalition. This could, for example, influence federal budget decisions and federal education policy, which could in turn lead to a restructuring of the federal ‘Live Democracy!’ programme. Historically, the roots of today’s diverse German PCVE landscape, the bulk of which is implemented by civil society, lie in federal programmes for the prevention of right-wing extremism and racism. It is thanks to this history, as well as the country’s general dark history, that despite an increased focus on PCVE measures against religiously motivated extremism after 9/11, many measures are still explicitly aimed at preventing right-wing extremism. However, if the AfD were in government, it may influence the allocation of public funds to PCVE projects, with a shift towards those addressing left-wing and religiously-motivated extremism, arguing that these are the ‘real’ threats to our present society. Notably, as these terms are already inherently normative, they could also be given a new interpretation causing, for example, actors who currently promote democratic values to be labelled as ‘left-wing extremists’. Consequently, PCVE projects against right-wing extremism would decrease in number, and the respective projects would come under increasing pressure to seek funding elsewhere or reorient themselves. Any PCVE project that seeks to receive public funding in the future under such a government will need to swim with the current. However, it is not only the increasing lack of measures to prevent right-wing extremism that represent a collapse of an important pillar of a resilient democracy. PCVE measures to prevent religiously motivated extremism, which only ‘dance to the tune’ of a right-wing extremist party’s demands, will presumably be designed in such a way that they are highly stigmatising and thus not what we today understand as ‘effective’. 

In a second scenario, the AfD could one day even become part of the federal government. In this case, it might even have the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of the Interior under its control. If that were to happen, it would even be possible for ‘Live Democracy!’ to be abolished altogether or replaced by a new ideologically driven programme. A ‘blacklist’ for civil society organisations that take a clear stance against right-wing extremism could be part of this doomsday scenario and be excluded from funding. As a result, some civil society organisations would not even have the opportunity to reorient themselves, they would have to close or rely on donations only. Lastly, a final and the darkest scenario is an AfD-led government in which the AfD holds key ministries such as the Ministry of the Interior, Justice or Education. Not only would the work of civil society organisations against right-wing extremism no longer be supported, it could also be defamed and criminalised as agitations against the state and endangering national security. Repressive measures against such ‘criminal actors’ represent the pinnacle of this scenario. Where security authorities no longer work against right-wing structures, but with them, there is no longer any room at all for what we understand as PCVE today. There could be measures under this banner, yet these would themselves be right-wing extremist in nature and based on a concept of extremism that is directed against enemies of a right-wing extremist government. Although even today it is not entirely undisputed what the kind of ‘extremism’ PCVE measures are directed against, such an understanding of PCVE would only be an instrument legitimising violence and discrimination, a perversion of its original function. 

What can be done to prevent these doomsday scenarios? On the one hand, active efforts must be made to ensure that the AfD’s rise to political power does not materialise. This requires decisive action from democratic parties, which must reinforce the ‘firewall’ against extremist influence. Ironically, it also calls for strengthening the very PCVE measures that combat radicalisation. If these measures were funded by the democratic parties currently in power, with the longest possible legally secured funding periods, their preventative impact could be significantly enhanced. On the other hand, democratic parties must also fortify or change the institutional frameworks in which PCVE measures operate, ensuring they remain resilient against potential political interference. One critical step would be to guarantee financial stability for civil society organisations, rather than leaving them reliant on annually approved funding. A democracy promotion law, which could have provided such security, was blocked in 2021 by the CDU and again in 2023 by federal states led by the CDU and the CSU. Their objections centred on concerns about potential support for so-called ‘left-wing’ extremist organisations and ambiguities in the definition of extremism – similar arguments to those we are seeing again today. Another step could therefore be to provide better financial support to the federal states and local authorities so that they can embed tried-and-tested and ‘effective’ PCVE measures in regular structures. This would also take some of the political attention away from the PCVE landscape. Moreover, it would also be a sensible structural development of Germany’s highly experimental PCVE landscape with its numerous ‘model projects’, as those that have proven successful could enjoy a longer-term future.

Editor note: This article was originally published on The Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Beirut Office.

The Syrian opposition’s military operation that led to the remarkable collapse of the Assad regime on December 8 drew attention to Hayet Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that led the offensive and has since assumed power. Understandably, much of this attention has been focused on the group’s radical past and previous links to the Islamic State IS and al-Qaeda and how they might affect its leadership’s future direction in ruling the country. While legitimate and important, these concerns stir the focus away from the pressing question of how HTS has survived more than a decade of intractable conflict, during which the country has witnessed the emergence, demise, and reconfiguration of many other groups. Answering this question could provide a broader understanding of the group’s constantly evolving worldview and may offer a glimpse into the future direction of its leadership.

A close look at HTS’s trajectory reveals a strong sense of pragmatism and adaptability, fueled by its leadership’s drive for survival and hunger for power. These defining traits have allowed the group to overcome multiple challenges, ensured its survival, aneventually assumed power over Syria today  – a position it appears to maintain to this day.

Leaving ISIS

For starters, HTS, initially known as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), was established in 2011 as the clandestine Syrian branch of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. JN’s growing popularity, stemming largely from its disciplined fighters and effective collaboration with local Islamist factions against the Syrian regime, along with the ambition for independence of its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani (better known as Ahmad al-Sharaa), prompted Baghdadi to bring this increasingly self-confident Syrian wing back under his direct leadership. In April 2013, Baghdadi unilaterally dissolved both JN and ISI to merge them into a new group called the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Al-Jolani refused and instead pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, which was theoretically the parent organization of both groups. This move prompted thousands of foreign fighters to defect to ISIS. It sparked a power struggle that eventually led to open conflict between the al-Jolnai’s group and ISIS that has lasted until today.

Shifting allegiance to al-Qaeda revealed an early sign of its leadership pragmatism. When asked about his decision to join al-Qaeda after leaving ISIS, al-Jolani told Martin Smith in 2021 that he needed the “symbolism” of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. As one of the most respected figures in the jihadi-Salafist movement, al-Zawahiri would give JN the legitimacy needed to mitigate the fallout of breaking away from ISIS. Indeed, there was little to suggest that ideological considerations prompted this move, which was arguably a clear attempt by al-Jolani to escape ISIS’s control while minimizing the damage of leaving it behind. 

Notwithstanding the differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda regarding the timing of establishing the caliphate and the nature and frequency of violence against opponents, JN still operated within the realm of jihadi-Salafism. Generally speaking, jihadi Salafis believe that violence is the only way to achieve socio-political change and that Shari’a law should serve as the sole source of legislation. Consequently, they view both democracy and the national state system as religiously illegitimat since these rely on man-made positivist laws. They also impose takfir—excommunication—on those they consider not to adhere to what they define as “true” Islam. For example, states are deemed infidel for not applying Shari’a law as their sole source of legislation.

Leaving Al-Qaeda 

Carrying the al-Qaeda  label came at a high price for JN. The US intensified its airstrikes, other local armed factions raised concerns about cooperating with the group, and ISIS launched military offensives to drive JN out of northeastern major cities such as Deir ez-Zor. All these factors pushed the pragmatic al-Jolani to adjust his strategy and reconsider his decision to represent AQ in Syria. In July 2016, he appeared in a video revealing his face to the public for the first time and announced that all operations under the JN banner were canceled in favor of forming Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). The international community, however, continued to classify it as a terrorist organization, and most local factions refused to merge with it, fearing international isolation and strained relations with supporting states. 

The logic behind divorcing al-Qaeda, merging with local factions, and embedding itself within the Syrian opposition was largely driven by the group’s leadership’s desire to remove itself from international terrorism lists. This strategy would ensure its survival and help avoid strikes from the US-led international coalition, which had inflicted significant damage on ISIS and, to a lesser degree, on JFS. After an intense round of negotiations, the group managed to secure a merger with three local factions—Liwaa al-Haqq, Jaysh al-Sunnah, and Ansar al-Din—culminating in the establishment of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017. 

HTS, the last rebranding

The establishment of HTS was a watershed moment for the group, marking the beginning of a gradual shift from jihad to politics. To facilitate this transition, it set up its semi-technocratic Salvation Government, which has received substantial criticism for its performance and lack of transparency due to HTS’s top-down approach to governance. Additionally, the group established its General Security apparatus, which has played a significant role in quashing dissent against the leadership and maintaining economic dominance in the region.

On the military front, the group sought to monopolize violence in its areas of operation and control. Between 2017 and 2022, HTS fought and defeated its former allies among local Islamist groups—such as Nour al-Din al-Zinki and Ahrar al-Sham—depriving them of the economic lifeline provided by the Idlib Bab al-Hawa crossing. It also put an end to Hurras al-Din, an al-Qaeda affiliate established by a top al-Qaeda loyalist who defected from HTS after its divorce from al-Qaeda, rejecting HTS’s ruthless pragmatism.

HTS leadership recognized that the nation-state system was the only viable framework for survival, necessitating cooperation with state actors. By 2017, HTS began establishing relations with Turkey—a state that was considered an infidel due to its secular nature. Additionally, HTS expelled senior members who still held old, extreme jihadi-Salafist views, especially those who rejected cooperation with Ankara. Ironically, HTS had previously fought local groups for accepting Turkish support and participating in Astana political talks about Syria, in which Ankara acted as guarantor. Additionally, HTS has shared intelligence with NATO through Turkey to target high-value targets of IS and al-Qaeda, signaling its readiness to become a partner with the international community war on terror. 

On the ideological level, HTS leadership has actively sought to dominate the religious sphere in Idlib and reshape the ideological orientations of its ranks. In March 2019, HTS established the Supreme Council of Fatwa—managed by al-Jolani’s advisers—to monopolize fatwa production (formal rulings or interpretations of Islamic law by qualified scholars). This central religious authority was designed to diminish the influence of global jihadi-Salafi ideologues and curb the sway of the remaining extremists within the group. Notwithstanding these efforts, hardline views within HTS’s rank and file still exist today, especially when it comes to applying democracy and dealing with other sects. 

HTS in power

For more than a year before the operation that toppled Assad, HTS-controlled areas in north west Syria witnessed public demonstrations calling for the removal of al-Sharaa, the release of detainees—many of whom had been tortured—and the establishment of an inclusive governance system. Paradoxically, HTS’s response was relatively restrained, with few casualties reported and only superficial reforms implemented. With HTS’s operation toppling Assad, al-Jolani transformed himself into a hero and put his adversaries in a delicate position where they must either comply with his rule or remain sidelined.

The international community finds itself in a dilemma on how to proceed. On one hand, toppling Assad was a desired outcome for most of its members, but having HTS, with its radical past, lead this effort complicates their calculus. Nevertheless, examining HTS’s trajectory reveals that the group is primarily driven by its leadership’s ambition for survival and hegemony. HTS has engaged in conflicts with various factions that possess different political and ideological backgrounds, suggesting that the group is not strongly committed to any specific ideological principles. In other words, it is largely politics that drive the group’s behaviors. 

Driven by political calculation, HTS leadership has genuinely changed over the last decade. While hardline elements still operate under the group’s banner, its leadership’s strive for rule that requires an inclusive, national direction is likely to prevail. HTS’s pragmatism is a double-edged sword; on the one hand, it means that al-Sharaa is willing to adopt new positions on issues such as women and minorities, but on the other, he might be ready to go to extreme lengths to stay in power.

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^{1 The group has been known by different names corresponding to distinct periods—ISI (Islamic State of Iraq)
from October 2006 to April 2013, ISIS/ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) from April 2013 to June 2014,
and IS (Islamic State) from June 2014 to the present.}

^{2 Martin Smith, an American journalist and producer, made a documentary about HTS and its leader titled “The
Jihadist” in 2021.}

Projects run by civil society are believed to be particularly valuable in preventing and countering violent extremism and in fostering democracy more broadly. For example, they can reach target groups that harbour opposition to state actors and they often possess valuable knowledge about local needs allowing for tailored services. For these and many other reasons, some countries, such as Germany, rely heavily on civil society efforts for promoting democracy and diversity as well as preventing and countering violent extremism. However, for such a diverse civil society landscape to flourish, the predictability of its financial support needs to be strengthened. This blog post explains why financial dependence on public funding, while useful and without alternative, can sometimes be dangerous, and what should be done to prevent such scenarios.

Federal programmes to promote democracy and prevent and counter violent extremism have a fairly long tradition in Germany. Since the early 1990s, federal programmes have provided public funding for projects to promote democracy and, initially, to combat racism. The largest and currently probably best-known federal programme established in 2015 is the ‘Live Democracy!’ programme. In its second funding period, 182 million euros were distributed to various civil society actors to implement projects to promote democracy and prevent and counter violent extremism of all kinds. A third funding period was due to start in early 2025. But then Germany was plunged into a budget crisis triggered by a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court on the unconstitutional retroactive use of climate and transformation funds, which left a funding gap of 60 billion euros. The federal government was faced with the challenge of revising existing spending plans while at the same time complying with the constitutional requirements of the debt brake. The tense political situation led to heated debates within the governing coalition, with no agreement being reached on savings and priorities. As a result of the deadlock, a federal budget for 2025 was not adopted in time and the budget crisis even ultimately led to the collapse of the German federal government. Although a provisional agreement on the 2025 budget was reached in July 2024, the differences within the so-called ‘traffic light coalition’ remained and led to the dissolution of the coalition and the scheduling of new elections in February 2025.

For the civil society projects funded by ‘Live Democracy!’, this again translated into existential fears. With funding due to expire at the end of the year and no federal budget set for 2025, many projects for which federal funding was a financial cornerstone were threatened with closure. Although this was only a fear and not yet a fact, civil society projects faced many challenges: How, for example, to retain qualified staff in the face of these prospects? The scenario of a shrinking supply of civil society projects promoting democracy and preventing and countering violent extremism would have mainly played into the hands of those actors for whom these projects were already a thorn in their side. A specialist from the Federal Association for Mobile Counselling expressed great concern to researchers at ‘Netzpolitik.org’, stating that if the services were to disappear, ‘what the AfD has wanted for a long time would have been achieved through the back door’. In short, it suddenly became a tangible scenario that the German democracy would lose some of its ‘Wehrhaftigkeit’ [defensibility]. 

It was not until mid-November 2024 that the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs sent a circular to the funded projects stating that the projects selected for funding would receive at least a pro rata allocation of the funding requested for 2025 until the newly elected federal government had passed a budget for 2025. The Ministry also held out the prospect of an extension of the approval period and an increase in funding. This was made possible by provisional budget management. As a result, the federal government retained its ability to act and fulfil its legal obligations even without an adopted budget. This also made it possible to publish a new funding guideline on 24 November 2024, which came into force on 1 January 2025. Since summer 2024, civil society organisations have been able to apply for funding from 2025 and many projects have been selected to be considered for funding and can now submit funding applications. These must now be reviewed and approved so that the promised funds are available to the projects in a legally binding manner. Importantly, one of the new features is the extension of the funding phase to eight years to provide more planning certainty.

How should this situation in Germany be viewed? On the one hand, state support for a large and diverse civil society PCVE practice in Germany is absolutely necessary. After all, this wealth of projects could not be sustained by private funding alone, and private funding would be even more volatile than state funding. The fact that there are such large federal programmes for the prevention of extremism in Germany is a great advantage in international and European comparison. On the other hand, recent developments also show the need for regular funding structures that are less affected by such political crises. Extending the funding period to eight years is a step in the right direction. Another could be to fund organisations rather than individual projects, so that they can plan for the longer term and are not under pressure to innovate. Such longer planning periods could also provide an incentive to evaluate activities and thus make the whole practice more effective. Some time ago, a so-called ‘Democracy Promotion Act’ was proposed in Germany to provide a legal basis for federal funding to create long-term and transparent funding that is more sustainable and less dependent on government crises and changes. However, this law has not yet been passed due to political disputes over its content and the distribution of funds. It remains to be seen whether the new governing parties will be able to agree on such an important solution to strengthen Germany’s diverse PCVE landscape.

In a follow-up to a blog post on violence against politicians by Joshua Farrell-Molloy, a previous VORTEX piece reported on the development of these attacks in Germany and reflected on possible causes. This blog post will now focus on the consequences of these attacks and possible strategies to deal with this phenomenon.

Attacks on politicians have both immediate and long-term consequences that threaten democracy. All the studies listed in the previous VORTEX blog post on violence against politicians in Germany show that politicians are increasingly considering giving up their political careers or are less willing to speak out on certain political issues in public because of experiences of verbal hostility or physical attacks against them. According to the MOTRA study, more than one in ten of those affected have considered resigning from office or have stated that they will not run for local political office again. In the Körber Foundation study, 19% of the mayors surveyed had considered withdrawing from politics and finally, in the study by the University of Duisburg-Essen and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, which focused on large cities, the figure was still around 5%.

Behavioural changes by politicians due to fears that they might (in future) be subject to hostility or attacks are particularly problematic. According to the Körber Foundation study, 68% of the mayors surveyed have already changed their behaviour due to concerns about hostility or insults. Even among those who have not yet been affected by hostility and attacks, for example, 35% (mostly) refrain from using social media out of concern about hostility and attacks and 29% express themselves less frequently on certain topics than before. Both withdrawal because of attacks and preventive changes in behaviour cause lasting damage to democracy. Local political activity becomes less attractive, especially for those who are more likely to be targeted by right-wing scapegoating narratives because of their political stances. Withdrawal from social networks also means that democratic voices are increasingly disappearing, and anti-democratic voices are gaining ground.

So, what can be done to reduce the number of such attacks and prevent further consequences that threaten democracy? A first measure would certainly be to strengthen police investigation and prosecution capacities. But this can only go hand in hand with educating those affected about what kind of online and offline threats can be reported under criminal law and how. Those affected by hate speech on the internet need to be informed, for example, about how to secure evidence in the digital space, what kind of screenshots they need to take, that they should also secure URLs and metadata such as the IP address and how to report the platforms. Moreover, there is a need to simplify reporting channels and criminal charges as well as providing generally accessible support structures for those affected. Since this year, the German Forum for Crime Prevention has been a nationwide point of contact for those affected thanks to funding from the Federal Ministry of the Interior and acts as a coordinating guide (Starke Stelle). Some federal states in Germany have already set a good example by establishing central contact points for those affected, e.g. Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, Saxony and Bavaria. Those affected can also be referred to civil society organisations, which can help them develop concrete strategies to increase their confidence or take individual preventive measures (e.g. apply for a ban on disclosure).

One example of such a civil society organisation is HateAid. This is a not-for-profit organisation that supports those affected by digital violence. It helps people who experience hate, hate speech or threats online – be it on social media, in forums or via direct messages. The aim is to provide them with legal, psychological and financial support and to show them how to defend themselves against digital attacks. The organisation offers free advice and assistance with gathering evidence and making a complaint. In certain cases, HateAid will also pay for legal action against the perpetrators and help to enforce claims for damages. As well as providing direct help, HateAid also lobbies politically for tougher laws against digital violence and campaigns for better protection online. Through awareness campaigns and education programmes, the organisation raises awareness of the dangers of hate speech and strengthens digital civil society

Other examples are the Federal Association for Mobile Counselling, which also offers mobile counselling for municipal officials and elected representatives in every federal state and published a guide on the topic of threats against local politicians in 2021, together with the Association of counselling centres for victims of right-wing, racist and anti-Semitic violence. The National Centre for Crime Prevention published similar guide in 2020. Since April 2021, there has also been the ‘Stark im Amt’ portal, which is operated by the Körber Foundation together with the municipal umbrella organisations and is aimed at those affected by local politics. It provides both networking and prevention work by showing how local politicians can prepare themselves for potential threats and how to behave in the event of attacks.

However, in addition to providing support for those affected and criminal prosecution, the problem of threats and physical attacks against politicians must also be tackled preventively. Germany has a particularly diverse range of civic education, democracy promotion and extremism prevention measures that contribute in various ways to making society more resilient to scapegoating narratives, for example. In the area of extremism prevention, many civil society organisations also provide advice in cases of potential radicalisation. Such services are indispensable, especially in times of multiple interlinked crises, which is why it would only be a welcome development if the financial support for such projects were secured in the long term.  

Director Justin Kurzel’s new film ‘The Order’, released late last year, is a true-crime thriller starring Jude Law and Nicholas Hoult. Adapted from the book ‘The Silent Brotherhood’, by Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, the film tells the story of the US-based neo-Nazi terrorist organisation The Order, a small militant faction that split from the Aryan Nations in the early 1980’s and was active for over a year until their downfall. 

During their brief existence The Order, led by Robert Jay Mathews, carried out a crime spree across the US that included bombings, counterfeiting operations and bank and armoured-cars robberies to finance their armed revolution against the government. In their most notorious attack, the group shot and killed Jewish talk radio host Alan Berg outside his home in Denver. An outspoken critic of the far-right, Berg was killed for being ‘anti-white’. 

Dramatised versions of real-life terrorism events are a genre of their own and risk feeling like bland made-for-tv docudramas. But The Order is an engaging cat-and-mouse detective thriller full of atmosphere. The haunting score by Jed Kurzel casts an unsettling backdrop on a film that feels deeply immersed in the geography, with stunning shots of landscapes capturing the magnitude of the Pacific Northwest. The shootouts are brutal and well-choreographed, evoking Michael Mann’s Heat, while the performances of the cast are all solid.

As is the case with most films inspired by true stories, some elements are dramatised for cinematic effect. Law plays Terry Husk, a fictionalised character created for the purpose of storytelling, a cliche cop dealing with a falling apart marriage and dispatched to a small town. There are moments which lack plausibility, like occasions where Husk and Mathews meet face-to-face, or when Mathews interrupts a church service to deliver an impromptu speech at an Aryan Nations compound, before the crowd erupts into cheers of ‘white power’, in scenes that feel a bit too theatrical. 

What makes the film most compelling though is the portrayal of Mathews by Hoult. Hoult delivers a stellar performance as a calculated, articulate and charismatic leader, whose handsome looks make him look out of place among his more weathered looking acolytes. There is a chilling coolness about his character that is unnerving, yet effective in conveying his magnetic aura—which seems precisely the point. The film really leans into this, making him as captivating to the audience as he may have been to his followers, helping us to understand a little better how they may have been drawn to him. However, this depiction is one which risks glamorising his persona and ideology.

Watching the film, it is easy to see how contemporary fellow travellers of The Order and their ideology might admire it. The film portrays neo-Nazis in a way we do not normally see. The group is shown as a well-dressed, highly organised and coordinated outfit, executing heists efficiently and remaining calm in combat and under pressure. Their competency is in stark contrast to law enforcement, depicted as always one step behind the group. Mathews’ death in a final blaze of glory during a fiery shootout with FBI agents, although an accurate portrayal, could risk making him even more admirable to his supporters. 

This theme is one which touches on a phenomenon any of those who study online communities of violent extremists will tell you— when such dramatised portrayals of their heroes enter their online universe they are often repurposed as propaganda. It is not difficult to imagine The Order spliced up into the sort of aesthetic tribute videos that are a mainstay in these online worlds, with velocity edits and flash cuts of shots from the film slowed down or sped up to high-energy soundtracks. However, any reuse of the film in this way is no fault of Kurzel. Regardless how filmmakers present the subject, extremist audiences tend to admire them through their own ideological lens. 

For example, on ‘Terrorgram’, a network of neo-Nazis on Telegram who promote terrorism and glorify far-right killers as ‘Saints’ (including Mathews), scenes from such films and documentaries are regularly recycled in their propaganda. This has included footage from ‘July 22’, about the 2011 Norway attacks, despite the director’s effort to balance the focus on Breivik with a harrowing depiction of the suffering endured by his victims. Tony Stone’s 2021 film ‘Ted K’ about Unabomber Ted Kaczynski also features, including clips of Kaczynski chopping down power lines or testing explosives alongside captions like “reject the modern world”. This was despite the film providing a character study of Kaczynski as a pathetic figure. Likewise, clips valorising Oklahoma Bomber Timothy McVeigh are taken from something as innocuous as reconstruction scenes from a National Geographic documentary about the bombing.

Of course, this is simply a feature of our highly visual world, where social media allows images and narratives to be endlessly repurposed, reframed, and reinterpreted. In our digital media landscape, no piece of visual storytelling remains confined to its original intent—especially when it resonates with audiences looking to project their own meaning onto it. For films like The Order, that paints a somewhat flattering picture of its subject, the risk may be even greater for appropriation, blurring the line between critique and admiration.

INTRODUCTION

The 2018 Brazilian presidential elections were characterised by political and electoral polarisation built from the ideological precepts bolstered by the Workers’ Party (Partido do Trabalhador – PT) and the Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal – PSL). The antagonistic evidence in the relationship around these two political parties was constituted by the speeches of the main subjects (candidates Fernando Haddad and Jair Bolsonaro, respectively) and were built from their discursive formations following two opposing lines of thought.

Bolsonaro appeared as an alternative to the Workers’ Party (henceforth denominated as PT), which had been in power since President Lula’s election in 2003. The years leading up to 2018 were characterised by corruption scandals, the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff (2016), economic downfall, and an increase in criminality (Layton et al. 2021). Thus, it is possible to say that the Brazilian political landscape, at the time of the 2018 elections, was propitious to feelings of revolt, exasperation, and the demand for change.

Drawing from those circumstances, Bolsonaro came forth and promised the people that his government would solve the problem of criminality, whose source was, according to him, none other than the government of PT. By assuring the people that he would put an end to PT’s “ideological grip” on the country, Bolsonaro stood as the candidate who would finally make Brazil safe.

EASY SOLUTION

A method through which Bolsonaro took advantage of criminality as a wicked problem (Selg 2020) is by communicating ‘easy solutions’ to Brazilians by means of emotive and phatic communication styles (ibid.). It seems that people can be coaxed into accepting ‘absurd’ solutions to the wicked problem of criminality, as contextualised by one of Bolsonaro’s quotes, stated during his campaign in the South of Brazil (Hupsel Filho 2018):

”It is inherent to the human being to carry a weapon. If someone is armed, I have to be too. We have to be on the same level. If a guy two metres tall comes to attack me, how will I, a short guy, defend myself?” ^[1](Curitiba city, Santa Catarina state, March 28^th, 2018).

The characteristics of wicked problems comprise two different sets. On the one hand, they give information about the problem, i.e. that wicked problems are especially difficult to define and to narrow down (Selg 2020). In this way, the problem of criminality is difficult to pinpoint, as there are hundreds of different problems that can merge under this umbrella term, including everything from cyberattacks to homicides – as long as they are characterised as something against the law. As the problem of criminality is unclear, it can be anything that Bolsonaro sees as effective for his purposes. In the case of the above quote, it is implied that it should be criminal that somebody who is two metres tall can attack you while you, being physically smaller, are not able to defend yourself. The mere threat of a potential enemy seems to be enough and that the only envisioned way forward is to acquire a weapon.

Communication styles such as this feed on the emotions and fears of its listeners. The audience can thus identify itself with these forms, as public appeals to stereotypes, common situations and stories are used to fortify the connection of symbolic messages and its listeners. Here, such a narrative is built that there is only one inherent solution, when actually other solutions could be more justified.

This brings us to the actual solution and the second set of characteristics of wicked problems. The solution to a wicked problem is not easily apparent and there might be repercussions for trying out different solutions (Selg 2020). In Bolsonaro’s quote above, we see that Bolsonaro advocates that there is an easy/only solution, i.e. just carry a weapon. In this way, you can defend yourself, no matter who comes up against you.

What Bolsonaro is actually doing however, is deproblematizing a wicked problem and possible policy interventions against it, deflecting this as a person’s individual responsibility of self-defence instead as that of the state and judicial bodies. This works because people have become frustrated with the current state of corruption and are hungry for change and justice, which Bolsonaro’s party manifesto offers (Burst et al. 2020). In this way, people would rather take this form of ‘illusioned empowerment’ – which comes packaged in very emotive language – than continuing with the current status quo.

COMPLEX EVALUABILITY

As a wicked problem, criminality is hard to define, thus it would be difficult to measure how much Bolsonaro’s government led to its decrease. Firstly, it is challenging to account for all variables which may or may not influence the criminality rate in Brazil. This is because by the ‘virtue of its wickedness’, criminality can be a sign of other problems (Selg 2020). Crime rate may be in causal relations with, for instance, the economy (UNODC 2012). At the same time, short-term results of interventions for decreasing criminality are mostly not conclusive and sometimes misleading. As such, the Pernabuco Program in Brazil invested in the decrease of homicides by 33% (Chainey 2019, §12). However, after 2015, its effectiveness fell down and the homicide rate reached its highest level in 2017 (ibid). This is to illustrate that solutions to criminality cannot be easily evaluated in a short-term perspective. Moreover, any solution to criminality has an irreversible effect, since human lives are at stake. All these features put criminality in the category of wicked problems (Selg 2020).

Furthermore, criminality is not restricted to just homicides. As noted previously, criminality is an umbrella term. In case of authoritarian populism (Selg 2020), the latter may open possibilities for a policy maker to focus only on the component of a given problem, which favours their position. When employing such a reductionist approach, Bolsonaro may argue that the rate of violent deaths, for instance, has decreased in Brazil (Lisboa 2019). An illustrative example of this is Bolsonaro’s speech at the UN General Assembly meeting in 2019, when he mentioned the 20% decrease in homicides (Verdélio 2019, § 9).

The latter may be used to support his pre-electoral promise illustrated in the party manifesto and his speeches. It is worth mentioning that, although the violent deaths rate has been decreasing since 2017 (Lisboa 2019), the power of organized criminal groups has increased (Berg and Varsori 2020).

To sum up, criminality as a wicked problem requires complex logical models for statistical analysis. However, even the latter is possible only when narrowing down criminality to one of its components. Therefore, there is an open room for a reductionist approach, which according to Selg (2020) is peculiar to authoritarian populism, as well as data manipulation for the sake of gaining public support.

ANTI-PT

During his electoral campaign in the North of Brazil, on September 3^rd, 2018, Bolsonaro stood on top of a sound truck and bellowed, while holding a rifle (Ribeiro 2018):

”We’re going to shoot PT-voters. I’m going to chase them away from our country.” ^[2] (Rio Branco city, Acre state, September 3, 2018).

It is worth noting that, by saying that he is going to shoot the people who vote for PT, Bolsonaro is implying that he is making the country safer. That is because, for Bolsonaro and his supporters, PT has been established as the source of all criminality. In this sense, the phrase above is not just a threat to all PT affiliates, it implies that they are the common (internal) enemy, and thus, PT becomes a signifier of criminality. As far as a solution for the problem of criminality, shooting people whose ideology differs from Bolsonaro’s is not a solution that can be understood as true or false. It is, instead, either good or bad, which once again allows us to characterise criminality as a wicked problem (Selg 2020).

On another instance, one can recognize traces of totalitarian populism in this quote. Bolsonaro exacerbates the antagonism between ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, meaning him and his supporters vs. PT and theirs. According to Selg (2020), totalitarianism has an intrinsic paradox, which can be exemplified through this quote. There is a clear social division: people who are ‘for-PT’ and people who are ‘against-PT’, which is to say ‘for-Bolsonaro’. However, this social division is seen as a problem. The ‘others’ must be chased away, they must leave the country, or otherwise be shot, in order for there to be no division.

Bolsonaro actively condemns all ideologies that are different from his own. Under this idea of homogenization of the way of thinking, lies the difference: ‘for-Bolsonaro’ vs. ‘for-PT’, friend vs. enemy (Schmidt 1932).

Hence, Bolsonaro needs PT as a reference point because it is the hate towards PT that totalized the people under his banner. PT had been in power for two decades and, after many political scandals (Layton et al. 2021), hate towards PT was preeminent. In this respect, one can identify here Laclau’s (1996) empty signifier. Along with this hate, the people were left with a ‘lack’: after so many years voting for PT, now that this party was no longer an option, the people were left with a feeling of ‘what else is left?’. And then comes Bolsonaro, representing the anti-PT, thus fulfilling this lack.

In summary, Bolsonaro needs PT to totalize his own supporters, and yet he promises to eliminate PT, because the party in question is the signifier of criminality. Bolsonaro relies on this division (us/them, friend/enemy), which is a division he is, in this quote, promising to get rid of.

CONCLUSIONS

I argued that Bolsonaro took advantage of the wicked problem of criminality to obtain public approval. Three motions or methods on how Bolsonaro was able to take characteristics of wicked problems and use them for his own political agenda are highlighted:

First, championing a seemingly ‘easy solution’ to pacify and give Brazilians a form of ‘illusioned empowerment’ against a wicked problem. Second, taking advantage of the immeasurability of the umbrella term ‘criminality’ for purposes of data selectiveness or manipulation. And third, benefitting from the good or bad evaluation around criminality, by branding the opposition, the Workers’ Party (PT), as a signifier for criminality, as something bad, and using this to totalize Brazilians against PT under his banner.

With these findings I want to showcase how utterances of authoritarian and totalitarian origins – phatic and emotive communications – can be dangerously effective when connected with wicked problems.

Understanding the limitations of wicked problems helps us to re-evaluate political promises, especially when these seem to contain empty words for the purpose of gaining public approval and power.

References

Burst, Tobias / Krause, Werner / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Weßels, Bernhard / Zehnter, Lisa (2020): The Manifesto Data Collection: South America. Version 2020b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpdssa.2020b

Chainey, S., Muggah, R., & Giannini, R. A. (2019). Reducing Homicide in Brazil: Insights Into What Works. Americas Quarterly.Retrived from https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/reducing-homicide-in-brazil-insights-into-what-works/, 04.12.2021

Hupsel Filho, V. (2018, March 29). “Arma é garantia de nossa liberdade”, defende Bolsonaro em Curitiba. Estadão. Retrieved from https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,arma-e-garantia-de-nossa-liberdade-defende-bolsonaro-em-curitiba,70002247541, 06.12.2021

Laclau, E., 1996a. Why do empty signifiers matter to politics?. In: E. Laclau, ed. Emancipation(s). London: Verso, 34–46.

Layton ML, Smith AE, Moseley MW, Cohen MJ. Demographic polarization and the rise of the far right: Brazil’s 2018 presidential election. Research & Politics. January 2021. doi:10.1177/2053168021990204

Ribeiro, J. (2018, September 3). “Vamos fuzilar a petralhada”, diz Bolsonaro em campanha no Acre. Exame. Retrieved from https://exame.com/brasil/vamos-fuzilar-a-petralhada-diz-bolsonaro-em-campanha-no-acre/, 06.12.2021

Schmitt, C. (1932). The concept of the political: Expanded edition. University of Chicago Press.

Selg, Peeter. (2020). A political-semiotic Explanation of wicked problems. Forthcoming In: Elżbieta Hałas, Nicolas Maslowski (Ed.). Politics of Symbolization Across Central and Eastern Europe. Berlin: Peter Lang.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Criminality (2012).Economic crisis may trigger rise in crime. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/February/economic-crises-can-trigger-rise-in-crime.html, 25.11.2021

Verdélio Andreia (2019).In UN speech, Bolsonaro talks about socialism and religion.The president criticized Cuba, Venezuela, and religious intolerance. Agência Brasil. Retrived from https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2019-09/un-speech-bolsonaro-talks-about-socialism-and-religion, 06.12.2021

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^[1] Originally: “É inerente do ser humano andar armado. Se alguém está armado eu tenho que estar também. Tem que nivelar. Se vier um cara de dois metros de altura me atacar, eu, que sou baixinho, vou me defender como?” (Hupsel Filho 2018). Translation by Heidi Campana Piva.

^[2] Originally: “Vamos fuzilar a petralhada. Eu vou botar esses picaretas para correr do nosso país.”
(Ribeiro 2018). Translation by Heidi Campana Piva.