Author
For most of us, it seems difficult to understand why some individuals are drawn to radical groups. Scholars from a range of academic disciplines have attempted to explain this phenomenon. One line of reasoning emphasises that individuals who experience injustice are more open to radicalisation. Another highlights the importance of social networks, suggesting that people become radicalised because they know someone already involved in a radical group. Friends and family members may, in other words, play a key role in persuading individuals to join.
In countries affected by both poverty and state collapse, some people are drawn to radical groups because such groups can offer protection as well as a source of income. Yet another perspective focuses on individual traits and personality. Earlier debates, particularly during the 1970s, often portrayed terrorists as abnormal in some respect—for instance, as suffering from antisocial personality disorder. This line of argument has largely been abandoned. The prevailing view today is that individuals who radicalise, even to the point of engaging in terrorism, are in many ways quite ordinary. In fact, it may be the case that individuals with severe psychological disturbances are less likely to be recruited, as they may struggle to function within a (radical) group.
In this text, I argue that people are drawn to radical groups through normal psychological processes. The starting point is simple: human beings are social beings who need the group and group belonging. This is the case for several reasons. My discussion is informed by motivational theory, although I do not seek to dismiss alternative explanations grounded in other theoretical perspectives. Rather, I aim to contribute one of several relevant lenses that may offer useful insights.
My argument begins from the premise that humans need to belong to a group. One reason is purely physical. Without a group, human beings are relatively defenceless against external threats, including harsh weather conditions, dangerous animals, hostile adversaries, and food scarcity. For this reason, groups are inherently attractive to individuals. The idea that “going it alone” is a sign of strength does not hold up well. Humanity has survived largely because of its ability to form protective groups. In this sense, Thomas Hobbes may well have been right when he argued already in the seventeenth century that life without the state is “nasty, brutish, and short”.
What does this have to do with radical groups? The attractiveness of such groups is likely to increase in so-called failed states, contexts where the state has collapsed and is unable to provide physical security, let alone basic social services. While radical groups typically have limited resources, there are situations in which they are able to offer such goods. Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka are well-known examples of organisations that have provided social services alongside their political agendas. In such cases, these groups can acquire a certain degree of appeal.
However, human beings have more than just physical needs. According to motivational theory, groups also fulfil psychological needs, such as the need for love, affection, and belonging. Experiencing genuine acceptance within a group—a feeling of being valued and of fitting in as one is—can be deeply satisfying. Conversely, rejection can be psychologically damaging.
Radical groups are often discussed in terms of how they mobilise emotions such as anger and resentment. While this is certainly important, it is not the whole picture. Individuals who are accepted into a radical group may also experience inclusion, care, and a sense of belonging. This can be particularly significant for those who struggle to find acceptance elsewhere, for example due to experiences of exclusion or bullying.
In addition, people are not only drawn to groups for protection or belonging. Groups can also provide a sense of self-worth and self-esteem. However, this depends on the group being perceived as having value or status—not only by its own members but also, crucially, by others. Here, radical groups face a challenge. They are rarely regarded as high-status groups, at least not in the eyes of the broader society. Individuals who join such groups therefore risk losing status rather than gaining it. Many radical groups appear to be aware of this and have developed various strategies to counteract it.
For example, if a radical group recognises that it is unlikely to gain acceptance within mainstream society, it may instead seek recognition within a narrower community. An Islamist group, for instance, might attempt to enhance its status among Muslims in Europe rather than among the European majority population. Some groups go further by actively distancing themselves from mainstream values and constructing an alternative value system. One example is certain Salafist groups in Britain, which claim to restore a “pure” and authentic form of religious practice. Another strategy involves elevating the moral standing of the in-group by discrediting others. In such cases, the group not only presents itself as superior according to its own criteria but also attributes negative characteristics to out-groups.
To summarise, from the perspective of motivational theory, radical groups can become attractive under certain conditions. Resourceful groups may be appealing if they are able to take over functions normally associated with the state, such as providing security and basic social services. They can also offer community, belonging, and, in some cases, a sense of status. If individuals are drawn to radical groups for these reasons, this attraction can be understood as a result of normal psychosocial processes.
Finally, I would like to offer a brief personal reflection. In many parts of Europe, anti-immigration parties have gained political ground. Immigration, particularly Muslim immigration, has often been framed as a problem, and immigrants themselves as a burden. This rhetoric has increasingly been echoed not only by fringe actors but also by mainstream political parties.
From the perspective of Muslim immigrants, such a social climate may foster a sense of low status in the eyes of the majority society, and in some cases a feeling of rejection. Under these conditions, the appeal of radical groups may increase. Their message of belonging—of being welcomed, valued, and respected within a Muslim community—can be highly attractive. Likewise, claims that “we” possess a superior moral or religious status may resonate. In this sense, the nationalism promoted by anti-immigration movements may, paradoxically, prove counterproductive. The sense of exclusion it generates can be readily exploited by radical groups.