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During the summer 2026, Europol and the Spanish agency CITCO organised an initiative to disrupt the Com online ecosystem and limit the spread of material related to it. It resulted in the identification of over 4000 URL’s that included such material. This was one of the many interventions against the Com that have been taken by authorities during the last 4-5 years.
The Com features prominently in reports about the current trends in violent extremism. It is a key part of the phenomenon that is often referred to as nihilistic violent extremism or nihilistic violence. It is seen as one of the foremost examples of hybridised extremism and increasing youth radicalisation and it is highlighted, for example, in the Global Terrorism Index 2026 report.
But what is nihilistic violent extremism? This blog post goes through briefly what we know about it and asks whether it is justified to label it as violent extremism.
What does “nihilistic violent extremism” refer to?
In recent years, there have been increasing observations of online communities that glorify violence and its perpetrators, as well as incite and manipulate other children and young people into committing violent acts against people, animals, and themselves. These communities are characterised by the rejection of social norms, an anti-human and anti-societal worldview, and a desire to create chaos and destruction in a society they do not consider worth saving (Argentino 2025a).
This landscape includes numerous competing and sometimes collaborating groups. Examples of such groups include 764, No Lives Matter, and Maniac Murder Cult. Based on current knowledge, these groups operate in closed channels on social media platforms, mostly Discord and Telegram.
New participants are primarily recruited on gaming platforms favoured by children and young people and recruitment material can be found from many mainstream social media platforms (Graphika 2025). The Com can be seen as an ecosystem or umbrella under which many of these groups operate, but similar groups also exist outside the Com.
Most of the perpetrators and victims involved in these groups are minors, some of whom are very young (Argentino 2024a). Some adults are also involved, but investigations indicate that they typically joined the groups as minors. It is challenging to draw a clear distinction between the perpetrators and victims, as most perpetrators have themselves been victims first or have committed acts under pressure.
A main factor driving the activities of these networks is their internal hierarchy and the quest for status within it. In these groups, an individual’s status and influence are determined by the violent acts they have committed or have encouraged others to commit. All actions must be documented for other group members through videos, images, or livestreams.
Another key element is extortion. The individuals involved in these groups are purposefully and systematically looking to recruit children and young people who are in a vulnerable position. Those recruited are lured in different ways to join these groups and then pressured into committing violence, causing destruction, producing sexual material, or creating self-harm footage. If they do not comply, they are threatened with various forms of humiliation and revenge. This makes it difficult to leave the groups. In these groups, an individual’s status and influence are determined by the violent acts they have committed or have encouraged others to commit (Argentino 2024b, Argentino 2025b).
Currently, it is difficult to reliably assess the scale of the phenomenon. The best available public source is the arrest data collected by Marc André Argentino (Public Safety Canada’s researcher and the leading expert on the topic) and Angus Lindsay. According to this information, by May 2026, arrests have been made in at least 33 countries, and the cases involve almost 5,400 victimised individuals or entities (Argentino & Lindsay 2026).
Although groups like 764 and No Lives Matter are relatively new, online subcultures focused on violence and self-harm have existed for a long time. What makes these groups and violence-focused subcultures in general particularly noteworthy in today’s context is both their visibility on social media and the extensive use of social media by increasingly younger children. Nowadays, it is technologically much easier to produce and share images, videos, and livestreams, and the necessary technology is readily available to children through smartphones.
Relationship to Violent Extremism
The Com and the various groups are quite commonly called together as nihilistic violent extremism. This framing is likely influenced by the fact that the indiscriminate acts of violence associated with this phenomenon often outwardly resemble terrorist attacks. In some cases, perpetrators have also faced terrorism charges and groups been classified as terrorist entities.
One key practical reason for putting these groups under the violent extremism label is the implementation of preventive measures. In many countries, efforts have been made to prevent children and young people from drifting into such communities and to support those already involved in disengaging. Making use of interventions and models developed for the prevention of violent extremism have presented themselves as the most readily available pathway for advancing prevention and victim support.
The Com and the groups under it are clearly harmful, especially for young people, and actions need to be taken to prevent people from becoming involved in it. But how appropriate is it to treat it as a form of violent extremism?
There is no simple answer to this question, as there are both arguments in favour and against it. In any case, it is important to recognise that these communities differ significantly from what has traditionally been understood as violent extremism.
Violent extremism is typically defined by its political or religious motivation. For example, Finland’s National Action Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Violent Radicalisation and Violent Extremism defines violent extremism as “the ideologically inspired use, threat, encouragement or support of violence. Violent extremism may be associated with any ideology that justifies violence. It often involves an attempt to evoke feelings of fear and insecurity.”
Many groups that are part of this phenomenon are influenced by violent extremist ideologies, communities and subcultures, particularly by far-right accelerationism and satanism. They often express admiration for terrorist attacks and their perpetrators, as well as unrestrained glorification and pursuit of destruction and chaos.
To what extent these groups can truly be considered ideological is another matter. The influences are not equally evident across all subgroups. Even when they are, they do not seem to indicate deep engagement with or commitment to accelerationism or any other ideological view. It is actually this lack of ideological attachment (together with glorification of violence and misanthropy) that has led to their characterisation as ‘nihilistic’ (ISD, 2025).
The use of symbols and narratives from different ideologies seem rather derive from aesthetic fascination and the social capital that their use can bring to an individual. It can most aptly be seen “as currency through which status, transgression, and group membership are signaled, rather than as coherent political programs pursued through violence”, as Argentino and Lindsay (2026a) argue (see also Argentino & Lindsay 2026b).
Along the same lines, Joe Ondrak and Laura Vitelli (2025) have suggested that what we are witnessing may be described as ‘participatory memetic violent extremism’. By participatory memetic violent extremism, they understand “a symbolic statement of affiliation with or participation in groups that valorise violent or transgressive action, either as an end in itself or for its perceived social and cultural significance, in lieu of any clear strategic, political, or ideological goal”. This means that rather actions against any political goal, the violent acts can rather be seen as acting out the narratives and legends of the subculture and thereby becoming part of it.
Whatever one thinks about the role of ideology here, it is important recognise that the actions of The Com and other groups reach clearly beyond violent extremism. Although some acts of violence resemble terrorist attacks, these networks and groups are also associated with other forms of criminal behaviour, such as extortion, sexual exploitation, and various forms of harassment. This significantly affects how individuals become involved, what participation entails, and what disengagement means or requires. The key question is whether current prevention and intervention practices provide sufficient tools to address this phenomenon.
Further research and reflection are needed to determine whether the process of joining these groups can accurately be described as radicalisation. Current evidence suggests that a significant portion of those who end up in these groups are children and young people in vulnerable positions, whose involvement often result from coercion and manipulation.
Finally, if we label this phenomenon as violent extremism, we need to be careful not to treat it as something distinctly new and exceptional, just because it is different from what we have learned to expect from violent extremism. The Com and the groups under it did not appear out of blue. Instead, they build on numerous older online subcultures as well as make use of common modes of interaction among children and young people, existing social hierarchies, and a fascination with the forbidden or dangerous.
If not nihilistic violent extremism, what could this phenomenon be called? Our team and some other researchers have adopted the term violence-focused online communities, as this summarises the key traits of the phenomenon: centrality of violence in its narratives and action, the online ecosystem at its core and its decentralised nature.
Read more about the topic: Leena Malkki, Henrik Ali-Hokka & Saija Benjamin: Violence-focused online communities. RADIA Brief 1/2025.
REFERENCES
Marc-André Argentino, Chasing Clout: How Com Networks Turn Violence into Social Currency, 2024a.
Marc-André Argentino, When ‘Community’ Means Cruelty: An Introduction to the Criminal Networks and Behaviors of The Community, Comm, Com, and 764, 2024b.
Marc-André Argentino, Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE): An Analytical Framework, 2025a.
Marc-André Argentino, The Pillars of the Com Network, 2025b.
Marc-André Argentino & Angus Lindsay, “Remotely Coerced Violence: 764, The Com Network, and the Hybridization of Threats”, CTC Sentinel, June 2026a.
Marc-André Argentino & Angus Lindsay, Schrödinger’s Terrorism: Is it or Is It Not in the Box?, 2026b.
Graphika, Jumping Off Platform, 2025.
ISD (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Terror without ideology? The rise of nihilistic violence, 2025.
Jan Ondrak & Laura Vitelli, Participatory Memetic Violence: Legend, Ostension, and Ideologically Diffused Violence, 2025.