Category: Blog

Certain topics naturally bring together not only academics but also policymakers and professionals who work on them. Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and, by extension also terrorism, is one example, where research intersects with real-world challenges faced by law enforcement, civil society actors, and policymakers. These professionals, who often enough work in their own filter bubbles, have much to gain from networking. Yet, opportunities for cross-sectoral mutual learning and networking often remain limited due to structural as well as professional hurdles. This blog post describes the opportunities, but also the challenges, of these rare occasions of coming together. 

The most common format for meetings are thematic conferences, which are open to researchers as well as representatives from politics and practice. One example of this is the recently held 6th annual conference of Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) in April 2025, titled “Rank and Files or Memes and Likes? Terrorist Organisations, Groups, Networks.” As the title suggests, the conference centred on violent extremists’ and terrorists’ activities in the online sphere – a particularly complex and evolving challenge for policymakers and law enforcement agencies but also a topic that has caught increased scholarly attention. This is a commonality of such networking conferences: They tend to focus on those topics that are felt as the most pressing and emerging challenges in countering violent extremism and terrorism. Networking events, therefore, serve as a marketplace for informational demand and supply, ensuring that discussions remain relevant and forward-looking. In this marketplace, policymakers and practitioners seek insights on current and future threats and face challenges on dealing with them. Many so-called national action plans, strategic policy documents on preventing and countering violent extremism, emphasise the need for evidence-based decision-making. Even when policymakers do not immediately recognise the relevance of academic research, exposure to new insights can have indirect but significant effects on policy formulation. Likewise, practitioners, whether from law enforcement or civil society, can share their experiences and provide feedback on how existing P/CVE policies or research resonates with their work. Lastly, for researchers, such a conference offers the opportunity to influence policy and practice with their research findings, either by offering new insights or by providing critical perspectives.

Two examples from the ECTC conference can be highlighted since the programme of the conference was published and both projects are publicly described. One example for research influencing policy and practice is the VEOMAP research project funded by the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange and realised at the ITSTIME research centre in Milan, which drew on open-source intelligence and used social network analysis to explore the pro-Islamic State (IS) information ecosystem and its evolution on the surface web (July 2023-March 2024) (see Lakomy 2024). By showing the structure, among others the quite centralised nature of this ecosystem, such research may resonate with similar findings from law enforcement agencies, go beyond them or inspire practice methodologically. A different example, showing the possibility of sharing experiences with P/CVE policy, albeit without going too much into the detail of this process, is the proscription of the Terrorgram collective as terrorist organisation on 26 April 2024 in the United Kingdom (see Home Office 2024). Sharing the steps and implications of this progress as well as perspectives on its effectiveness allowed policymakers and law enforcement agents from other countries to contemplate whether similar efforts could be realised in their respective national contexts.

While the picture painted here sounds promising, it is not without its problems in reality. Two interlinked problems will be discussed here. Firstly, professional differences between the actors often stand in the way of learning from one another and fruitful dialogue. Policymakers and law enforcement agents are often said to ‘think’ differently from prevention actors, as the former focus strongly on eliminating security risks and the latter have a broader understanding of prevention that also looks at the strengths of individuals and society against violent extremism. It seems counterintuitive at first, but to bridge these differences, which is necessary to enable a fruitful exchange and learning from each other, a lot of dialogue and trust is needed. One conference alone will not be able to create this. Instead, regular formats are needed that enable interpersonal relationships and a ‘meeting again’, an important basis for building trust. Only in such a setting is it conceivable that P/CVE practitioners in particular, some of whom have a special relationship with P/CVE policymakers due dependency relationships caused by public funding programmes, will be encouraged to share their experiences and criticism. Only when trust has been established do researchers get the impression that they are met with honest interest and open ears. However, structural bottlenecks in the P/CVE field, especially a lack of more stable funding, mean that exchange formats tend to appear sporadically rather than being permanent. Without naming examples here, there are some of these kinds of exchange formats that started promisingly and then fizzled out due to domestic political changes in the country that funded the event or due to the expiry of the one-off funding period. Others have been good spaces for exchange for years, where both new and the same people have been able to meet again and again, and which are now at risk of dissolution due to an administrative change, and it remains unclear to what extent previous formats will be continued. Those who want to secure the benefits of these exchange formats would do well to ensure that they are not a one-off event or that their future is uncertain, but that they take place regularly and thus allow some trust-building in the P/CVE and counterterrorism field. 

Extremism prevention work that focuses on universal or the overlap of universal and selective pedagogical prevention often relies on the development and implementation of workshop formats (Ceylan & Kiefer, 2022; Slama & Kemmesies, 2020). These workshops address diverse participants in a group setting, ranging from students in schools to multipliers like teachers in training, social workers, and police or prison officers. During implementation, various forms of resonance are generated (Koynova et al., 2022). Such feedback can serve as a tool for the iterative formative assessment of the implementation process, helping facilitators adjust and improve workshops dynamically (Golding & Adam, 2016; Husain & Khan, 2016). Unlike evaluation, this monitoring offers a descriptive overview of the current state of implementation (Junk, 2021; Koynova et al., 2022).

During my secondment at the Violence Prevention Network (VPN), I worked on a project aimed at refining feedback tools to better fit the demands of prevention practice and enhance their potential for monitoring processes. To achieve this, we collaborated closely with practitioners, incorporating their perspectives and experiences while following a procedure inspired by design thinking (Meinel et al., 2011). This iterative, practice-oriented approach enabled us to systematically analyze the needs of practitioners, identify challenges in feedback collection, and refine tools through testing and incremental adjustments. In line with previous reports, core concerns included limited time, personnel, and financial resources (Koynova et al., 2022). Thus, when designing the feedback tools, time efficiency, integrability into the course of the workshop, and quick and simple documentation were mainly considered (s. also Junk, 2021). In this light, this blog post summarizes the background and development of the project, exploring how feedback can best be used for monitoring in universal and selective prevention contexts.

Across disciplines, feedback is generally understood as information about how something is perceived (e.g., Jacobs et al., 2010; Jug et al., 2019; Voyer et al., 2016). In the context of extremism prevention, the possibilities and use of feedback can vary between individual counseling, typically employed in selective or indicated prevention, and group settings, which are more common in universal or selective prevention (Flückiger, 2021; Slama & Kemmesies, 2020). While the sender and receiver of feedback can also vary, the focus here lies on feedback provided by participants during workshops and how it can inform processes of adapting and developing the programs accordingly. Asking for participant feedback aligns well with the goals of prevention, fostering democratic practices and valuing participants’ opinions. In some settings, such as prisons or schools with strict regulations, it may be unusual for participants to be asked about their impressions (Witt, 2006). Feedback in workshops is predominantly understood as an assessment of the quality of the training and participants’ satisfaction. However, additional aspects can be considered when gathering participant feedback, such as changes in experiences, attitudes, and needs (Jacobs et al., 2010; Sufi Amin et al., 2020).

To enhance practical applications, universal/selective prevention workshops taking place in different contexts were observed in a first step. Many workshops already incorporated elements of participant resonance, such as introductory or final rounds that encourage participants to share associations, wishes, or experiences. Feedback elements can directly impact the composition of the current or a subsequent workshop and allow for follow-up reflections. This indicates that depending on when and how feedback is collected, different conclusions can be drawn. Consequently, observations led to a systematization of the different aspects, considering the course of a workshop (see Table 1). While a final feedback round captures retrospective assessments, it may overlook new needs that emerged during the workshop. In contrast, pre-post feedback distinguishes between participants’ initial expectations and their concluding insights.

Table 1. Overview of possibilities of feedback methods over the course of a workshop

In the next phase, the existing feedback instruments were refined and complemented to facilitate the monitoring of workshops. While feedback is already a common element of workshop formats, small adjustments can help implement, structure, and document feedback sequences more systematically. Feedback tools were structured by implementation timing (beginning, middle, or end of the workshop) and the type of response they generate. In this regard, they were tailored to align with the goals of the workshop formulated beforehand. Additionally, the feedback formats were designed to integrate smoothly into the overall workshop structure to minimize time constraints often expressed by practitioners while also enabling and encouraging different participants to express feedback.

As open-ended feedback questions are common practice in oral introductions and final rounds, this approach was maintained to capture both intended and unintended effects of the workshop, which are essential for monitoring efforts (Koynova et al., 2022). Open-ended questions also encourage references to specific experiences and examples, avoiding overly general statements such as “everything was great.” This approach provides insights into overall satisfaction, as well as the development of needs and experiences, including: What did participants want to remember from the workshop? Which questions were relevant at the beginning? Which new questions arose during the workshop? What topics concern the group? How did attitudes shift over time?

Workshops with trainers who tested preliminary feedback tools revealed the need for two different approaches. Although the scope is similar, younger participants require pedagogically engaging methods, whereas adult participants can be asked more directly through open-ended questionnaire formats. Given the different insights that can be gained from feedback, these different formats were incorporated into a modular framework that enables flexible combinations of feedback methods depending on available time and workshop dynamics. For each method, options for online or offline implementation were designed, allowing for anonymous responses. While online tools simplify data collection, analog formats need to be photographed and compiled at the end. Additionally, participant preferences and potential barriers to either format need to be considered. A structured documentation archive that traces feedback back to specific workshops, target groups, and settings is crucial for clustering responses and making necessary adjustments.

In conclusion, a well-structured feedback system can enable practitioners to identify recurring needs, refine content, and track the demands of specific target groups. Instead of using feedback solely for isolated session assessments, a systematic approach allows for long-term insights into learning experiences and trends across multiple workshops. This ensures that prevention programs remain dynamic and responsive to participant needs.

Bibliography:

Ceylan, R., & Kiefer, M. (2022). Chancen und Risiken der Radikalisierungsprävention. In R. Ceylan & M. Kiefer (Eds.), Der islamische Fundamentalismus im 21. Jahrhundert (pp. 289–301). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37486-0_14

Flückiger, C. (2021). Basale Wirkmodelle in der Psychotherapie: Wer und was macht Psychotherapie wirksam? Psychotherapeut, 66(1), 73–82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00278-020-00478-y

Golding, C., & Adam, L. (2016). Evaluate to improve: Useful approaches to student evaluation. Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education, 41(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/02602938.2014.976810

Husain, M., & Khan, S. (2016). Students’ feedback: An effective tool in teachers’ evaluation system. International Journal of Applied and Basic Medical Research, 6(3), 178. https://doi.org/10.4103/2229-516X.186969

Jacobs, A., Barnett, C., & Ponsford, R. (2010). Three Approaches to Monitoring: Feedback Systems, Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation and Logical Frameworks. IDS Bulletin, 41(6), 36–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2010.00180.x

Jug, R., Jiang, X. “Sara,” & Bean, S. M. (2019). Giving and Receiving Effective Feedback: A Review Article and How-To Guide. Archives of Pathology & Laboratory Medicine, 143(2), 244–250. https://doi.org/10.5858/arpa.2018-0058-RA

Junk, J. (2021). Quality management of P/CVE interventions in secondary and tertiary prevention: Overview and first steps in implementing monitoring and reporting.

Koynova, S., Mönig, A., Quent, M., & Ohlenforst, V. (2022). Monitoring, Evaluation und Lernen: Erfahrungen und Bedarfe der Fachpraxis in der Prävention von Rechtsextremismus und Islamismus. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. https://doi.org/10.48809/PRIFREP2207

Meinel, C., Leifer, L., & Plattner, H. (Eds.). (2011). Design Thinking. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13757-0

Slama, B. B., & Kemmesies, U. (Eds.). (2020). Handbuch EXTREMISMUSPRÄVENTION.

Sufi Amin, Prof. Dr. Samina Malik, & Prof. Dr. N. B. Jumani. (2020). Exploring Socialization Process, Peacebuilding and Value Conflict of Distance Education Students at International Islamic University Islamabad. Sjesr, 3(3), 198–203. https://doi.org/10.36902/sjesr-vol3-iss3-2020(198-203)

Voyer, S., Cuncic, C., Butler, D. L., MacNeil, K., Watling, C., & Hatala, R. (2016). Investigating conditions for meaningful feedback in the context of an evidence-based feedback programme. Medical Education, 50(9), 943–954. https://doi.org/10.1111/medu.13067

Witt, K. (2006). Feedback-Kultur als Strategie demokratischer Veränderung. Fontane-Gymnasium Rangsdorf, Brandenburg (pp. 37, [22] pages). BLK : Berlin. https://doi.org/10.25656/01:197

The Overton Window is a concept that describes the range of ideas and policies that are politically acceptable to the mainstream at any given time. Originally developed by Joseph Overton^[1], the theory suggests that public opinion is not fixed but shifts over time, influenced by social movements, political leaders, and cultural trends. While some ideas are seen as radical or unthinkable today, they may become widely accepted in the future through a gradual process of normalization.

In other words, you can imagine a spectrum of ideas on a particular topic, ranging from unthinkable (too extreme for society) to policy (accepted and implemented by governments). The Overton Window represents the portion of this spectrum that is currently deemed acceptable by the public and policymakers. When activists, media figures, or politicians introduce ideas outside of this window, they may at first seem shocking or unacceptable. However, through repetition, framing, and gradual shifts in public sentiment, these ideas can move into the Overton Window, making them more acceptable and eventually mainstream.

We can find a lot of cases where the shifts in the Overton Window ended in positive changes in society. For example, a few decades ago, same-sex marriage was widely seen as unacceptable in many countries. However, advocacy efforts, legal battles, and media representation shifted public attitudes. Today, same-sex marriage is legal in many parts of the world, showing how an idea once considered extreme can become mainstream. Similarly, marijuana was criminalized for much of the 20th century, and discussions about legalization were largely outside the Overton Window. However, changing attitudes, medical research, and economic incentives have shifted the perception. 

Terrorism, Radicalization, and the Overton Window

Now looking more precisely at terrorism and radicalization, the Overton Window is often discussed in the context of political and social movements but it also plays a role in the spread of extremist ideologies. Radicalization occurs when individuals are gradually exposed to extreme beliefs that were once outside their frame of reference but become normalized over time.

At an individual level, in the late 20th century, violent jihadist ideologies were considered fringe beliefs, even within extremist circles. However, through propaganda, online forums, and radical preachers, these ideas moved closer to the Overton Window for certain audiences. Groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS leveraged media and social networks to normalize their extreme views, making them appear more acceptable to vulnerable individuals.

Similarly, and at a more societal level, the rise of far-right extremism follows a similar pattern. White nationalist ideas, once confined to the margins of society, have gradually entered public discourse. Online communities, political rhetoric, and media platforms have contributed to shifting the Overton Window, making once-taboo discussions about racial superiority or ethnonationalism more commonplace. This normalization can create an environment where hate crimes and acts of domestic terrorism become more likely.

In this way, it is possible to question what is currently happening in the United States (as in other countries), where attacks on gender-rights, democracy or even the economic system are becoming mainstream and accepted by large fringes of society. As an example, one could refer to Elon Musk´s Nazi sign on public television. Both the fact that he did it and that it was highly debated in various spheres of the population interrogates on changes in our vision of both historical and current events. 

This also questions the direct impact individuals can have in shifting the Overton Window one way or the other. And in fact, political strategists, activists, and even extremist groups use deliberate tactics to move it´s margins. Some of these techniques are media influence, by controlling narratives through news outlets and social media, as well as repetition, with the slow normalization of extreme ideas through frequent discussions, or even by framing radical ideas in a way that makes them seem logical or appealing.

To conclude, the Overton Window helps explain how societies change over time—whether for progression or regression. While it has led to positive changes such as civil rights advancements, it also plays a role in the normalization of dangerous ideologies. Understanding this concept is crucial in recognizing how ideas gain traction and shape the future of public discourse.

---

^[1] Joseph Overton himself never published on the concept which was popularized after his death, in particular by his colleague, Lehman, Joseph G. (2006). The Overton Window of Political Possibility. Mackinac Center for Public Policy.

Within the VORTEX Doctoral Network, we explore three key dimensions of radicalisation: (1) Pathways of Radicalisation, (2) the Social and Political Contexts of Radicalisation, and (3) Countering Radicalisation. Some time ago, those of us working on the Social and Political Contexts of Radicalisation decided to organise a panel to share our research with fellow scholars, practitioners, and the broader civil society. Last week, Heidi Campana Piva, Violette Mens, and I brought that idea to life at the 5th Helsinki Conference on Emotions, Populism, and Polarised Politics (HEPP5), hosted by the University of Helsinki.

Our panel, Radicalisation as a Challenge to the Liberal Democratic Social Contract, examined how radicalisation fractures liberal democracy across societal, epistemic, and political domains—through conspiracy-fuelled extremism, the research-policy divide, and the mainstream right’s illiberal drift.

Heidi presented her research on the anti-establishment sentiments embedded in conspiracy theories and their role in radicalisation. She argued that conspiracy theories do more than reflect societal tensions—they actively accelerate radicalisation. By demonising enemies, silencing dissent, and framing violence as a necessary wake-up call, they don’t merely spread counter-knowledge; they weaponise it. Her research offers crucial insights into how rising social pressures may erode liberal democracies.

Violette, in turn, took a more applied approach, analysing France’s epistemic community on radicalisation research. As radicalisation studies expand, a stark divide persists between academic insights and political action, often fuelling populist and polarising responses. Her work explores how France’s dual-role researchers—those who straddle academia and policymaking—shape radicalisation discourse, revealing how knowledge translation impacts both the social contract and its fractures.

Finally, I tackled the political dimension by examining the illiberal turn in European (and global) politics—a shift that could reshape liberal democracies for years to come. My central question: Is the mainstream right radicalising? While European mainstream right parties have long radicalised on immigration, is this trend expanding into other policy domains? As far-right parties broaden their battlegrounds, I conceptualise how policymaking functions in liberal versus illiberal democracies and explore whether mainstream right-wing parties are adopting illiberal policymaking strategies. I also outline key areas for future research.

Radicalisation is not just a phenomenon confined to fringe movements or extremist networks—it is reshaping the very foundations of democratic governance. Understanding these dynamics is more urgent than ever. Our panel was just one step in this broader conversation, and the work continues.

Please have a look on my presentation here:

During the Helsinki Conference on Emotions, Populism and Polarised Politics (March 05, 2025), Heidi remotely presented her work entitled “The Anti-Establishment Feelings of Conspiracy Theories in the Process of Radicalization”. Check out the video of her presentation below!

From the 5th to the 7th of March, I had the opportunity to attend HEPP5 in Helsinki. On the first day, I presented in a panel created with my two other Vortex colleagues Heidi Piva and Javid Ibad. Luckily, the conference was recorded so anyone interested can take a look at our work.

The panel examines how radicalization disrupts the liberal democratic social contract by focusing on its political, discursive, and epistemic dimensions. The papers address various aspects of radicalization: the shift of center-right parties towards illiberal policies; the use of conspiracy theories as tools of radicalization, particularly in deepening polarization and justifying extremist actions; and a critique of the gap between academic research and policy on radicalization, which reveals how knowledge production shapes discourses and responses. Together, these contributions shed light on how radicalization, populism, and polarization challenge the liberal democratic consensus in contemporary Europe.

On my side, I explain how academic research on radicalization expands and a significant disconnect persists between scholarly findings and political action, sometimes leading to populistic or polarising positions. My work highlights the formation of diverse epistemic communities, of researchers as policy makers, in the case of France, contributing to the understanding of radicalization. Through bibliographic discussions, interviewees reflect on their roles regarding the dealing of the past attacks and more generally on how they have shaped the discourse surrounding radicalization. This reflection, based on a relational approach, uncovers how knowledge and its translation influence both the social contract and its polarisation. By bridging the gap between these two entities, this research aims to foster more informed and effective policy responses to the challenges posed by radicalization, ultimately contributing to a more nuanced and effective approach to this pressing issue.

Editor note: This article was originally published the Italian Institute for International Studies. 

The Islamist organization in power today in Damascus, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, is grappling with the management of power and the unification of a country divided and torn apart by years of civil war. After having led a lightning advance against the Assad regime, starting from the governorate of Idlib where it had been confined for the last ten years or so and heading for the capital at the beginning of December 2024, it has completely changed its narrative from jihadism to ruling Islamism. A gradual and fundamentally pragmatic change that has the objective of maintaining power. The challenge of HTS is now to include all the components in the new Syria without distinctions between men and women, language and religion. A challenge that the leadership of the organization seems to have pragmatically accepted, but which still needs to be completely accepted by the base of the movement.

Jabhat al-Nusra’s Islamist narrative: lurching between ISIS and al-Qaeda

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, has undergone significant ideological, organizational, and alliance transformations since its foundation in 2012. This evolution occurred gradually, even during its affiliations with the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Qaeda, where its narrative remained distinct. Initially, when it was part of the Islamic State in Iraq (2012-April 2013), its approach was markedly less extreme than ISIS’s. Al-Nusra aimed to mobilize regional fighters to challenge Bashar al-Assad’s regime rather than to govern. Nevertheless, the group attracted thousands of foreign fighters into its ranks, especially in its early stage.  The group focused on supporting fellow Muslims in Syria, without displaying ambitions to rule. During this period, it also sought to forge connections and alliances with local factions and civilians, positioning itself primarily as a movement dedicated to fighting the Syrian regime and its allies.

In April 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra severed ties with the Islamic State in Iraq and aligned itself with al-Qaeda Central, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Contrary to expectations that the group would adopt a less extreme stance given al-Qaeda’s relatively moderated approach compared to the Islamic State in Iraq, Jabhat al-Nusra entered a more radical phase. This shift was largely due to defections by hundreds of foreign fighters who perceived the group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani (later known as Ahmed Al Sharaa, the self-appointed Syrian President), as too lenient. These fighters believed that the Islamic State in Iraq was more aligned with their views, leading to their departure.

To counteract this perception and retain his fighters, al-Jawlani sought to reaffirm Jabhat al-Nusra’s commitment to the Salafi jihadi cause, demonstrating that the group remained resolute and formidable. This period of competitive radicalization is exemplified by a 2015 incident where Shadi al-Waysu, then a judge and now the Minister of Justice under HTS, was filmed supervising public executions of women, underscoring the group’s hardened stance. Despite these actions, the group was internally conflicted about its direction. While it aimed to project strength and adherence to the Salafi jihadi cause to its members and enemies, it also sought to integrate and show solidarity with the local communities it was part of. Thus, during this period, Jabhat al-Nusra grappled with conflicting narratives about its identity and goals.

By 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra realized the high cost of its association with al-Qaeda and consequently severed ties. The group’s public discourse shifted from al-Qaeda’s global agenda to a more localized focus. They began to eliminate phrases with global connotations like “Jihad against the West” or “Jihad against secular states,” replacing them with terms emphasizing their focus on Syria, albeit with an Islamist orientation. This change was symbolically marked by their adoption of the Syrian revolutionary flag, modified only by adding the shahada, the Islamic declaration of faith. The initial signs of change emerged in 2016 when al-Jawlani publicly revealed his face for the first time. Until then, his identity had been concealed, known only by his voice. In this pivotal moment, he announced the severance of ties with al-Qaeda and declared that the group would no longer align with external organizations. This marked the beginning of a shift towards pragmatic moderation. By 2017, the leadership made concerted efforts to blend the Islamist elements of the group with a stronger nationalist focus, emphasizing their commitment solely to Syria.

HTS in power, and jihadism?

When Jabhat al-Nusra broke ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in 2016, it faced internal resistance from pro-al-Qaeda members within the group. Most of these members defected and formed Hurras al-Din, which remained affiliated with al-Qaeda in Syria. Although Hurras al-Din announced its dissolution last month, it had effectively ceased to exist in 2020 after HTS cracked down on it and shut down its military bases. Driven by a desire to survive and dominate northwest Syria, al-Jolani sought to merge with other local factions to integrate his group within the local Islamist opposition. This effort resulted in the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017, a merger that included Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, Army of the Sunna, Ansar al-Din, and Nur al-Din al-Zenki Movement. Some of these factions later defected from HTS, prompting the group to either dismantle or weaken them.

By 2017, HTS began promoting the concept of al-Kayan al-Sunni, or the Sunni entity, encapsulating the group’s narrative as the protector of Sunnis in Syria against the Alawite regime and its allies. This narrative remained largely unchanged until December 2024, when HTS advanced towards Damascus. During this operation, a radical shift occurred in their discourse, moving away from the notion of a Sunni entity to embrace a more inclusive slogan, “Syria for all Syrians.” This marked a significant change in their Islamist narrative as they approached the capital.

Currently the HTS’s state narrative talks about protecting all Syrians, regardless of their gender (here we mean men and women) or sect, which reflects its leadership’s high sense of pragmatic adaptability.  The leadership’s goal is to stabilize and solidify its power to ensure continued governance. Al-Sharaa is prepared to do whatever is necessary to achieve this, including engaging with minorities and forming a nominally inclusive government. This transition from a radical past to a more moderate position has not been smooth or complete. The leadership has responded to dissent within its ranks—those adhering to extreme and violent radicalism—by expelling, imprisoning, or executing them. 

The transformation within HTS was implemented through a top-down approach, with the leadership mandating a new direction and gradually enforcing it among its followers. The group has acknowledged its previous extremist behavior, positioning these actions as part of a past phase in its trajectory and implying a move away from such practices. For instance, when a 2015 video featuring the current Minister of Justice resurfaced and went viral recently, HTS confirmed its authenticity but emphasized that the actions were part of their history, without explicitly condemning them. Significantly, the minister involved was not removed from his position.

The challenge within HTS primarily lies in the relationship between its leadership and the organization’s base—its fighters and rank-and-file members—who have experienced the shift from the global jihadism of ISIS and AQ into to a governance-oriented Islamism. Until November 27, 2024, HTS publicly positioned itself as a defender of Sunni Islam, focusing on protecting the Sunni entity in Idlib. However, as they expanded their control into regions of Syria previously held by Assad, the leadership began advocating on behalf of all Syrians, shifting to a more inclusive rhetoric.This abrupt change in narrative presents a significant adjustment for the rank-and-file, who have been indoctrinated for years with the ideology of protecting Sunni identity. This transition may be challenging for fighters used to a narrower, sectarian viewpoint. Moreover, many HTS fighters, having never left the conservative environment of Idlib, are now encountering less conservative communities in Damascus. These new interactions could potentially foster deeper social changes within Syrian society, as human relationships evolve and influence perspectives and behaviours.

After a government collapse in 2024, Germany faced another federal election on February 23, 2025. In the 2021 federal elections, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a party that is now even listed by German federal security authorities as a case of a suspected right-wing extremist organisation, entered the German Bundestag for the first time while more than doubling its result in the previous election with 12.6%. In this year’s federal election, the AfD received 20.8% of all votes, making it the second strongest party behind the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In the federal states of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia, the respective state Office for the Protection of the Constitution has categorised the state associations of the AfD as ‘definitely right-wing extremist’. However, all three are also examples of federal states in which the AfD enjoys particular support. In the federal elections, the party received 37.3%, 32.5% and 38.6% respectively. 

However, instead of clearly distancing themselves from the party in their campaigns, some democratic parties, those that had long perceived themselves as representatives of a ‘centre of society’, increasingly tapped into narratives that the AfD is strongly capitalising on, especially during the run-up to the elections. The reaction to deadly attacks in recent months with a debate on migration and asylum is just one example of this. Moreover, the so-called ‘firewall’ against the far-right, an agreement that democratic parties would not cooperate with far-right parties, started to crumble just before the federal elections. In early February, the candidate for chancellor of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) tabled a motion in the Bundestag aimed at limiting irregular immigration to Germany, which found a majority with the votes of the AfD parliamentary group. It is a novelty in German post-war history that the votes of an extreme right-wing party have helped such a motion to gain a majority. This step has benefited one party in particular: It showed the AfD that it can influence conventional politics and is accepted by other parties – albeit indirectly – as a majority procurer. Lastly, another current example is a formal question from the CDU/CSU parliamentary group to the federal government on the political neutrality of state-funded organisations, which was submitted two days before the federal election. Numerous organisations, whose ‘political neutrality’ the CDU/CSU would like to have examined, had organised demonstrations against right-wing extremism and in response to the fall of the ‘firewall’ before the election. At present, there is a wave of criticism that this represents an attempt to intimidate civil society protest against right-wing extremism and for democratic values. The CDU/CSU’s questions also relate to organisations that receive funding as part of Germany’s largest funding programme for democracy and against violent extremism, namely ‘Live Democracy!’. This is a sinister sign, as it shows that civil society engagement against the far and extreme right is becoming politically unpopular or that attitudes that were originally reserved for the AfD are being ‘normalised’. This blog post takes this as an opportunity to present three doomsday scenarios of what the future of measures to prevent and counter violent extremism (PCVE) could look like if the AfD continues to gain power.

One possible scenario is the participation of the AfD in government, potentially as a junior partner in a coalition. This could, for example, influence federal budget decisions and federal education policy, which could in turn lead to a restructuring of the federal ‘Live Democracy!’ programme. Historically, the roots of today’s diverse German PCVE landscape, the bulk of which is implemented by civil society, lie in federal programmes for the prevention of right-wing extremism and racism. It is thanks to this history, as well as the country’s general dark history, that despite an increased focus on PCVE measures against religiously motivated extremism after 9/11, many measures are still explicitly aimed at preventing right-wing extremism. However, if the AfD were in government, it may influence the allocation of public funds to PCVE projects, with a shift towards those addressing left-wing and religiously-motivated extremism, arguing that these are the ‘real’ threats to our present society. Notably, as these terms are already inherently normative, they could also be given a new interpretation causing, for example, actors who currently promote democratic values to be labelled as ‘left-wing extremists’. Consequently, PCVE projects against right-wing extremism would decrease in number, and the respective projects would come under increasing pressure to seek funding elsewhere or reorient themselves. Any PCVE project that seeks to receive public funding in the future under such a government will need to swim with the current. However, it is not only the increasing lack of measures to prevent right-wing extremism that represent a collapse of an important pillar of a resilient democracy. PCVE measures to prevent religiously motivated extremism, which only ‘dance to the tune’ of a right-wing extremist party’s demands, will presumably be designed in such a way that they are highly stigmatising and thus not what we today understand as ‘effective’. 

In a second scenario, the AfD could one day even become part of the federal government. In this case, it might even have the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of the Interior under its control. If that were to happen, it would even be possible for ‘Live Democracy!’ to be abolished altogether or replaced by a new ideologically driven programme. A ‘blacklist’ for civil society organisations that take a clear stance against right-wing extremism could be part of this doomsday scenario and be excluded from funding. As a result, some civil society organisations would not even have the opportunity to reorient themselves, they would have to close or rely on donations only. Lastly, a final and the darkest scenario is an AfD-led government in which the AfD holds key ministries such as the Ministry of the Interior, Justice or Education. Not only would the work of civil society organisations against right-wing extremism no longer be supported, it could also be defamed and criminalised as agitations against the state and endangering national security. Repressive measures against such ‘criminal actors’ represent the pinnacle of this scenario. Where security authorities no longer work against right-wing structures, but with them, there is no longer any room at all for what we understand as PCVE today. There could be measures under this banner, yet these would themselves be right-wing extremist in nature and based on a concept of extremism that is directed against enemies of a right-wing extremist government. Although even today it is not entirely undisputed what the kind of ‘extremism’ PCVE measures are directed against, such an understanding of PCVE would only be an instrument legitimising violence and discrimination, a perversion of its original function. 

What can be done to prevent these doomsday scenarios? On the one hand, active efforts must be made to ensure that the AfD’s rise to political power does not materialise. This requires decisive action from democratic parties, which must reinforce the ‘firewall’ against extremist influence. Ironically, it also calls for strengthening the very PCVE measures that combat radicalisation. If these measures were funded by the democratic parties currently in power, with the longest possible legally secured funding periods, their preventative impact could be significantly enhanced. On the other hand, democratic parties must also fortify or change the institutional frameworks in which PCVE measures operate, ensuring they remain resilient against potential political interference. One critical step would be to guarantee financial stability for civil society organisations, rather than leaving them reliant on annually approved funding. A democracy promotion law, which could have provided such security, was blocked in 2021 by the CDU and again in 2023 by federal states led by the CDU and the CSU. Their objections centred on concerns about potential support for so-called ‘left-wing’ extremist organisations and ambiguities in the definition of extremism – similar arguments to those we are seeing again today. Another step could therefore be to provide better financial support to the federal states and local authorities so that they can embed tried-and-tested and ‘effective’ PCVE measures in regular structures. This would also take some of the political attention away from the PCVE landscape. Moreover, it would also be a sensible structural development of Germany’s highly experimental PCVE landscape with its numerous ‘model projects’, as those that have proven successful could enjoy a longer-term future.

Editor note: This article was originally published on The Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Beirut Office.

The Syrian opposition’s military operation that led to the remarkable collapse of the Assad regime on December 8 drew attention to Hayet Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that led the offensive and has since assumed power. Understandably, much of this attention has been focused on the group’s radical past and previous links to the Islamic State IS and al-Qaeda and how they might affect its leadership’s future direction in ruling the country. While legitimate and important, these concerns stir the focus away from the pressing question of how HTS has survived more than a decade of intractable conflict, during which the country has witnessed the emergence, demise, and reconfiguration of many other groups. Answering this question could provide a broader understanding of the group’s constantly evolving worldview and may offer a glimpse into the future direction of its leadership.

A close look at HTS’s trajectory reveals a strong sense of pragmatism and adaptability, fueled by its leadership’s drive for survival and hunger for power. These defining traits have allowed the group to overcome multiple challenges, ensured its survival, aneventually assumed power over Syria today  – a position it appears to maintain to this day.

Leaving ISIS

For starters, HTS, initially known as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), was established in 2011 as the clandestine Syrian branch of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. JN’s growing popularity, stemming largely from its disciplined fighters and effective collaboration with local Islamist factions against the Syrian regime, along with the ambition for independence of its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani (better known as Ahmad al-Sharaa), prompted Baghdadi to bring this increasingly self-confident Syrian wing back under his direct leadership. In April 2013, Baghdadi unilaterally dissolved both JN and ISI to merge them into a new group called the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Al-Jolani refused and instead pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, which was theoretically the parent organization of both groups. This move prompted thousands of foreign fighters to defect to ISIS. It sparked a power struggle that eventually led to open conflict between the al-Jolnai’s group and ISIS that has lasted until today.

Shifting allegiance to al-Qaeda revealed an early sign of its leadership pragmatism. When asked about his decision to join al-Qaeda after leaving ISIS, al-Jolani told Martin Smith in 2021 that he needed the “symbolism” of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. As one of the most respected figures in the jihadi-Salafist movement, al-Zawahiri would give JN the legitimacy needed to mitigate the fallout of breaking away from ISIS. Indeed, there was little to suggest that ideological considerations prompted this move, which was arguably a clear attempt by al-Jolani to escape ISIS’s control while minimizing the damage of leaving it behind. 

Notwithstanding the differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda regarding the timing of establishing the caliphate and the nature and frequency of violence against opponents, JN still operated within the realm of jihadi-Salafism. Generally speaking, jihadi Salafis believe that violence is the only way to achieve socio-political change and that Shari’a law should serve as the sole source of legislation. Consequently, they view both democracy and the national state system as religiously illegitimat since these rely on man-made positivist laws. They also impose takfir—excommunication—on those they consider not to adhere to what they define as “true” Islam. For example, states are deemed infidel for not applying Shari’a law as their sole source of legislation.

Leaving Al-Qaeda 

Carrying the al-Qaeda  label came at a high price for JN. The US intensified its airstrikes, other local armed factions raised concerns about cooperating with the group, and ISIS launched military offensives to drive JN out of northeastern major cities such as Deir ez-Zor. All these factors pushed the pragmatic al-Jolani to adjust his strategy and reconsider his decision to represent AQ in Syria. In July 2016, he appeared in a video revealing his face to the public for the first time and announced that all operations under the JN banner were canceled in favor of forming Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). The international community, however, continued to classify it as a terrorist organization, and most local factions refused to merge with it, fearing international isolation and strained relations with supporting states. 

The logic behind divorcing al-Qaeda, merging with local factions, and embedding itself within the Syrian opposition was largely driven by the group’s leadership’s desire to remove itself from international terrorism lists. This strategy would ensure its survival and help avoid strikes from the US-led international coalition, which had inflicted significant damage on ISIS and, to a lesser degree, on JFS. After an intense round of negotiations, the group managed to secure a merger with three local factions—Liwaa al-Haqq, Jaysh al-Sunnah, and Ansar al-Din—culminating in the establishment of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017. 

HTS, the last rebranding

The establishment of HTS was a watershed moment for the group, marking the beginning of a gradual shift from jihad to politics. To facilitate this transition, it set up its semi-technocratic Salvation Government, which has received substantial criticism for its performance and lack of transparency due to HTS’s top-down approach to governance. Additionally, the group established its General Security apparatus, which has played a significant role in quashing dissent against the leadership and maintaining economic dominance in the region.

On the military front, the group sought to monopolize violence in its areas of operation and control. Between 2017 and 2022, HTS fought and defeated its former allies among local Islamist groups—such as Nour al-Din al-Zinki and Ahrar al-Sham—depriving them of the economic lifeline provided by the Idlib Bab al-Hawa crossing. It also put an end to Hurras al-Din, an al-Qaeda affiliate established by a top al-Qaeda loyalist who defected from HTS after its divorce from al-Qaeda, rejecting HTS’s ruthless pragmatism.

HTS leadership recognized that the nation-state system was the only viable framework for survival, necessitating cooperation with state actors. By 2017, HTS began establishing relations with Turkey—a state that was considered an infidel due to its secular nature. Additionally, HTS expelled senior members who still held old, extreme jihadi-Salafist views, especially those who rejected cooperation with Ankara. Ironically, HTS had previously fought local groups for accepting Turkish support and participating in Astana political talks about Syria, in which Ankara acted as guarantor. Additionally, HTS has shared intelligence with NATO through Turkey to target high-value targets of IS and al-Qaeda, signaling its readiness to become a partner with the international community war on terror. 

On the ideological level, HTS leadership has actively sought to dominate the religious sphere in Idlib and reshape the ideological orientations of its ranks. In March 2019, HTS established the Supreme Council of Fatwa—managed by al-Jolani’s advisers—to monopolize fatwa production (formal rulings or interpretations of Islamic law by qualified scholars). This central religious authority was designed to diminish the influence of global jihadi-Salafi ideologues and curb the sway of the remaining extremists within the group. Notwithstanding these efforts, hardline views within HTS’s rank and file still exist today, especially when it comes to applying democracy and dealing with other sects. 

HTS in power

For more than a year before the operation that toppled Assad, HTS-controlled areas in north west Syria witnessed public demonstrations calling for the removal of al-Sharaa, the release of detainees—many of whom had been tortured—and the establishment of an inclusive governance system. Paradoxically, HTS’s response was relatively restrained, with few casualties reported and only superficial reforms implemented. With HTS’s operation toppling Assad, al-Jolani transformed himself into a hero and put his adversaries in a delicate position where they must either comply with his rule or remain sidelined.

The international community finds itself in a dilemma on how to proceed. On one hand, toppling Assad was a desired outcome for most of its members, but having HTS, with its radical past, lead this effort complicates their calculus. Nevertheless, examining HTS’s trajectory reveals that the group is primarily driven by its leadership’s ambition for survival and hegemony. HTS has engaged in conflicts with various factions that possess different political and ideological backgrounds, suggesting that the group is not strongly committed to any specific ideological principles. In other words, it is largely politics that drive the group’s behaviors. 

Driven by political calculation, HTS leadership has genuinely changed over the last decade. While hardline elements still operate under the group’s banner, its leadership’s strive for rule that requires an inclusive, national direction is likely to prevail. HTS’s pragmatism is a double-edged sword; on the one hand, it means that al-Sharaa is willing to adopt new positions on issues such as women and minorities, but on the other, he might be ready to go to extreme lengths to stay in power.

---

^{1 The group has been known by different names corresponding to distinct periods—ISI (Islamic State of Iraq)
from October 2006 to April 2013, ISIS/ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) from April 2013 to June 2014,
and IS (Islamic State) from June 2014 to the present.}

^{2 Martin Smith, an American journalist and producer, made a documentary about HTS and its leader titled “The
Jihadist” in 2021.}

Projects run by civil society are believed to be particularly valuable in preventing and countering violent extremism and in fostering democracy more broadly. For example, they can reach target groups that harbour opposition to state actors and they often possess valuable knowledge about local needs allowing for tailored services. For these and many other reasons, some countries, such as Germany, rely heavily on civil society efforts for promoting democracy and diversity as well as preventing and countering violent extremism. However, for such a diverse civil society landscape to flourish, the predictability of its financial support needs to be strengthened. This blog post explains why financial dependence on public funding, while useful and without alternative, can sometimes be dangerous, and what should be done to prevent such scenarios.

Federal programmes to promote democracy and prevent and counter violent extremism have a fairly long tradition in Germany. Since the early 1990s, federal programmes have provided public funding for projects to promote democracy and, initially, to combat racism. The largest and currently probably best-known federal programme established in 2015 is the ‘Live Democracy!’ programme. In its second funding period, 182 million euros were distributed to various civil society actors to implement projects to promote democracy and prevent and counter violent extremism of all kinds. A third funding period was due to start in early 2025. But then Germany was plunged into a budget crisis triggered by a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court on the unconstitutional retroactive use of climate and transformation funds, which left a funding gap of 60 billion euros. The federal government was faced with the challenge of revising existing spending plans while at the same time complying with the constitutional requirements of the debt brake. The tense political situation led to heated debates within the governing coalition, with no agreement being reached on savings and priorities. As a result of the deadlock, a federal budget for 2025 was not adopted in time and the budget crisis even ultimately led to the collapse of the German federal government. Although a provisional agreement on the 2025 budget was reached in July 2024, the differences within the so-called ‘traffic light coalition’ remained and led to the dissolution of the coalition and the scheduling of new elections in February 2025.

For the civil society projects funded by ‘Live Democracy!’, this again translated into existential fears. With funding due to expire at the end of the year and no federal budget set for 2025, many projects for which federal funding was a financial cornerstone were threatened with closure. Although this was only a fear and not yet a fact, civil society projects faced many challenges: How, for example, to retain qualified staff in the face of these prospects? The scenario of a shrinking supply of civil society projects promoting democracy and preventing and countering violent extremism would have mainly played into the hands of those actors for whom these projects were already a thorn in their side. A specialist from the Federal Association for Mobile Counselling expressed great concern to researchers at ‘Netzpolitik.org’, stating that if the services were to disappear, ‘what the AfD has wanted for a long time would have been achieved through the back door’. In short, it suddenly became a tangible scenario that the German democracy would lose some of its ‘Wehrhaftigkeit’ [defensibility]. 

It was not until mid-November 2024 that the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs sent a circular to the funded projects stating that the projects selected for funding would receive at least a pro rata allocation of the funding requested for 2025 until the newly elected federal government had passed a budget for 2025. The Ministry also held out the prospect of an extension of the approval period and an increase in funding. This was made possible by provisional budget management. As a result, the federal government retained its ability to act and fulfil its legal obligations even without an adopted budget. This also made it possible to publish a new funding guideline on 24 November 2024, which came into force on 1 January 2025. Since summer 2024, civil society organisations have been able to apply for funding from 2025 and many projects have been selected to be considered for funding and can now submit funding applications. These must now be reviewed and approved so that the promised funds are available to the projects in a legally binding manner. Importantly, one of the new features is the extension of the funding phase to eight years to provide more planning certainty.

How should this situation in Germany be viewed? On the one hand, state support for a large and diverse civil society PCVE practice in Germany is absolutely necessary. After all, this wealth of projects could not be sustained by private funding alone, and private funding would be even more volatile than state funding. The fact that there are such large federal programmes for the prevention of extremism in Germany is a great advantage in international and European comparison. On the other hand, recent developments also show the need for regular funding structures that are less affected by such political crises. Extending the funding period to eight years is a step in the right direction. Another could be to fund organisations rather than individual projects, so that they can plan for the longer term and are not under pressure to innovate. Such longer planning periods could also provide an incentive to evaluate activities and thus make the whole practice more effective. Some time ago, a so-called ‘Democracy Promotion Act’ was proposed in Germany to provide a legal basis for federal funding to create long-term and transparent funding that is more sustainable and less dependent on government crises and changes. However, this law has not yet been passed due to political disputes over its content and the distribution of funds. It remains to be seen whether the new governing parties will be able to agree on such an important solution to strengthen Germany’s diverse PCVE landscape.